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MUSLIM PRESENCE IN FRANCE: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ASPECTS

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WEST EUROPE REPORT

MUSLIM PRESENCE IN FRANCE: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ASPECTS

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 1-238

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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON ATTITUDE OF IMMIGRANTS, FRENCH

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 1-5

[Article by Olivier Mongin]

[Text] How can we discuss immigration? Not in what way can we discuss it, in the sense of what tone to adopt in order to avoid the worst excesses of dramatization now verging on delirium, or to escape virtuous demagogy and the horrors of the complacency of which the fashionable left is not ever aware, but rather, of whom do we want to speak, who is involved? And why is this going so badly at the present time?

Is one truly speaking of immigration when it is held up as the favorite target of the extremist racism on which an accursed France has the sad monopoly, France which is the more accursed since it is the subject of scorn, having been shamefully sold out by the eternal princes of morality? The breadth, the complexity and the historic origins of racism cannot be focused on the immigrants alone without falsely representing them as the expiatory victims of all our modern fears, forgetting that they are first, first and foremost, immigrants, rather than candidates for the gallows and chauvinist persecution.

And furthermore, are we talking of immigrants when we plunge ourselves into excessive irritation with a French society which is ashamed of itself, to the point of forgetting that all of us, sons of peasants that we are, suffered the same insults and experienced, with our families, the humiliations of immigration, when the time came to leave the land of our ancestors? The actor Gerard Depardieu put it magnificently (in ACTUEL, No 63): "Thirty kilometers from our grandmothers with their magic, in our HLM [controlled rent housing] in a city with a population of 75,000, Chateauroux, we were totally rootless. No news, for they did not read, and they stay there now because they are afraid of all the news thrown at them by the television, and this fear is related to the ancestral fear of the wolf, but without the roots, the land, the stone."

But if we are all immigrants, can one be surprised at the general confusion produced by the fact that the "harkis" (the French Muslims), the natives of the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories], the political refugees, those who want to remain "foreigners" in France, those who demand citizenship,

as well as those who, already having it, are all regarded as immigrants, as "foreigners,"[2] indiscriminately?

Hard to discern, the nebulous entity called immigration is seen as a raw, naked labor force which is reflected abstractly in statistical curves and in series of figures, or else tragically felt, emotionally experienced as the sacrificial victim of the demons of crisis. Either way, the immigrant does not exist, being calculated and tabulated, or serving as the involuntary actor in a tragedy which tears him apart. He does not have his own history--he is asked to say nothing, to keep silent.[3] Such moreover, is the traditional behavior of the immigrant included in those famous turn-of-the-century waves, which have become true models in the space of a few years,[4] since immigration "became a problem." Before being admitted into the French community, the immigrant had to suffer in silence, to pay a very high price for his integration, in a veritable initiation ritual during which his "will" was put to the test of the republic, which subsequently gave him the right to enjoy the privileges of citizenship and nationality. An old revolutionary country, France likes to orchestrate these dissonant and brutal splits. Thus the immigrant was nothing, before overnight becoming someone. Pushed to its extreme, this logic is found again in the peevish arguments in which the intelligent choice comes down to a superb alternative: either you become French and you behave like all the Frenchmen, or you "shut up and go back where you came from," post haste. Either servile assimilation or immediate return to one's native land.[5]

Unfortunately this attitude is suicidal and grotesque, and this semblance of argumentation no longer is consistent with what is happening today. One can become as agitated as one wants, one can vituperate against the inertia of the leaders and rail against the absence of a consistent policy, but one must however admit that immigration can no longer be ignored historically, for two interrelated reasons. "The main element in the current change," Jean Leca tells us farther on, "does not seem to me to be the rejection by those who arrived first and by the French population, but rather the crisis in the French political community which is linked with the changes in the expectations of the immigrants." On the one hand, the integration capacity of French society has suffered some blows as a result of the crisis in the welfare state, as well as the fate of the "imaginary republican," who is the more revered now that he is disappearing.[6] In fact, the usual mechanics of integration is not working well, and the traditional agencies of socialization (church, family, business, school, political parties, trade unions) are wondering, very late in the game, about their failures. Within this context, how can one fail to understand the vehement deception to which Amr Helmy Ibrahim, who chose French nationality, bore witness: This system does not keep its promises, and is no more egalitarian than any other?

However, the immigrants, who are ever less ready to pay a very heavy entry fee for ever more limited gains (professional, scholastic), have nonetheless decided to remain in France. This does not mean that they all want to become French citizens. And thus we have an unprecedented situation: an increasingly precarious prospect for traditional assimilation, to which is added the desire to remain in France and to assert a presence openly and obviously. We are in fact witnessing the emergence of a kind of immigration

which insists that it be called by its proper name, that it be respected and that its demands be heard.[7] Immigration is no longer clandestine, but demands that it benefit henceforth from its own visibility.

This harsh fact cannot be dissociated from the Le Pen effect and the feelings it reflects: it was imagined that immigration was a temporary matter, a difficult period to be gotten through by those in contact with it, a necessity dating back to the legitimate period of growth.... And one had to admit that the immigrants did not show any express desire to depart. Then a war as foolish as it was lost in advance was declared. We will get nowhere by asking "what if?" One can go back as far as one wants, even challenging the citizenship granted in these recent years, imagining false political refugees everywhere. It will do no good, for we will be faced with the historic irreversibility of immigration, which will be borne out by the elections in 1986, because it will indeed be necessary to recognize then that many immigrants are now French citizens and will no longer hesitate to vote.[8] Such is the fact. These immigrants are not like the others, for many of them are already French. Who is French and who is an immigrant? We lose our footing completely! As to believing that the eternal virtues of French society, its multicultural aspect, should settle all of this smoothly, we must change our tune and recognize that the traditional forms of integration are very generally dying out, just as one must realistically admit that the migratory flow is being blocked.

It is indeed the current confusion which makes it necessary to take very seriously the recent proposals pertaining to the right to vote, which have the merit of seeking to incorporate politically a population which cannot expect everything from "respect for its culture." Why is there a surge of panic with regard to immigration? Because the immigrants are neither foreigners nor future assimilated citizens in the classic sense of the term, and no one is too sure any longer who they are.

With regard to this historic development with its dramatic emotions, there are not many possible conclusions. The poorest involves creating a fiction: there is our culture and there is theirs, that of these people from the Muslim countries (typical of the last major wave of economic immigration), and its particularity of which is such that it is subtly undermining the universalism of our little republic. Thus one kills two birds with one stone. Islam explains everything, from the current shortcomings in integration to the tension in the French model of integration. Culturalism takes its toll, and debates on origins and identity are the law. Every man for himself, in the name of Islam, the Republic, France, the Maghreb.

The tribalism and the particularism for which the others are so much criticized are in the process of undermining political universalism in the French style, which is succumbing to the siege of arguments about the imperiled French identity. For France is not characterized by a cultural identity, an original source, a specific root, but rather by the establishment of a political space in which the citizens are independent of the community of belonging, and the recognition of the individual is isolated from his ethnic origin. The fact that the imaginary republican, the traditional accounts and myths which go along with citizenship and civic education, are no longer so

credible should not lead to a search for compensatory "cultural" myths outside the political realm. Now this is indeed what is happening with regard to the debate on immigration. There is a tragic slippage from political discourse, from a reflection of the "public welfare," toward hints of composite identity wherein Islam is accused of all kinds of barbarism, even before recognizing that one has indeed reacted to them. As to the new defenders of secular republicanism, they are merely making a show, even if they avoid becoming culturalists, because they are not recognizing that "universalism does not repeat itself, but is won" (Michel Mariam).

The majority of the authors in this issue agree on this point: if immigration is so troubling to the French conscience, it is because of the jolts experienced by universalism in the French fashion and its political model. But far from being the "single" cause of that, immigration makes it necessary to reflect on the conditions of integration necessary, on whether it can any longer be reduced to the republican assimilation of the past, or should yield to the dictates of tribalism, ethnicism and culturalism.[9] Which would come down to destroying the fragile divisions in French society, wherein the consensus is necessarily political, and even the possibility of a political space in which the individuals do not judge themselves as a function of their cultural affiliation alone, as well. As Louis Dumont wrote (CRITIQUE, May 1985): "(For the French), national awareness is subordinated. For the French citizen, the individual belongs essentially to the human species, and his identity is not linked to his particular culture. The result thereof is that the Frenchman identifies his own culture with the universal culture."

One should not be surprised: the debate on the right to be different[10] is a focus which will recur throughout this issue, but it apparently pertains to us all, French citizens and immigrants alike. And one can see at present a painful game of dodge which might end badly: while one immigration faction accepts the limits of the "culturalist" discussion and implicitly admits that integration must take into account certain rules of the political game,[11] recognized ideologists (first and foremost the right-wing club members) are confusing the issue by allowing the belief that French identity is a matter of culture. In short, one must be French in order to be French. Tribalism is back, but not always where one would expect it!

Postscript: This series, which follows a certain number of special issues (PROJET, January-February 1983; LES TEMPS MODERNES, March-April-May 1984, reprinted in a pocket edition by Denoel in the MEDIATIONS collection, 1985), does not pretend to be exhaustive (we did not choose to include a review of all the immigrant populations) but does raise some questions to which neither French citizens nor immigrants can remain indifferent. Rather than emphasize cultural differences, we chose to stress the points of historic convergence.

The first and second portions were reviewed by the editors of ESPRIT, while Gilles Kepel and his colleagues took responsibility for the third portion.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the propositions set forth by Marcel Gauchet in FRANCE-CULTURE (4 January 1985) on the subject of Le Pen's supporters. Is it not they first

of all who feel scorned because they could never get a hearing for their complaint, for their aggressive view of cohabitation with the immigrant population in large complexes or elsewhere? See also the numerous contributions by Francois Demantes, in PROJET, ESPRIT, etc.

2. It was not so long ago that one spoke of foreigners, rather than immigrants. In April of 1966, ESPRIT devoted a special issue to "Foreigners in France" (see the historic article by Antoine Prost in that issue). In 1973, Juliette Minces published a work entitled "Foreign Workers in France" (Seuil). If the ESPRIT issue placed the emphasis on political refugees to some extent, J. Minces clearly showed the shift toward economic integration, and took up the issue of immigration in the broader sense. It might also be noted that ESPRIT carried a report in July of 1939 on "Emigration, a Revolutionary Problem." At that time, there was as much talk about emigration as about immigration!

3. This is the reason for the importance of the works which have refused to stigmatize or to stylize the image of the immigrant, stressing instead the migratory cycles or describing networks of immigrants in dealing with history (see F. Dassetto and A. Bastenier, "Islam Transplanted," published by EPO, Antwerp, 1984; Jacques Katuszewski and Ruwen Ogien, "Networks of Immigrants," Workers' Publications, Paris, 1981.

4. The waves of immigrants between the two wars were no less the focus of xenophobic campaigns. See Joseph Rovan, "The French Against the Immigrants," L'HISTOIRE, No 57.

5. See the work by the Club de l'Horloge, "The National Preference, a Response to Immigration," Albin Michel, 1985. Jean-Louis Schlegel refers to it farther on.

6. Concerning the prevailing illusion of republicanism, see Diana Pinto in INTERVENTION, No 10.

7. What should it be called? It is no longer the so-called "demographic immigration" (the term used for the definitive immigration of the beginning of the century), nor the economic immigration regarded as temporary. Apparently, it is now perceived in relation to its source rather than as a function of the host country. Thus the Club de l'Horloge distinguishes a European wave, a Muslim wave and the current planetary wave which includes all of the damned of the earth (Tamils, Vietnamese, etc.) all tumbled together.

8. To take but one example, the number of potential new voters among French citizens from the Maghreb who are the offspring of members of the old native military contingents and the foreign workers born in North Africa is estimated at 1 million (see LE MONDE, 23 April 1985).

9. See Laurent Cohen-Tanugi, "The Law Without the State--On Democracy in France and in America," Paris, PUF [French University Press], 1985.

10. The criticism of this argument is not without its effects on the usual concepts of racism. "I regard as false, or in any case incomplete, the accepted idea to the effect that racism reveals a radical rejection of the 'other,' a basic intolerance of differences, etc. Contrary to what is believed, the image of one's counterpart, one's "double," is vastly more troubling than that of the 'other.'" (J. B. Pontalis, "Discussion: A Face Which Will Not Be Seen Again," LE GENRE HUMAIN, 11, special issue, "Society and Racism," p 17).

11. One will note the reservations Michel de Certeau has with regard to the articulation which we believe necessary between the cultural and the political. The cultural claim is in his view the means of getting around or limiting the effect of the political, which leads him to lump Bretons and immigrants together. The fact remains that the one group benefits from a political model, while the other is excluded therefrom. See the explanation by Andre Lebon concerning the relations between the integration and the maintenance of cultural links, the latter facilitating the former (HOMMES ET MIGRATIONS, No 1056, 15 September 1983).

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INCREASE IN XENOPHOBIA STUDIED*

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 74-81

[Article by Jacques Caroux]

[Text] To analyze the rise of xenophobia among the popular strata, does it suffice to recall that France is faced with one of the heaviest waves of immigration experienced in a very long time, to ascribe the duration of the economic crisis to that fact, or to stress that in the cities, large urban complexes or low-cost housing neighborhoods, the percentage the immigrant population represents has not ceased to increase (25 percent of the population of the large complex which served as our survey field, not counting the citizens of the DOM-TOM [Overseas Departments and Territories])? One could also relate the phenomenon historically, by referring to the periods of tension which preceded the assimilation of the various immigrant communities.

But what, first of all, is an immigrant? Who are the currently favored targets of xenophobia, the victims of popular stigmatization? The workers we interviewed answered "the blacks" (West Indians, in fact, who make up 17 percent of the population of the large complex). Are these French citizens with a Catholic culture immigrants? To understand the image of the "immigrant" for a population group which defines itself as "native French," one must indeed have in mind the republican model for the integration of immigrants in the nation-state.

The French Model for the Integration of Immigrants

French society, as clearly analyzed by Pierre Gremion, Michel Tibon-Cornillot and Jean Leca,[1] can be defined as a cross between a unitarian state and a multicultural society, or again a unifying center and a surrounding sector which quietly protects its cultural particularities on the periphery. The

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* This text is based on to the results of a study dealing with the changes in popular sociability and the social effects of the new policy with regard to low-cost housing neighborhoods established by the National Commission for Neighborhood Social Development (called the Dubedout Commission, then the Peace Commission). The research field was a large complex in the Paris region.

republican model for the integration of immigrants, which has functioned in homologous fashion with this contradictory mixture, is based on an implicit consensus which existed between the state and the French people:

--It fell to the state and its institutions to ensure the support and respect of the French citizenry, conceived in the manner of abstract universalism.

--It fell to society to preserve its specific cultural diversities, while formally submitting to the mold of republican unity.

--It fell to the immigrants to adapt to this articulation, which was indeed complex but has proved its efficacy.

With regard to the republic institutions, the immigrant has no choice but formal assimilation, and abandonment in the civic space of any assertion of his differences. The demand for additional rights which would take his cultural differences into account could not be reconciled with the model of integration-assimilation.

Achieving citizen's status, while it is a necessary condition, does not suffice therefore to guarantee real incorporation in French society, which has its own criteria for integration which cannot be confused with those of the state. As M. Tibon-Cornillot wrote: "The term 'immigrants' brings together in a single structure peoples of foreign origin and groups of French nationals who in some cases have been French citizens for several centuries (the West Indians)" (op. cit.). It is this broad definition of the "immigrant" we have used here.

Relations Between 'Native French Citizens' and Immigrants

The awareness of the "workers" and that of the "lower middle class"[2] are differentiated when it comes to methods of perceiving immigrants by the relative importance those interviewed in the two categories assign to the problems seen as being related to the presence of immigrants.

Sampling of Workers (A)	Lower Middle Class Sampling (B)
1. Influx into the territory	1. Social life
2. Social life	2. Education
3. Instability	3. Influx into the territory
4. Education	4. Instability

While the working population expresses a strong feeling of being overrun and dispossessed from its own territory, the lower middle class people enumerated the difficulties and problems inherent in the cohabitation of population categories which do not share the same lifestyle.

One might therefore distinguish two main systems of thought. The first takes the form of a popular nationalism which is strongly xenophobic in tone, while the second is related to the French model of integration for immigrants, and

is characterized by the stress placed on the need for immigrants to become invisible, to be assimilated.

Xenophobia Among the Workers

In analyzing the period between 1871 and 1940, the historian Michelle Perrot noted: "The crisis aggravates a xenophobia the roots of which are ancient and complex. Economic rivalry reawakens cultural and political antagonisms and sometimes leads to a veritable working class nationalism."[3]

After a century, and taking into account the fact that the periods, the sociohistoric formations, the consequences of the crisis (social coverage), and the types of immigration are different, it is interesting to note, on the basis of our analysis of the content of the interviews with the sampling of workers, that major lines continue to exist between:

--the interiorization of the economic crisis, the identity crisis and worker sociability; and

--the rise of feelings of territorial invasion and insecurity, and the development of working class nationalism and xenophobia.

It is in fact significant, in view of the characteristics of the sampling (a high level of members of political groups and associations), that we found not an affirmation of a strong identity defining a major axis of conflict (capital-labor) in the working population, but negative identities (they are "the poor," "society's rejects," "the dregs," or "all workers because we don't have millions"). A series of adjectives and expressions reflect the sense of being invaded. "We have been overrun, saturated, submerged." "We are fed up with immigrants." "There one wonders if he is in France." "You can count the French citizens on the fingers of your hand." This feeling reaches its culmination when the arrival of immigrants is described as the overrunning of the large complex by all the races of the earth (compare the concept of planetary racism).

It is "they," those who operate like an invisible hand, manipulating the French people for the profit of foreigners, who are responsible for this invasion. The complaint against "them" voiced by those interviewed in sample A is that the people were not consulted. "They" impose the immigrants upon the people, who become passive victims to the extent that they have no means of expressing themselves or acting or defending their own living space against what they regard as a tide of immigrants. Thus there is a feeling of double dispossession from their territory, by "them" and by the immigrants. Those responsible for this invasion are sometimes designated by name: it is Chirac, the mayor, the HLM, the government. Another culmination of the sense of being overrun is reached when the concept of a strategy of territorial conquest supposedly pursued by the immigrants is added.

The massive presence of immigrants analyzed as a phenomenon making the large complex into a "dumping ground for immigrants," "a garbage city," can only lead to the departure of French citizens. In the case of those who are "captives," that is to say the strata of the working population which lack any

financial capability to leave the city, the "flight" of the French is regarded as a catastrophe. They do not see how they could halt this process other than by provoking the departure of the immigrants. In addition to the sense that the territory is being despoiled, those who hold this position have a sense of danger which, for both the French and the immigrants, is induced by an undesired joint presence--the uncontrolled upsurge of racism. This position involves saying that if "they" continue to impose a volume of immigrants which is not wanted, going over the heads of the native residents, there is the danger that they will be tipped into a racism which for the time being they are managing to throttle.

The Significance of the Republican Integration Model

By giving first priority to the problems related to the cohabitation of population categories with different lifestyles and belonging to different ethnic groups, and by insisting parallel with this on the need for the immigrants to make themselves "invisible," to become assimilated, and to erase their particularities in the social area, the lower middle classes thus continue to promote the traditional model for the integration of immigrants, even if, incidentally, they see that it is ever more difficult for this model to function, with regard to a multiplicity of ethnic groups.

So that everything will come out right, then, the immigrants would have to become integrated and assimilated and adapt, because "those who live like Europeans are no trouble." But on the whole, the lower middle class people believe that "this is not working," that while some categories of immigrants try to live in the French fashion and to conform to the traditional integration model, the fact remains "that it is difficult to live together," "that it is difficult to make them understand that they should not be intrusive," and that even when one would like to interact with the immigrants, "one does not know how to go about it."

In addition to this view, which the lower middle class shares with the working people, there was a gradation, when it came to the interviews with those in sample B, and often even within a given interview, ranging from a position of principle--"one can associate with anybody"--to comments on the difficulties of living within a multi-ethnic "community," and indeed nostalgia for a social life involving native French citizens. "I am not a racist, but in the past it was a matter of fully integrated French citizens with roots going way back, firmly established. As the years have passed, this has changed with the immigrants, with an upset in relations among people, because one must respect different ethnic groups. Their cultures and their tastes are not necessarily ours. Thus one must deal with:

--the survival of the republican model for the integration of immigrants as a general reference, reflected in the repeated demands that they adapt and learn proper manners, and

--a realization that this model which still survives is ever less efficient, or more precisely only functions for certain categories of immigrants (the Portuguese, Asiatics and families from the Maghreb) defined as "invisible."

while overall, the working population begins with a realization of the failure of the model for the integration of the immigrants and views their presence in terms of the "harmful effects" and "degradation" they introduce into community life. the lower middle class, making use of this model, analyzes the difficulties encountered and distinguishes between the categories of immigrants who conform to this model and those who do not. "I tell you we are being overrun. and yet they do indeed have problems, those people. However, some of them adapt very well. I have known Portuguese people who were very nice and Vietnamese who behave very well. One never hears of them, for they have learned how to live. The West Indians, on the other hand, create a tremendous number of problems--they do not adapt."

However, if this model has proved to be ever less efficient, the existence of a feeling of being overrun expressed in terms quite similar to those used by the workers interviewed seems to indicate that the social awareness of the lower middle class may change and move closer to that of the workers' stratum. Some of those interviewed in this sample emphasized that if the situation "does not change" in the direction they want, they will leave.

A Dissident Scheme--An Intercultural Approach

This ultraminority position was voiced by a militant belonging to a Catholic association and a member of a political party. It involves stressing the positive aspects of the immigrants' presence, stressing the positive nature of intercultural exchange and the contribution it can make to the people of France. "The problem of the immigrants is discussed solely in terms of its negative aspects, which are real, but at the same time this can truly make an exceptional contribution. To denounce the phenomenon without mentioning that it could provide something that many cities lack, and that in the end others might even envy--this sort of denunciation is something of a two-edged sword, and it serves to lock people into upon their problems."

However, these two individuals interviewed stressed that intercultural relations remain for the time being more a plan than a reality, since this attitude comes up against "differences in education, in culture, in belief, in leisure activities." The Catholic militant added a pessimistic note. The native French citizens, like the immigrants, are undergoing the same process of being uprooted and they thus set aside their questions about the intercultural approach to the cultural identity crisis. "What is causing the deterioration of the large complex is that there are people who no longer belong to anything. We are not city people, and some say "we are the population dregs." It is often said that after losing one's parents, one is no longer anyone's child. Well now, when one cuts his roots, one is no longer a tree, in the end one is no longer anything. Here you are nowhere."

French Society Faced With Multiethnic Immigration

Do the attitudes of the native French citizens we interviewed concerning the multiethnic phenomenon confronting them foreshadow the attitudes of our society toward this problem which seems ever more inevitable? Various attitudes and potential conflicts were revealed in connection with the four

categories of immigrants most often encountered in this large population complex.

1. Iberians. The traditional integration model works for this category, which is perceived as "invisible" because of its "discretion" in the social space, the proximity of its culture and its style of life. No potential major conflict with the native-born French was mentioned (merely some criticisms about the difficulties created in social life by the brawling of the youth).

2. Asiatics. This category is defined as potentially invisible because of its discretion in the social space and its conformity to the rules of our integration model. However its community isolation and style of life, based on the perpetuation of the traditional common law, prevents its full inclusion in French civic space. On the other hand, the recognized competence and virtues of the Asiatics places them in direct competition in the job force with native-born Frenchmen. Two potential sources of conflict were mentioned: their withdrawal into their communities and the internal structural methods of those communities, and the competition they introduce in the socioprofessional sector.

3. Natives of the Maghreb. This category, which some commentators say seems "to pose the main challenge to the French population of any of the various categories of immigrants" in other large complexes, is seen by our two samples as similar to the Iberians. Neighborly relations described as positive were mentioned. As in the case of the Iberians, there were some criticisms pertaining to specific instances (alcoholism). Other criticisms referred to their community isolation, their invasion of the collective space and the disturbance created in the schools by the presence of their children.

4. West Indians. This category was clearly indicated by our two samplings as the most "visible" category of immigrants, despite the civic and cultural (Catholicism) similarities. This visibility has to do with the pursuit of their style of life in the social space, but also, as emphasized by many of those interviewed, to the fact that these people are black (sample A) and French (sample B), which "dramatizes" coexistence with this population category, because where its members are concerned, the possibility of their return to their country of origin can be contemplated.

Apart from a conflict based on the difference in lifestyles, the distinction made by those in sample A and to a lesser extent those in sample B between "whites" and "blacks" indicates that a conflict with the "colored peoples," when they are highly visible in the social space, cannot be excluded.

Xenophobia and Private Life

The integration of the immigrant communities has often been accompanied in France by periods of increasing tension preceding assimilation (for example, the very violent conflicts with the Italian population between 1880 and 1893, resulting in numerous deaths). Thus we would be in a period of spasm, traditional for French society and strengthened by the economic crisis. Without regarding the xenophobic reactions and the conflicts associated with them as negligible, it would therefore be advisable to place them in

perspective within an integration process, the violence in which has also been directed, historically, at the various groups making up French society.

This optimistic interpretation does not take into account the crisis in our model for the integration of immigrants, which makes a redefinition of the relationship of the state with the groups making up French society and the immigrants urgently necessary. Both with regard to the "native" French citizens and the immigrant categories, we find ourselves faced with a new stake in the conflict concerning the establishment of a new model for the integration of immigrants. In view of the possible results of a change in French society under the impact of the multiethnic phenomenon, the workers we interviewed clearly expressed their rejection of it, in the form of a popular nationalism with a strong xenophobic ring.

Paradoxically, the spread of xenophobia can be seen as based on the process of individualization which proceeds "invisibly" in democratic societies. In a large complex, the immigrants are no longer faced with the criteria for the integration of natives of French territories, marginally preserving their particularity, but those for individuals without territorial affiliation, which encourages separation as a life style. The mythical claim of insularity, the concept of "one of us" shaped by an identity, is emerging at a time when, as those we interviewed admitted, "we no longer belong to anything." Out of the fog, the image the workers in the large complex have of themselves seems to emerge. From belonging to a profession, a community, indeed even a class, there has been a transition to negative identification. However, there is one single point in common: the desire to retreat within the family cell. All, both militants and nonmilitants, agree that outside private life, there is no real well-being.

And this focus on private life cannot simply be reduced to the results of the social aid policy (splintering) or the enduring economic crisis (crisis in popular societility), but must be analyzed as a more profound process, a new factor in the imaginary establishment of our society. It is then that the insular label "native French citizen," brandished against the "invasion" by the immigrants, takes on its full meaning. It means in fact French citizens living separate, enclosed in their own cells, refusing to tolerate the noise and the racket of interrelated life. Beneath the seemingly tribal logic of claims to and marking of territory there are concealed a series of naked individuals and the dissolution of the traditional reference points for the difference between Them and Us. "By revealing one's neighbor in the man who is different, and in proceeding to dissolve the framework for community existence, the modern age is exposing individuals to a double challenge. They can no longer push responsibility for themselves onto a social order which establishes their place and subjects them to its traditions, nor can they any longer seek refuge from the Other in a system which regulates all contacts and codifies interpersonal relations in detailed fashion."

The rise of popular xenophobia is being paralleled by the many forms of the process of individualization and the "equality of conditions" the democratic societies impose upon themselves. While Tocqueville saw therein a means of diminishing conflicts and violence, writing in "On Democracy in America" that "for several centuries we have seen that conditions have been equalizing,

while at the same time discovering that morality is weakening," xenophobia hinders that advance of equality which leads to a confused recognition that the difference in the Other does not prevent identical affiliation.[5] And the defiant and hostile relations with the Other (in one case the West Indian, in another a native of the Maghreb, and elsewhere, an Asiatic) are intensifying in the centers of social habitation. For these are indeterminate individuals deprived of any identity capable of establishing a distance,[6] lacking roots so that they could express territorial individuality, and manipulated by "them," who must accept proximity to differences which seem to them intolerable. For those who are "constrained," the workers who have come to the end of their residential course, the magic solution is to exclude these categories from society, terming them the source of all evils and demanding their departure. For the others, those who still have some maneuvering room, the lower middle classes, after a last appeal to the republican model for the integration of immigrants, what remains for them is the possibility of departing to the lands inhabited by "our kind," where the social rhythm is characterized by silence, impersonal civility and private family life.

FOOTNOTES

1. Pierre Cremion, "The Peripheral Regime," Seuil, Paris, 1978; M. Tibon-Cornillot, "The Challenge of Immigration from the Maghreb," LE MONDE, 23-24 August 1983; and Jean Leca, "Questions on Citizenship," PROJET, January-February 1983.

2. In order to analyze the relations of the French lower classes (in the large complex) with the immigrants, we established a double sample. One was a workers' sample (in this large complex, relatively unskilled workers were involved) and a lower middle class characterized by cultural assets--teachers, social workers, office employees) sample.

3. Michelle Perrot, "The Workers on Strike," Paris, Mouton, 1974, p 194.

4. Alain Finkielkraut, "The Wisdom of Love," Gallimard, 1984, p 160.

5. See Marcel Gauchet, "Tocqueville, America and Us," LIBRE, No 7, 1980, p 92.

6. Without lapsing into substantialism, it would be well to recall, with Claude Levi-Strauss, that "identity is a kind of virtual center to which we must refer to explain certain things, despite the fact that it never really existed" (in "Identity," PUF [French University Press], 1977, p 332).

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PROBLEMS, CONFLICTS FOR EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 143-154

[Article by Alain Pierrot: "The French Schools and Their Foreign Students"]

[Text] "Do the immigrants have a place in the schools?" "What should the schools do for them?" And so on. All of these are improper ways of posing an obviously crucial problem, that of the students who are not French or who are not "really" French. The mass media discuss the educational system and integration unceasingly. From the right wing to the left, a consensus has almost been reached: a school system "created for little French citizens" cannot, unless it changes profoundly, accommodate a million foreigners. Of course "children of immigrants" and "second-generation" are inaccurate terms, since the German or Belgian children whose parents work in France are not included, although they were however "our" immigrants of the 19th century, but the students from the DOM [Overseas Departments], like the "Muslim Frenchmen," are included. Their common characteristic is that through their families, they belong to cultures and societies which are dominated, or presumed to be, the centers of which lie outside French. In our attitude toward them, whether benevolent or hostile, they read both the place assigned to them and the implicit standard of what it means to be a "real" French citizen.

When we examine their status in our school system more carefully, we see in fact an increasing concern about them on the level of the responsible bodies, both political and pedagogical, but little tangible evidence to confirm it. It is more nearly our general concept of education and the excessive importance the hazy notion of "ethnic" identity has taken on therein which create the problem. This is why, after some brief specific data, we will deal above all with the ideological and philosophical causes preventing us from having a clear view of the immigrants in this matter, who play various roles but rarely their own.

In 1984, there were a little over a million students of foreign nationality in the French schools, almost all (95 percent) of them in the public educational system, where they accounted for 10 percent of the enrollment. While 16 percent of the students in France are in private schools, only 5 percent of the foreign students are enrolled there, and they represent only 2.4 percent of the total.[1] The volume of foreigners is twice as great in "special" (educational difficulties) classes as in general education, and the percentage

of natives of the Maghreb is greater than that of foreign students of other origins. Generally speaking, the proportion of immigrants from Europe is dwindling, to the benefit of those from Africa and Asia. Taken all in all, nothing could be more consistent with the usual image of foreign students having difficulties in the schools. Concerning this, some people believe that "they are lowering the standard" and damaging the "first-class image" of our public schools, while others see the immigrants as the victims of a system which has failed to adapt and to take their "specificity" into account.

Specific Measures

1. Since 1970, initiation classes (CLIN) have been offered. In principle, they are for students from 7 to 12 years of age who do not know French on arrival in France ("non-French speakers" and "first arrivals"). And they are designed to enable them to take their place in regular classes speedily (after a year, at the latest). They have seen a substantial drop in enrollment, which has dwindled in a few years from 12,000 to 9,000 (of whom 8,000 are foreigners and 1,000 French citizens). They are characterized by great disparities in age and education and intellectual levels. Nor is there unanimity on their effectiveness in the realm of linguistic apprenticeship, because of the fact that these children, now living in France, learn the language in "natural" fashion on a parallel basis. Thus one can understand why these courses are controversial. The criticism that they segregate needlessly derives from the observation that one too often finds therein children who are French-speaking but who are regarded as belonging to a small category.

There are also sixth- and fifth-form classes of the same type called adaptation classes (CLAD). In 1983 and 1984, 180 classes accommodated 2,667 students. Their limited number, even though the capacity to learn a language spontaneously decreases with age, while the level of requirements is higher, explains the fact that many young foreigners find themselves assigned to educational structures (prevocational classes for foreigners or primary initiation courses) which fail to take their earlier secondary educational achievements into account.

2. Beginning in 1975, Training and Information Centers for the Education of the Children of Migrants (CEFISEM) were established. Currently there are 20 of them in France. These centers are staffed by primary and secondary level teachers, and are responsible for continuous training activities designed for all teachers who have a high proportion of foreign students in their classes. They also function in the educational institutions, in particular in the ZEP (priority zones defined in 1981-1982), and they maintain very regular contact with the foreign associations and teachers appointed to teach the languages and cultures of the countries of origin in the schools. Although they are affiliated with the teachers' training schools, the role they play in the general pedagogical education of teachers remains incidental, which somewhat limits their contribution. This structure is exclusively French.

3. The teaching of the languages and cultures of the countries of origin (ELCO). While the knowledge of their mother tongue is hardly in doubt for the "first arrival" students in the CLIN, the same is not the case for those who have lived in France for several years. Following the bilateral agreements signed by France with various Mediterranean countries between 1973 and 1981 (Portugal, Italy, Tunisia, Spain, Morocco, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Algeria), about 100,000 of the 700,000 foreign primary school students have been pursuing courses in the languages and cultures of their native lands, with teachers recruited and paid by the government of each of the countries which have signed such an agreement with France. For half of the students, these three course hours are incorporated in the normal schedule, while the other half pursues a "deferred" or "extracurricular" course. The various countries do not have identical concepts, and enrollment varies greatly from one nationality to another: from 7 or 8 percent for the Algerians and Moroccans to 25 percent for the Portuguese, and even 50 percent for the Italians (including, it is true, French students of Italian origin).

It was in the era of the North-South agreements on transfers of manpower and within the framework of the "free movement of workers in Europe"[2] that these courses were organized, both in France and in the other industrialized countries in Western Europe which were experiencing an important influx of immigrant workers. Basically they provided a guarantee to the parents, within the logic of temporary emigration.[3] Their return to their countries would come about "for the better" for their children if, during their stay abroad, they had been educated in the language and the culture of their country.

In view of the large percentage accounted for by unofficial languages and dialects in immigrant situations the language taught is not necessarily the same as the language of the family, which many students no longer speak fluently, moreover, even if they still understand it.

For those taking these courses, a double difficulty often develops--that of being temporarily separated from the rest of their class, and that of not really knowing how to speak the language which everyone seems to identify as their "real" one. The reluctance of the students, as well as that of the parents who no longer send their children to class, should not be considered in isolation from the position of the French teachers who, as a whole, have more nearly "tolerated" these courses than really approved of the principle on which they are based. Their line of thinking is that maintaining bilingualism hinders the learning of French, along with the additional fear that when these classes are integrated, a ninth of the school time will thus be lost.[4]

Which Mother Tongue?

Among the "nondiplomatic" justifications for this educational plan, the argument for the needed grounding in the mother tongue ranks high. There are many who think[5] that emigration, by depriving this language of its "instrumental" function (it is no longer the vehicle either of education or of social life in France), while it alone would have a symbolic value (the mother's, and thus the basic patterning, language), puts immigrant children in a "semilingual" rather than a bilingual situation. Language, culture and personality would "normally" be inseparable, and the children of immigrant

workers would thus be experiencing "dissociation."[6] Unless one unconditionally accepts such a mystical concept of the "mother tongue," it is possible to recognize, on the basis of a good many examples of "nonpathological" personalities, that an individual can begin to think and live in one language and can continue that personal development in another. Patterning relations, on the affective and social level, which the "mother" initiates in her own language are not inherent in it, but are on the contrary added to it, thus giving rise to linguistic forms and situations with strong symbolic values. Serious difficulties may indeed trouble those whose "personal languages" are characterized by contradictory practices and situations of inequality, but it is these conflicts which disturb, not the languages as such, which only reflect them.

Awareness of Language and Its Cultural Implications

The young people living in France, however diverse their linguistic origins, have a mastery of the oral variations of ordinary French analogous to that of French citizens in the same social situation. With regard to the written language, in which the conscious representations of language play a greater role, it appears that interference with the family linguistic base is not infrequent. The question is then, whether they experience French as "their" language or as that of the majority, and more "legitimate," group. This is a question of an affective and ideological nature and does not really pertain to linguistic competence as such. It is indicative that children of 10 or so years of age have some difficulty in experiencing the language of their parents as "their language" when it is different from that of their comrades, while by the end of adolescence, the search for identity leads a certain number of young people to want to learn the language of "their people," even if they are totally unfamiliar with it. But in such cases, it is Arab poetry, Spanish theater or Italian literature and not the "lost language" of their first affective exchanges which they want to master.

The low level of the younger students' motivation clearly reflects the dominant position of family cultures and languages, which they have internalized and express through their attitude of rejection, incorporating their precarious status and their own educational difficulties.

Is There a Specific Educational Failure?

Overall, the position of foreign students in the educational system is less favorable than that of French citizens. However, a SIGES [Business and Statistical Data-Processing Department] study[7] on the schooling completed by the children of unskilled workers yielded figures very close to those for French students in the same socioprofessional category, even showing a slight advantage for foreign children born in France. Thus it was possible to report in LE MONDE DE L'EDUCATION (No 100, p 16), that "in the same environment, the children of immigrants are more successful than French children." This effort to reverse the stereotype merits two comments. On the one hand, the generalization, based on the least favored category (12.6 percent of the active French population as compared to 38.15 percent of the foreign workers) is hasty, and is moreover based on slight statistical differences. Finally, and most important, precisely because "all other things are not equal," the

failures remain important. The main point of interest in this study is that it excludes an "ethnic" interpretation of the failures and corrects the doomsaying to which there is such a ready surrender, with as its consequences the flight on the part of some toward private education and the strengthening of racist theses. Thus Boulot and Fradet could write: "Is it not in the accumulation of poor educational conditions and poor socioeconomic conditions that the real causes of the educational shortcomings of the children of immigrants should be sought, rather than, as is usually done, referring to the linguistic deficit and the cultural handicap?"[8] Here again we encounter the criticism, very familiar since the 1960s, of the failure of the schools themselves to adapt ("poor educational conditions"). In conclusion, they proposed that "the schools incorporate the practices of the popular sectors in their content and procedures" (p 1913).

Return to Sociological Criticism of the Schools

Making failure the main index of the functioning of an educational institution is now a commonplace. The school would thus be but a machine for selection based on social criteria disguised as educational activities. Thus "reinterpreted," failure in school is no longer a failure, properly speaking, because on the one hand it is an inevitable reflection of the system, while on the other, whatever the subjective evaluation of the phenomenon, those who fail are in fact stigmatized because their differences, their languages and their cultures have no proper place in the schools. In a demystified approach to the problem, the only real pedagogical question would be: "What social content will I give my educational process? Toward what social function--conservation or schism--will it be oriented?"

Either one thing or the other: either there is failure because there are previously defined goals, and one cannot judge the reality of the school system solely on the basis of the effects it has or does not have in the realm of social mobility without first of all judging it on the basis of its own goals. Or else one abandons them and with them the normative assessment of the failures. It has been proposed that we substitute here the life, the language and the practices of certain social groups.

Fifteen years or so ago, the study of the dynamic elements in the popular culture with a view to changing the schools was suspended. We see the same hope reborn today with the assignment of the role of a dominated social group needing to be emancipated to the immigrants. Suddenly it seems easier to assign a content to this culture oppressed by the petit bourgeois French educational system--the content of the immigrants' cultures and languages, with ethnologists becoming the theoreticians of this new pedagogy.

The Lesson Taught by the Ethnologists

For the "critical" educators, the only true theory of education was of a sociological or political nature. Slipping into the costume worn earlier, some ethnologists today feel that theirs is a comparable mission with regard to those naive persons who might still believe in passing on general knowledge or encouraging activities and apprenticeships. A recent article in L'ECOLE MATERNELLE FRANCAISE[9] is a perfect illustration of this. The roles are

clearly separated. "Reconciling theory (ethnological data) and practice (daily schoolwork)" (p 28). The nursery school teachers "did not know...that they were functioning on the basis of the cultural patterns of the dominant French society...which they passed on without really questioning them" (p 31). Speaking of culture only in the third person,[10] the ethnologist would describe the functioning of the schools objectively, taking care to attach value judgments to their single source--a particular ethnic culture. It is urgent that the teacher who conceives of his work from a "universalist" point of view, that of a general and rational education, learn that he must not arbitrarily impose his own cultural identity, to the detriment of the various cultures which he stifles in his own students.

Like all of the elements in this body of anthropological knowledge, the concept of culture is a working hypothesis which is subject to revisions, above all when, going beyond a descriptive listing, one wants to make of it an interpretive concept. Too many of the leading ethnologists have questioned the necessary subjective implication and its ambiguities to allow us to accept the undifferentiated dogmatism which sets the theory of cultures in opposition to ethnocentric practices which are unconscious, since they are normative. The concept of culture in the ethnological sense cannot serve as a guide for pedagogy, without striking a destructive blow, the first victim of which would be logic itself. This is what is done in this same article (p 32), since the schools are called upon to break with their historic tradition.

The goal proposed is in the end (p 32) "to allow individuals and groups to be simply what they are, to live their culture in freedom and to determine their identity themselves." In a confusion of what should be, with the exception of those who would be comfortable within the French school tradition, committed to a basic sacrifice, it is the providential harmony between individual liberty and traditional culture which is being proclaimed. Ethnological theorizing can be no safeguard against an imaginary break by our system with its own cultural basis. It can, on the other hand, help the schools to gain an awareness of which dominant values our society invests it with, and to relate those values to the new value of respect for other cultures.

Respect for Other Cultures

Respect traditionally follows a denunciation of the oppression imposed upon regional identities, popular strata and colonized peoples subjected to forced assimilation, which is effected by invoking such abstract values as rationality, the rights of the individual, etc. But to respect a cultural phenomenon, for example religion, one must have established its relative importance, detaching oneself from it, which presumes putting social identity above other values. Respecting the cultures of students can thus only result from respect for them personally based on our criteria for individual rights. Such respect in no way places the various cultures on an equal footing, because any "claim" by a culture other than our own to extension beyond the limits assigned by our society to the personal sphere must be rejected. The right to be a Muslim in France does not mean that inheritance can be defined according to the rules of the Koran, and the school requirement pertains to all, whatever the viewpoint of the respective culture may be. It is necessary to have the courage to recognize this. It is because we place our own values

elsewhere--in the nature of political control and power and the rights to work, medicine, comfort, education, information and free movement, etc. (wherein the written word, the juridical system and individual responsibility are basic) that we can allow cultural forms of another type (above all those of the traditional oral societies) to enter the educational system. Because we regard these cultural forms as minor, this "respect" implies a devaluation. Our society is based on more abstract social relations, wherein cultural questions are possible because tradition is no longer the sole source of legitimacy. The reduction of direct social control, which is the consequence thereof, has allowed the development of the illusion that every individual or group can develop therein according to its standards and as it wishes. Conversely, there is within a part of the French population a symmetrical or complementary difficulty in accepting that more individual freedom leads to more differences in lifestyle. Because some people do not see how social cohesion can be maintained unless everyone conforms to a given cultural model, participating in the same rites, the presence of other cultures seems to them intolerable.

Intercultural Activities

Making a break with ethnocentrism beginning in childhood in order to eliminate this form of racism is the common characteristic of rather diverse practices which have for the past 6 or 7 years been defined as intercultural. Some people have believed that cuisine, music, stories, in short the various folklores (sometimes overlooking French folklore), because they are cultural forms which do not lead to conflict and are accessible to the very young and "within reach" for the parents, will allow a more open approach to others and respect for their differences. There is no better example of respect which devalues. Aware of this hazard, others have sought to bypass this "exposition" of cultural diversity and to develop a joint pedagogical system. Mrs Abdallah-Pretceille[11] compares it to consciousness-raising education. "The point of departure is the reality experienced by the child in a multicultural situation," and the goal is "to learn to read cultures." We find here the same ethnological distortion as before. This utopia hardly seems to be hampered by the minimal methodological precautions required for such a project. If the difficulties of a purely logical nature which children encounter when it comes to distinguishing a particular instance from a general law are understood, a whole range of consequences might be feared, beginning with the reinforcement of racism, if such a concept were by chance to be truly put into practice.

The definition of the intercultural goal on the level of expression seems more realistic, on the one hand because it is not subject to the same methodological requirements, and on the other, because it does not involve the "other cultures" except to the extent that the interested parties choose to view it thus. But unless one believes that in a situation of theatrical, musical or graphic expression, all of the specific goals of the schools are achieved, the methods and content of education and their relationship with these activities of expression remain to be defined. Some hope that a new culture will emerge from this, with the school becoming the "workshop," indeed the testing bench for those musicians, association members, architects and

various militants who are concerned with being the protagonists in social and cultural innovation.

Apart from the illusion that they are thus themselves emancipated from the evil ethnocentrism which lies in wait for teachers, the greatest risk is that children will be led into a false sense of autonomy and freedom for lack of being faced with the ordinary institutional demands. The intercultural effort cannot be isolated from the goals of education in the schools, or it is likely to dissolve into insignificance or to betray itself. The "open" culture, which can be modified indefinitely as new communities are encountered, is nothing but, nor could it be, the deepening and broadening of our own culture.

The Ideology of Cross-Breeding

Intercultural activities appear to constitute a turning point in time, the dawn of a new era, the first blush of the "other," the "new" culture. While accurate descriptions are lacking, one term nonetheless is gaining acceptance: "cross-breeding." In a multiethnic and multicultural France, one reads with increasing frequency that we are or will be cultural crossbreeds. The formula strikes the target and is provocative enough that an expert in mockery such as Coluche could go so far as to say that "those who believe they are French are wrong." The most direct analysis of this formula reveals that it falls precisely within the logic of racism, with the difference that the one group demands what the other abhors, since the advocates of cultural cross-breeding and the racists recognize equally that cultures are an integral part of human groups. One can presume that the former see a social inheritance where their adversaries believe in biological heredity, but the consequence they derive therefrom is the same. The mechanical product of cohabitation by communities gives birth, through cross-breeding, to cultural change. History proves that many other outcomes are possible, that some groups maintain their specificity at least in part, while others lose it entirely, and that the dominant influences are not proportional to numbers, since the determining reasons are themselves of a cultural nature. To date the most profound changes have affected the immigrants themselves above all. The "leave my friend alone" phenomenon is not only the reaction of the immigrants to the exacerbation of racist crimes. If so many French adolescents understand this, it is perhaps to a great extent because those who are still the victims of racism are nonetheless "integrated" enough to demand equal rights and to adopt very effective techniques of expressing themselves, according to a code which is that of our media and our political and social system.

Cultural Relativism

There is an obvious relationship between the consecration of cultural identities and the major themes which have dominated French thinking for some decades--cultural relativism, historicism and irrationalism. And to search for the key to the persistent difficulties we have experienced in the clarification of pedagogical and cultural discussions is not, therefore, unreasonable.

Jacques Bouveresse, in his last two books,[12] analyzes these themes with great lucidity, and his criticism has equally to do with the questions which concern us. "Free exchange most often corresponds to an effort of understanding between different traditions and cultures, and it seeks to establish a consensus of a new type" [RC, p 99]. And so much for the intercultural effort in its most utopian version. As to the rationalist tradition, it would be "practically the only one incapable of effecting free exchange, of fully respecting its adversaries and dealing with them in a way other than exclusion pure and simple." It is indeed in terms of the same considerations and charges that the French schools are asked to abandon their universalist pretensions. There is here, as J. Bouveresse explains, a justification for any cultural or physical violence, for each individual will think only within the framework established by his culture, and the notion of value will disappear too along with the abandonment of any concern for universality. On what other foundation, however, can the right to difference be based? With the denunciation of the principles of our rationalist tradition as the same, and the multiplication of "historic or cultural lacks in continuity," the teachers have been convinced that they should not (or cannot) continue to impose knowledge on students belonging to a cultural universe different from their own.

The Cultural Status of the Schools

From the kitchenettes and washrooms of the nursery schools through personages in books, cafeteria menus and school holidays coordinated with religious festivals, without, obviously, overlooking history, geography and language, the schools implicitly and explicitly recognize but one single style of life as legitimate--that of the French petite bourgeoisie. These criticisms are fully documented and prove that the schools do not always readily reach the level of their own established values. One might imagine that a reaffirmation of these values would enable the schools to be less passive with regard to the existing stereotypes, and thus more original on the basis of their specific function, which is to give everyone access to basic knowledge. They are thereby linked with "scholarly" culture and not only to our arbitrary "remote" cultures. This limits their range to that of the development of knowledge and rationality, knowing how to express oneself, to read, to reason, to conduct a logical discussion, etc. Family life, leisure time and religious practices are well outside their scope. On a number of points, this analysis coincides with the educational priorities set forth by J.-P. Chevenement.

French Patriotism and the Universal[13]

The national minister of education was not content to proclaim simply that the schools should transmit basic knowledge, going on to say that through civic instruction and history, they should give new vigor to "national feeling." One could hardly be more explicitly ethnocentric! Remembering that he denounced the excessive emphasis on differences, is there still a place in the schools for recognition of non-French cultures? In entrusting the task of studying immigration to J. Berque, J.-P. Chevenement established an assimilationist orientation free of any ambiguity: Calling for "the best possible integration in the nation."

It is logical and necessary to instruct all of the children living in France in its history, geography and language, precisely because they live there. But does understanding the history of a country mean memorizing patriotic symbols more or less mechanically? In his letter to the dean of the General Inspectorate dated December 1984, J.-P. Chevenement explained that what was needed was "a narration with dates comprehensively representing the major events in the history of France and, when necessary, Europe" this is quite consistent with the official instructions of June 1984 reviving the references familiar to earlier generations ("the collective memory"), from the heroic Vercingetorix through Charles Martel ("The Arabs will never again advance north of the Pyrenees," or in other words "Get this native of the Maghreb out of my sight!") to de Gaulle, the superb solitary figure in the whole 20th century. One can see that the eagerness to encourage love of country overrides every other consideration. Neglecting the history of others as a principle cannot help but pacify the minds of the most chauvinistic.

These same instructions advise limiting the study of prehistory to the wealth of material pertaining to France alone. What could be more logical, however, than to explain that Homo erectus lived not only in Tautavel and Nice, but in Germany, Morocco and China as well? Experience has shown precisely that certain children from these countries were affected in an entirely different way, the more so since from the scientific point of view, the former presentation is ridiculous, while the second for its part is formative.

Why not teach that writing developed 5,000 years ago in the countries of the Near East, whose image is too often brought down to one of violence, oil and fanaticism? Understanding the history of one's country means knowing that its territory was for a long time nothing but a region, or several regions, in large political complexes in the Roman or Germanic eras (and therefore that neither Clovis nor Charlemagne was French).

And finally, does love of the fatherland require deception by omission or adherence to the most suspect conventions? According to these same instructions, the reign of Saint Louis was "the most beautiful medieval French period." Why render honor to a notorious anti-Semite who was responsible for the annihilation of the cultural heritage of the Jews, which had been preserved and enriched in Champagne and in the rest of the kingdom over a period of centuries, but was reduced to ruin by his order in Paris? More generally, the total silence about medieval anti-Semitism in Europe and its repeated resurgence until the 19th century deprives students of an important element in an understanding of what the moral atmosphere of these eras was, and at the same time the sense of emancipation brought about by the American and French revolutions. With such knowledge, they would understand where the Nazi practices (which were not all born of a "diabolical imagination") came from. In this connection, the crusaders of Godefroy de Bouillon ("a European undertaking," according to these same instructions) were the precursors of the trend when they burned all of the Jews they found still alive in Jerusalem in 1099 in a synagogue, the first version of the "final solution."

It is logical to stress the value of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, because it corresponds in fact to a time when our country was at the heart of world history and was regarded as such by others. But the linear

"ethnocentric" treatment does not really allow this. For French citizens themselves, the history of France can only be understood if it is seen within frames of reference larger than itself. If the teaching of it remains subordinate to the exaltation of a "powerful national feeling" (J.-P. Chevenement, 23 October 1984), children of other origins, for their part, cannot fail to experience a sense of exclusion even more keenly, unless they persuade themselves that their ancestors too were Gauls, which cannot after all be regarded as progress in their historic comprehension.

The French Language and Literature

Rather than perfecting new materials designed to "strengthen" the practice of French among the children of migrant workers, as the "order" just given to the CEFISEM instructs, again officially endorsing the concept of the linguistic deficit, one might hope that the instruction given the study commissions--"broader knowledge shared by all the students will contribute to a better mutual understanding and the development of a culture which is more open and richer" (18 December 1984)--will be applied to the teaching of history as well as French. The existence of French-speaking writers on several continents, in black Africa and in the Maghreb in particular, in fact makes possible a more open approach to other human realities in our own language, with translations eliminating every limitation in a realm in which we can no longer content ourselves with the megalomaniac principle according to which "it is French, and thus universal."

From Closed to Open Ethnocentrism

The clarifying effect which one can perceive in the ministerial statements suffers from a major difficulty: the very nature of the popularity it has won. One might fear in fact that this popularity does not derive entirely from the conviction that we are thus reestablishing the more traditional schools in terms of their content (except for data processing) and their methods, to wit the authoritarian inculcation of knowledge. Children of every origin are likely to suffer therefrom, beginning with the foreigners and all the French citizens who do not feel truly at home in the schools. It is indeed necessary to devote great concern to the knowledge they acquire. The mastery of written French is indeed an "absolute" priority for those who were not initiated in it in their families, and thus for many children of immigrants. But this vigilance does not have to do solely with discipline and the direction of the effort. It is only through rather diverse and rather autonomous situations of real activity, so that both the individual difficulties and the most original expressions will be evident therein, that it can lead to a serious assessment of intellectual gains.

The children of immigrants do not require a special pedagogy, and there is no reason to devote more attention to their specific characteristics than to those of others. When it is seen that certain educational activities or references are characterized by an arbitrary cultural aspect, instead of "compensating" for them by dangerous references to other ethnic realities, it would be well to go beyond the very principle of this narrow ethnocentrism. In other words making the educational reality more consistent with its universalist aim. "Differentiation" cannot be inculcated without moving

to the new right wing, which ungently preaches an "authentic differentialism" (Alain de Benoist), in other words apartheid, a consistent version of cultural relativism.

Apart from the fascination of the exotic or a postcolonial guilt complex, one cannot see on what basis other than humanism and rationalism, the desire to go beyond our own cultural limitations (our "ethnocentrism") in a more open approach to other cultures can take on its meaning in the schools. It is therefore not a question of renouncing our cultural tradition or of intensifying it in a so-called "competitive" kind of chauvinism, but rather deepening it by bringing our concepts and our school practices closer to the universalist values without which they too often dissolve into incoherence.

FOOTNOTES

1. Memorandum 84-34 dated 24 September 1984 (SIGES, 58 Boulevard du Lycee, 92170 Vanves.

2. Directive of the Council of European Communities dated 25 July 1977.

3. See Francoise Henry-Lorcerie, "An Intercultural Approach or Integration--The French Schools Challenged," GRAND MAGHREB, Nos 32 and 33-34, July and October 1984.

4. See A. Pierrot, "What Place Is There in the Schools for Immigrant Languages and Cultures?", CAHIERS PEDAGOGIQUES, No 229, December 1984.

5. Such as Dr Berthelier in MIGRANTS-FORMATION, No 58, September 1984.

6. B. Berthelier refers to G. Bateson, on the one hand, and schizophrenia, on the other (again in MIGRANTS-FORMATION, p 53, ci). He writes that the Arab (dialectal) relates essentially to the present. "The subject... being a prisoner of the immediate present, his speech will anticipate the future only with difficulty." This is the reason for the "submission to God" and the "community." In brief, everything would already be incorporated in language, from Islam to school failure!

7. P. Mondon, MIGRANTS-FORMATION, No 58, p 6.

8. In LES TEMPS MODERNES, No 452-53-514, p 1912.

9. Mrs Ida Simon-Barouh, No 5, February 1985.

10. Ibid., p 19. "In the common sense of the word, 'culture' is invested with merit. For our part, we will avoid using it in this sense."

11. In BOUVELIER, "Non-French-Speaking Children in the Schools," A. Colin, p 106.

12. "The Philosopher Among the Autophagous" and "Rationality and Cynicism" (referred to here as RC), Editions de Minuit (Midnight Publications), 1984 and 1985.

13. J.-P. Cheveneement at the 22 November 1984 symposium "To Be a Citizen."

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ASSIMILATION, SEPARATISM TO BE STUDIED

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 173-175

[Article by Gilles Kepel: "The Muslim Population and the Islamic Community"]

[Text] The Muslim population living in France today serves as the target of the discussions and polemics dealing with the presence of immigrants on our national territory.

According to the arguments of some, the Muslims are, thanks to their culture, so to speak, incapable of assimilation. They would be unable to share the values assumed to be basic to the French identity, the essential components of which suddenly prove to be religious, indeed racial. And Islam, with its halo of usage and custom, would keep its men and women on its side of a line which cannot be crossed, marked on the map by the blue of the Mediterranean.

In response to this argument, other certainties are voiced: the Muslims are by nature similar, indeed identical, to the rest of the population living in France. The strangeness or singularity of Islam would then be shrinking like drying leather to the boundaries of private religious practice. In this way, the Muslims in France would then melt one by one into the citizenry of a republic which pays no attention to the religious preferences of its children.

The social discussion seems to be navigating today between these two types of extreme and opposite propositions, following in the wake of a political debate which for its part is tacking between the Scylla of "send them back across the borders" and the Charybdis of "give them their citizenship." In the one case as in the other, the Muslim population has the status of a passive thing. Decisions will be made concerning these people without, apparently, any consideration of what they themselves have to say about their situation.

The effort in the series of articles which follows has been to listen to the words of the Muslims who live in France. This desire to listen is based on a simple postulate: whatever the desires of some for expulsion and others for assimilation may be, there is today a Muslim population estimated at 2.5 million individuals living in France, who due to this very fact, developed and built their style of life on French soil. This style represents a whole complex of social practices which interrelates with the organization with which the French state concerns itself. It is these practices we want to

study, in their relationship with this organization, and the purpose of this is to replace an approach based on the framework of French political categories including the Muslim population here and there, with a reverse trend designed to restructure the political categories utilized by the Muslims in France to conceive of their role and their destiny.

At the outset in the very planning of our procedure, two questions arise. Why place emphasis on the "Muslim" nature of a population which may perhaps claim not a religious identity, but other kinds, for example ethnic, social, linguistic, etc., making it inappropriate to think in terms of the very concept of a "Muslim population"? Why, moreover, look into the political aspect of social practices which, some say, have no such aspect, such as fasting, prayer or avoidance of certain types of food?

What is certain is that the public perceives the fact that 5 percent of the population living in France adheres to Islam as a problem. The fact that this is a matter of opinion, if you will, and may possibly be a false problem in relation to the more systematic concept of the world, does not change matters at all. In fact, as soon as one abandons the level of prejudice to look into the Muslim aspect of a population sociologically, one is faced with so many different practices and representations which are divergent if not contradictory among themselves, that Islam in France is no longer a given concept as such, immutable in its essence, but a subject requiring reorganization at the conclusion of the study.

And just as we are questioning the Muslim aspect of these practices and arguments, we are questioning the political aspect, that is to say what it means in terms of the French social system as a whole. Thus, for example, the prayer undertaken within the framework of private religious practice by a Muslim alone in his home does not come into the framework of our investigation. On the other hand, collective prayer, or that which takes place at the labor site, is in our view very significant, in that because of its visibility, the homily which may possibly extend it, and the premises required for its performance, it has a place in the system of symbols recognized by society and the French state.

The empirical data on the ways of being a Muslim in France today show great variety. We will attempt first of all to make a broad survey of these forms, isolating and separating from them certain pertinent characteristics in order to establish a typology of modes of behavior, practices and representations making it possible to look into the links between Islamic culture and political attitudes among the Muslim population in France, a link which is basic for those who want to contemplate the changes in law which the establishment in France of such a population might in the future require.

The fact is that the French "assimilationist" model, developed within the framework of a nation-state which is the foster brother of Jacobinism, is being put to a harsh test in this last quarter of the 20th century thanks to the upsurge of community demands, among which the regional and religious ones are most conspicuous. The foreigners assimilated and naturalized in the last 2 centuries, on the basis of a movement which is not basically different from that which gallicized the provinces and provincial dialects, experience this

process on an individual, and hardly at all a community, level. There is nothing to prove that it will always be thus, and outside France, without going as far as the imperial model of the United States, wherein communities are juxtaposed and reach agreement, our Spanish, Italian and German neighbors have integrated the concept of a nonstate community, established on their territory and in their language, in their law, from Catalonia to the Upper Adige, and from the Basques to the people of Val d'Aosta.

As will be seen in the articles which follow, the Islamic community affiliation is rather clear in a certain number of the practices and representations we have attempted to analyze. But this very affiliation shows great diversity in nature, ranging from the murid model, for example, which is very open and receptive to French society, to the Islamist model, which is more closed and instrumental in its relation to French society. Although there is without a doubt a community affiliation developing among certain Moslem protagonists in France (and probably more among the multiple and violently competitive spokesman than among the Muslims at the base level), this community seems to us to have ill-defined contours, for the time being, which represent as many points of impassioned debate.

This difficulty in specifying the contours is not caused by the people who are the focus of the study alone, but by the research team[1] making the study as well. The articles presented here are the first rough outlines of a phase designed to gather together and organize materials and preparation for an extensive sociological survey which will be undertaken later. The publication of these preliminary works, the provisional nature of which should be stressed, is intended to provide an opportunity for criticisms and remarks which will help us to define our subsequent efforts more clearly.

FOOTNOTE

1. The research team, headed by Remy Leveau, was established within the framework of the International Studies and Research Center (CERI) of the National Political Science Foundation, with the support of the Center for Studies of French Political Life (CEVIPOF), the CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research], and the Ministry of Research and Technology.

   The articles presented here were the subject of oral reports delivered during the 2 days of study held at the CERI on 28 February and 1 March 1985. The report presented by Remy Leveau and Catherine de Wenden was published separately under the title "Outline of the Development of the Political Attitudes of Immigrants From the Maghreb" in the REVUE XX[e] SIECLE, No 7, July-September 1985.

   Guy Herzet, the director of the CERI, has thanks to his decisive support enabled the research team to benefit, since it was established, from the support of the Center. We are very pleased to offer him these first fruits of our efforts.

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ARABIC RADIO STATIONS: CHARACTERISTICS, AUDIENCE

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 176-185

[Article by Luc Barbulesco: "Arab Radio Stations in the FM Band"]

[Text] It is with the Arab radio stations in the FM band which can be heard in Paris that our study begins. These radio stations are not, it goes without saying, any the less the tool, because they are "free," of various groups which make themselves the spokesmen for their listeners, and beyond that group, for a population the contours of which remain unclear--Arab, Muslim, immigrant? None of these groups could be confused by the observer with the population which, it is claimed, is represented. Nonetheless, these radio stations, insofar as they are heard, respond to needs and demands, even while they create others. In addition, a comparison of their programs, their messages, their languages and the levels of language they use makes it possible to establish a first approximation of the range of practices within the Muslim population in France.

A survey of the Arab-Muslim role in FM programs beamed toward Paris soon leads to the realization that, although neither massive nor permanent, this role is nonetheless very real. It is rather difficult to establish the exact number of the radio stations broadcasting on the FM band, since some of them appear and disappear again equally suddenly, while for others reception is difficult because of the poor technical quality or the weak power of the broadcasting facilities. Another difficulty has to do with the criteria to be adopted in defining an Arab radio station. If programs in Arabic alone (all of the programs) is obviously not a necessary condition, one can readily see that a lack of Arabic programs, above all if this is linked with clearly non-Arabic content, might exclude certain radio stations from our survey, even though a part of the Muslim population residing in Paris might listen to them (I am thinking, for example, of Radio-Soleil and Radio-Afrique).

In a first phase, and before going into a more detailed description of the content of the programs of these radio stations, we will list them, placing them in a curve which will not represent their respective frequencies (for

they do or can change these, since practically none of them is legal), but rather will assess the greater or lesser extent of their "Arab" nature. This quality of being "Arab" is in turn made up of elements such as the Islamic theme, the adoption of pro-Arab positions, preference for Arab classical or popular music, etc. Obviously, the explicit and announced desire on the part of the sponsors of a radio station to be viewed as Arab is also an element in this Arab nature.

The Emergency of a Community

Let us say at the outset that this study should be placed within a certain perspective, seen from the point of view of the relationship between these radio stations and their audiences. We believe that the role of the radio stations termed "Arab" or "Muslim-oriented" operating on the FM band is less the expression of a particular culture, in this instance that of the immigrants (even though in fact it is unofficially recognized that they play this role), than a contribution, through their very existence and their method of operation, that of free radio broadcasting, to establishing the existence (or should we say provoking the creation) of a community termed "Arab-Muslim." It is a known fact that one of the achievements of that linguistic discipline known as pragmatic is that it has shown that any communication of a message, whatever it might be, involves the emergence of at least two levels: that of the originator and that of the recipient of the message. And it is more precise to regard them more as creations of the word situation than as entities which existed prior to it. In fact, established as such by the dispatch of the message, these two levels are capable of being changed, divided and obscured in various ways in the course of the communication process.

This model of "level-creating messages" can be transposed from the area of interpersonal communications to the mass media. Moreover, the important thing here lies in the emergence, or the increasing visibility, to speak in more political terms, of new partners in the social game, partners who like to represent themselves in these days as "communities," a concept as rich and interesting as it is ambiguous.

In the range covered by this Arab-Muslim sector which is claimed and postulated by the radio stations being studied, we have then first of all, at the point of greatest openness, Radio-Orient (broadcasting on 106.5 Mhz 18 out of 24 hours a day), and then Radio G--The Voice of the Immigrant (on 98) and Radio Third World--El Sawt al Arabi (on 102.5), broadcasting during some evening hours. Two other radio stations (Radio Arabe de Paris and Radio des Musulmans) could be mentioned, but they have not broadcast since the fall of 1984, or if they are continuing to do so, it is in sporadic fashion and difficult to hear. And finally, at the other end of the range we have Radio-Beurs (broadcasting on 96.5, between 6 pm and 2 am).

A Single Multicolored Radio?

Before moving on to a study of the content of the programs broadcast by each of these radio stations, we will look briefly at their legal status. It would appear from this point of view that, Radio-Beurs excluded, none of these

stations has legal authorization to broadcast. In other words, they are all broadcasting illegally. However, this illegality is relative, since it is perfectly well-known to the public authorities, who are tolerating the situation. Some radio stations have preferred to cease broadcasting voluntarily, if only temporarily, to forestall seizure. This was the case with Radio Arabe de Paris, which broadcast for the last time during the evening of 14 November, at the end of the so-called period of tolerance. Since that date, however, it has begun again to broadcast, but only sporadically. Be that as it may, that evening broadcast, supposedly the last, by a free pro-Muslim radio station, provided an opportunity for a very fruitful discussion with the listeners, who called the studio in large numbers. It is interesting to note, in relation to the cultural role of rallying the Arab-Muslim community which this type of radio station may play, that the majority of the listeners, entirely aware of it, were very insistent about the existence of an Arab and Muslim voice in Paris, of the need for which this radio station had made them aware, and which they did not want to see disappear. Some even went so far as to urge that all three "Arab-Muslim" radio stations then broadcasting to Paris join together on the same frequency, very readily envisaging the existence of a "tricolor" radio station (on the implicit model of the Parisian Jewish radio stations).[1]

This possibility, which is not practical for the time being because of the lack of ideological compatibility among these stations, is not viewed askance by the government authorities, who could look favorably upon the development of a single denominational radio station serving the members of the second largest religious community in France. The most serious candidate among the radio stations for this role is Radio-Orient, whose proposal was submitted to the higher authorities last autumn by the ambassadors of the Arab League in Paris. The only reason authorization was not given was the impossibility at the present time of finding a frequency available in the 88-102 FM range, which is extremely crowded.

It was moreover as the future "Moslem radio station" that Radio-Orient, which was represented at the National Convention of Associations of French Muslims held in Paris last December,[2] was hailed at that gathering.

Radio-Orient is therefore the best developed and also the most professional of these radio stations. It operates, as do many private radio stations in the FM band, as an association. This association, which has taken the name "Radio-Orient--The Voice of the Paris Arab and Muslim Community" (this complete designation is regularly reiterated in both Arabic and French between programs), originally adopted as its goals, its bylaws say, "providing objective reporting on the Muslim world in all its diversity, serving the Muslim community in the spiritual, moral and artistic realms, and encouraging dialogue between civilizations and cultures."

It should be noted that the "Muslim community" should be taken in its broadest and most civilizing sense, as used in the countries of the Near East, that is to say including Christian Arabs. Not only are there Lebanese and Egyptian Christians among the 50 employees this radio station has, and not only did it share its frequency for a time with another free Christian Phalange radio station, La Voix du Cedre [The Voice of the Cedar], but also a certain number

of Christian leaders of Lebanese or French nationality were among the personalities who voiced their sympathies with and support for the newly established free radio station in 1982. This inclusion of Christians in the "Muslim community" (el-jaliya el-islamiya3) is the more remarkable since, far from being vaguely cultural, the Islamic content of this radio station's programming is entirely specific and religious in many respects.

A good number of the programs, in fact, have to do with Islamic practice and education. The Friday prayers are often broadcast over the airwaves by Radio-Orient direct from Mecca, as is the homily. In answer to a question from a listener one day, one of the station's announcers said that this program was being broadcast thanks to the Saudi authorities, with a view to serving the "jaliya islamiya" in Paris. However, when the listener expressed surprise that this program is always broadcast from Mecca and never from another Arab capital, or even from a mosque in a Paris region, this same announcer answered that this was the plan. In fact, the prayers are today being rebroadcast most of the time from a mosque in Paris.

A large part of the music library of the radio station, moreover, consists of gifts of cassettes from Saudi radio stations, Idha'at el-qur'an el-karim and Nida' el-islam.4 This material support from Saudi Arabia, far from being concealed, is entirely in the open, and is also there to be read in the budget of the association, where it is clear that the budget can be balanced thanks to private gifts coming basically from the Saudi royal family. When questioned on this point, a representative of the national authority said he saw nothing wrong in this, provided that the rule according to which an individual private gift must not exceed 25 percent of the total resources is respected.

Another rule provides that its own broadcasts must represent at least 80 percent of the total programs broadcast, for each radio station, which has not prevented the broadcasting of the recordings supplied directly by the Saudi radio stations of which we have spoken. Among these recordings are religious talks (commentaries on the Koran) by Sheikh Charawi,5 who has a large following in the Near East. His appearance on Radio-Orient cannot help but emphasize the Egyptian coloring which is also to be found, moreover, in the musical programs.

Professing thus to be Muslim, Radio-Orient might have an audience among Muslim Paris listeners who are not Arabs. Some indications, such as a letter received at the station and read over the radio in which an African listener expressed his pleasure at the existence of a radio station "heard by all the Muslims," might suggest that its audience even exceeds the boundaries of the Arab-Muslim population. The fact remains that since almost all of the station's programs are in Arabic, they must perforce be oriented more toward this audience than any other.

Very nearly all of the programs broadcast by Radio-Orient are religious. A portion of them which is not negligible can be put in the category of "educational and entertainment programs," in which the entertainment is never without educational purposes, and the educational programs always fall within a game context. Here one can see one characteristic, and certainly not the

only one, which Radio-Orient has in common with the government radio stations in the Arab countries in the Levant.

Program Entitled "I Want a Solution"

For example, a program called "How To Win" (i'raf terbah) poses puzzles for the listeners on various subjects taken from the realm of Arab culture (history, geography, art, proverbs which must be completed). There may be a fragment of music which the listener is asked to complete, also giving the name of the singer. The model established by Radio Monte-Carlo is clearly evident. This does not alter the fact that this station shows an affiliation on the part of both the announcers and the listeners with the space of the "uruba," or Arab world, in the way listener participation is solicited, in the compensation--symbolic--of the winner, a way of enhancing, and thereby confirming him.

This participation by the listeners is often requested and may even be the very essence of the broadcast. For example a Wednesday evening program called "I Want a Solution" (uridu hallan) allows the listeners to call the studio to pose a problem of a social or legal nature. In the majority of cases the issues are set forth in a letter. For example, a girl finds herself subject to mistreatment by her stepmother (her father's second wife). What should she do? Various answers are contributed by the listeners and by the announcer, who, generally speaking, stresses the fact that an unusual solution can be found for problems situated within a Muslim moral or juridical framework--problems involving a second wife, paternal authority, the emancipation of young women, etc.--because the individuals are living in a society wherein the juridical system is not Islamic. Here there is an interesting awareness of the very situation in which the Radio-Orient listeners as a whole find themselves, a situation which in turn justifies and nurtures the existence of the radio station.

Other programs too are based on letters sent to the studio, which the announcer reads into the microphone before providing an answer. A program entitled "Greetings" (tahiyya-wa-ba'd) involves the reading of letters received from prisoners. It is remarkable that the majority of these letters, which come from inmates in La Sante or Fresnes, do not by any means comment on solitude or subjective misery, but bear witness to an awareness--or an awakening understanding--of affiliation with the "Arab-Islamic community," and hardly involve any requests except those explicitly involving the desire to have this awareness nurtured by receiving books, cassettes, etc.

Finally, structured on the same principle as the preceding examples, but more general in scope and also more ambitious intellectually, a program entitled "Ask and Islam Will Answer" (es'el wal-islam yujib) takes the form of a series of "fatwa-s"7 provided by a sheikh--always the same one--on problems of daily life set forth in letters. This offers an opportunity for developing the religious dimension of these questions and stressing the real effect which Islam should have, as an ideology and a practice, on the life of Muslims. A similar program, but broadcast in French, is offered for the benefit of non-Arabic-speaking listeners.

It is notable that the program designed to provide answers which are truly Islamic to the questions of listeners covers a very vast area, as vast as that of the Muslim epistemic system itself. There is an easy transition from theological problems set forth within the framework of the traditional controversy with the two other monotheistic religions to an exposition, doubtless more succinct, of the reasons which would justify allowing the consumption of snails. But there is also a large number of questions linked with the problems of society and daily life which a Muslim living in France--and taking the fact that he is Muslim seriously--might encounter. For example, to the question of whether it is legitimate to take out life insurance, the sheikh, referring as always to various authorities, answers that life insurance as it exists in the West is not consistent with the spirit of Muslim law.

Other programs using different formulas postulate the existence of a living link between the "Arab-Muslim community" in Paris and the various sectors of Arab space. Within the framework of a program called "Dialogue" (hiwar), performers from various Arab countries who happen to be in Paris are invited to participate in a discussion with a station announcer. These celebrities (actors, singers, painters), most often from the countries of the Middle East, thus have a means of strengthening the links with the "territories" of the Arab world, which are explicitly presented as places of cultural reference. It is because of this same desire for a reference system that Radio-Orient often (whenever the opportunity arises) broadcasts special "reports" sent from the territory of one of the Arab countries in the Near East, or even elsewhere, if one of these countries is involved. For example, daily reports were broadcast direct from Sanaa while the assembly of the Islamic Conference Organization was being held in that city. More recently, a Radio-Orient correspondent reported to the listeners on the progress of King Fand during his trip to the United States. There is here an assertion of what could be called a "territorial base" serving as a concrete reference (or concrete space) for the confirmation of an Arab-Islamic community which is not at all made up solely of the religious and cultural dimensions.

It is perhaps this, the explicit reference to a concrete Arab space, or in other words a territorial base, which constitutes the difference between Radio-Orient and the other Arab radio stations in the FM band, to a greater extent than the use of the Arabic language, which as we have seen, is not total for Radio-Orient, and which we will see later on is far from lacking at the other radio stations. In fact, the two other FM band radio stations which are Arab, properly speaking (we will exclude Radio-Beurs for the time being), in other words La Voix de l'Immigre (sawt el-muhajer, or The Voice of the Immigrant, broadcasting on 98 Mhz), and La Voix Arabe (el sawt el-arabi, or The Arab Voice, broadcasting on 102.5 Mhz) make absolutely no reference to any Arab country. There can be no doubt that the language used here differs perceptibly from that one hears over Radio-Orient. It is no longer oriental Arabic, but the dialect of the Maghreb, without exception, which is employed. But this is more nearly an index of the origins of the announcers than of the cultural references of the radio stations.

The religious programs on Sawt el-muhajer, which is a part of Radio-G (a private station financially and materially supported by the communist

municipality of Gennevilliers), are assigned a substantially less important role, and the programming as a whole also involves fewer hours. News reports are given detailed treatment, with priority being given to news pertaining to Arab countries. Programs of a cultural nature are broadcast on Sunday evening, but the treatment given Arab culture here, for example on one given evening, the works of Taha Hussein,[8] is characterized by a very clear demystification effort and critical judgment. In this respect, the treatment differs from that given the same subjects on Radio-Orient, wherein the content and the style of the cultural programs are entirely similar to what is encountered in the countries of the Middle East.

Night Programming

On Saturday evening, a program called Mac el sanirin (With Those Who Keep Watch) extends late into the night, offering instrumental music and songs, and allowing the listeners to participate in a game by offering answers by telephone to puzzles, as well as involving song dedications, in imitation of professional radio stations such as Radio Monte-Carlo. Generally speaking, musical programming plays a large role in Middle Eastern, and in particular Egyptian, variety shows.

There is also a nightly musical program on El sawt el-arabi, a radio station which is a part of Radio-Tiers-Monde (Radio Third World), and which adopts a clearer ideological-political position. For example the music of Sheikh Imam[9] is offered repeatedly on the nighttime program on this radio station called layali-l-ghorba ("The Nights of the Exile"). These musical segments, to speak the truth, are used more for the purpose of breaking up a continuous monologue on the part of the announcer focused on the statement, many times reiterated, of the need for the defense of the Arab characteristics of the listeners, who are often addressed directly. "It is your Arab nature which you must defend, and it is your Arab presence (wujudak el-'arabi) which you must assert."

Moreover, the listeners are often invited to participate by telephone in discussions on subjects of the widest variety, but always related to immigrant life: "The Muslim Family," "The Arab Man and His Affective Nature--Should He Discard It To Adopt the Rationalism of the Westerners?", "Marriage With a Foreigner." The moderator of the discussion, who provides an introduction, also comments on the debate as it develops, and he likes to give a conclusive form to his statements, which tend clearly to have a pedagogical and moral tone with regard to listeners who are often awkward, and above all may speak Arabic badly. One listener called and said very simply:

"I am living with a foreign woman, outside the bonds of marriage."

"Do you know that this is a major sin in the eyes of Islam?"

"I know."

"Well, try to act as Islam dictates. Good-bye, my brother, and thank you for calling."

Then the discussion went on, with particular insistence on the (essentially French) phenomenon of young Muslim girls marrying non-Muslims.

For some time now (more or less since the beginning of February 1985), the ever more frequent presentation of religious programs has been noted on this radio station, taking up the greater part of the evening. There one hears, in particular, recorded talks by Sheikh Kichk'10 which are notable for the violence with which he attacks the progressive Arab regimes (such as the Baas regime in Iraq). Is this a resumption of control of the station by representatives of Islamism, or would the distinction between Islamic religious discourse and that of the progressive Third World be secondary to the essential thing, that is to say the assertion of an "Arab presence" on the Parisian airwaves?

It is perhaps, after all, this assertion of an Arab presence, independent of the forms it may take, which makes it possible to regard Radio-Beurs (a station whose announcers say it is neither an Arab, nor a Muslim, nor an immigrants' radio station) as a part of the complex of means of expression of the Arab-Muslim population in the Paris region. Here too, in the programming schedule of this radio station, programs--in French--with content like that of the similar broadcasts by Radio-Orient or La Voix Arabe are to be found. The program "Juridically Yours" is designed to provide solutions to the problems of daily life. The program "Parlor 107" maintains contact with prisoners.

A point it has in common with Radio-Orient is that the "territorial base," while it is situated outside the Levant, is nonetheless clearly designated. It is Algeria. Thus on Radio-Beurs, the whole of the evening of 1 November is devoted to the Algerian national holiday.

As to the nature of the music broadcast, it is substantially less oriental than that on the other radio stations. If Sheikh Imam is broadcasting (he has even been invited to broadcast live from the station), the announcers take great care to emphasize the progressive nature of his compositions that evening, and the proportion of oriental music (that is to say, basically Egyptian) is no more than a third of the time allocated for instrumental and vocal music. The other two-thirds are allocated to European and American and popular songs and Berber music.

The Shared Audience

Despite the fact that it has not to date been possible to establish any reliable estimates of the number (or affiliation) of those listening to each of these radio stations, one can be confident, as the announcers and officials at the various radio stations are, that the population which makes up the joint audience of all of these stations is for the most part immigrants from the Arab countries of North Africa and the Middle East, whose settlement in France may be recent or, quite the contrary, may go back a generation. In addition to this central listener nucleus, some radio stations located at the ends of our spectrum may seek, or rather capture, more particular and marginal categories, which find in the orientation or "tone" of this station or that an additional attraction. The young girls and boys in immigrant families from Algeria will be more at home with Radio-Beurs, which will not prevent them

from telephoning Sawt el muhajer to contribute to a discussion or to dedicate a song. On the other hand, Middle Easterners in Paris temporarily or making a more prolonged stay there will find in Radio-Orient a familiar style, which will however not prevent them from possibly considering themselves as integral parts, along with other categories of listeners, of that Parisian "Jaliya 'arabiya wa islamiya"[1] which is the main target of the station's message.

This leads us to a definition, by way of a provisional conclusion, of the status of this "Arab-Muslim community in Paris." If we compare the objective diversity of the components of this postulated community on the one hand (neither the use of the Arabic language nor Arab origin, nor even and above all the joint and massive practice of Islam can serve as pertinent criteria for such a definition), and on the other hand the singular insistence by all of the radio stations, Radio-Beurs excepted, on a single, same so-called Arab and Islamic community as the target of their messages, it would appear that the principle for the definition and establishment of such a community lies in large part in this message itself.

Now the study of a given communications situation, provided it does not overlook those aspects which are precisely "situational," cannot but bring forth the basic fact that speech, or rather the very gesture of speech, even before it is invested with any content whatever, makes of the interlocutor a hearer, establishing a sort of existence for him. Therefore speech will ipso facto qualify the hearer. In the present instance, this speech occurs within the framework of a situation characterized by a loss of identity, and also a search for identity, or let us say, more precisely, a search for the redefinition of identity. Radio, and the radio stations, will contribute greatly to this redefinition, the more so because the arrow in the classic diagram showing the direction of the message is reversible here. The hearers often become speakers, and are even encouraged to do so, in writing and by telephone. This participation by the listeners, far from being marginal and purely for its entertainment value (as is the case with the peripheral radio networks, RTL [Radio-Television Luxembourg] or Radio Monte-Carlo, which popularized this procedure in France), is entirely functional here. The listeners see themselves in the image of them the radio station proposes, and by this admission of recognition, they in return nurture the "consciousness-raising" effort being made with the audience by the radio station announcers. This leads gradually to the emergence of a specific group or community within the population of France as a whole. Also, it is known that the gaining of a group's awareness of itself, and thus its self-definition, cannot be dissociated from its crystallization as a distinct group. Who knows whether in such crystallization, the role of as immaterial an entity as radio broadcasting may not be as important as that played by more visible activities, those of the associations, or the truly religious activities of the prayer assemblies.

FOOTNOTES

1. As is known, the various movements found in the Jewish community of the Paris region, each of which is initially represented by a particular station (Judaiques-FM, Radio-J-Shalom), have (since 1984) been brought together on the same frequency. This grouping however has in no way

changed the diversity of these movements and approaches, which retain their distinctive characteristics.

2. This convention brings the representatives of the associations of "French Muslims," and not all the Muslim associations, together in Paris every year. The influence of the "French Muslims born in Algeria" is very visible in the speeches delivered on this occasion by the various representatives. It is therefore especially interesting to see a link established between the "harka" approach and that of a station like Radio-Orient.

3. The Arab word "jaliya" is rather widely used. It can apply equally to a group of nationals located abroad (for example, the Egyptian colony in London) or a broader population. The use of this word here allows us to avoid "ta'ifa," which has too religious a connotation.

4. Radio du Saint Coran (Holy Koran Radio) and L'appel de l'Islam (The Call of Islam).

5. Sheikh Muhammad Metwalli Cha'rawi (born 1911), former minister of the "waaf-s," plays a collective pedagogical role in Egypt (and well beyond it, as has been noted) very effectively. His lessons in religion, based almost exclusively on the Koran, and thus seemingly neglecting the scholarly tradition of the commentaries, have a wide influence among the popular strata because of their massive diffusion through innumerable pamphlets and via television. The very person of the sheikh is an important factor in the effectiveness of his teaching: good-natured but also severe, authoritative but also an actor, he is the embodiment of a certain style of da'wa (catechism), which some regard as patronizing.

6. It is known that the famous radio network of Monaco beams a large number of programs in Arabic toward the Middle East, where it has a large audience. The news broadcasts are highly regarded, but so are the variety programs, the American style of which (contests, games, musical novelties, Top Five) contrasts with that of the local stations.

7. The "fatwa-s", which correspond to what is called in the Jewish tradition teshuvot, are responses provided to the believer by a religious authority (who is not a priest, but an expert on tradition) on the widest variety of subjects. The answers are always supported by references, not from the Koran alone, but "legal" texts as well (by traditional jurists), and never fail to conclude with the formula "God alone knows" (Allahu a'lam).

8. Taha Hussein is the great writer and philosopher on Egyptian history (1889-1973). His subtle and complex thought was the focus of official rehabilitation in his country, which transformed it into an ideology.

9. This blind Egyptian musician, who is neither a sheikh nor an imam, as the Radio-Beurs announcers emphasized on the evening he was invited to broadcast (heavily stressing the absolutely "secular" nature of his message), has become linked with what is called "committed" or "progres-

sive" Arab songs. Together with the poet and songwriter Fouad Negm, he gave a recital (at the Amandiers Theater in Nanterre, in the spring of 1984) which was a great success. He now lives in France.

10. A celebrated Egyptian preacher who, during the summer of 1981, was among the most virulent critics, from the pulpit, of President Sadat. On the role played by his ideas in the ideology of Islamism, see the work by G. Kepel, which follows here, "The Lesson of Sheikh Faisal" (Note 4).

11. Arab-Islamic community.

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EFFECTS OF ISLAM ON DAILY LIFE

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 186-196

[Article by Gilles Kepel: "The Lesson of Sheikh Faisal"]

[Text]The Issues in the Islamist Debate on Muslim Immigration in France

The France of the 1980s has several hundred mosques, prayer rooms and premises designed for Muslim religious use. They serve multiple religious, cultural and social functions, and appear in various forms. Alongside the monumental mosques in the Fifth Precinct of Paris or in Mantes-la-Jolie, whose minarets rise into French skies, there are much humbler arrangements for the gathering of believers--carpets laid down in factory halls and the basements of HLM [low-cost housing] buildings and workers' clubs.

According to Islamic doctrine, believers must manifest their faith in a certain number of religious practices, including, apart from the profession of faith, the giving of alms, fasting during Ramadan, pilgrimages to Mecca and prayer. If the five daily prayers are the signs offered by each Muslim to show individual adoration of God, the collective prayer on Friday noon, which ordinarily takes place in the proper place, which is the mosque, serves the purpose of reincorporating the faithful Muslim in the community of believers week after week. Following the ritual prostration, the believers listen to their imam deliver the Friday sermon (khutba), in which he takes up the problems of the "Umma" and the best means of resolving them, governed by the injunctions provided by God through the text of the Koran or from the mouth of his Prophet.

In France, the majority of Muslims, who are factory employees often assigned to shift work, have a problem in participating in the collective Friday prayers. If this difficulty in carrying out a ritual requirement is symbolic evidence that the community as such cannot gather together, thus emphasizing the emigrant situation, the hegira (hijra), the fact nonetheless remains that the believers can meet during the free days of the French weekend in their various religious premises. By way of compensation for the sermon they were unable to hear altogether on Friday, they attend lessons (dars), through which the preachers attempt to bring the scattered threads of the identity of their flock together again.

It is one of these lessons I would like to present and analyze here. It was set forth at the beginning of 1984 in the mosque established in the basement of a workers' club administered by the SONACOTRA[1] in Bagnolet. The imam who is its author, the Lebanese Sheikh Faisal Maoulaoui, or Abou 'Ammar, enjoys some renown among his coreligionaries in France. He sponsors various federations and confederations of Muslim associations, and is the spiritual guide of the Islamic Group of France (GIF). The lesson of Sheikh Faisal gives a voice to one of the trends of thought which runs through the immigrant Muslim population, without by far constituting its majority representation in this year of 1985--the Islamist faction, whose attitude is the daughter of the thinking of the Muslim Brothers and the sister of that of the various Islamist movements which enrich the news reports from the Middle East and North Africa.

In the lesson set forth here, the subject of which is "The Commandery of Good and the Rooting Out of Evil,"[2] Sheikh Faisal drafted an image of the world designed for the Muslim immigrant workers who make up his weekend audience in the windowless room in the SONACOTRA club. He set forth for them a model for the interpretation of Islam, and through it, an explanation of their present situation and an affirmation of their identity as combatants in a "jihad" the purpose of which is to bring down the regime governing in violation of the injunctions of God, and to build the Islamic state.

To understand how such a model is set up is to identify the procedures making possible the resolution of the most common problems in the daily life of a Muslim immigrant worker through commitment to a battle which establishes a communion between the social system and the transcendental order. And evaluating the dynamics of this model, in comparison to those characteristic of other movements of thought found elsewhere in the Muslim population, leads to the question as to whether the solutions it offers, with its preaching of "transcendental militancy," can satisfy--and to what point--the social, cultural and identity requirements of this population.

In order to understand the establishment of the Islamist model, it is essential first of all to review the lesson of Sheikh Faisal itself. It was presented as a lengthy address, the tape recording of which took up a 90-minute cassette. The sheikh spoke in Arabic, and used the so-called "grammatical" (fusha) level of language (which is a kind of koine understood by literate individuals), while also having frequent recourse to the Lebanese dialect, particularly, for example, when he referred to this or that trivial situation. The general poverty of vocabulary, doubtless dictated by the mediocre Arabic linguistic level characteristic of a listener from the Maghreb, and the systematic use of redundancy and reptition deprive a literal translation of the lesson, or of its most important passages, of any great interest. Thus we will examine a summary, supplemented here and there by quotations from the original text.

The Commandery of Good and the Rooting Out of Evil

This is the theme of this lesson, which is not "an academic or scientific lecture" but a series of "considerations on a subject pertaining to our present activity: calling the people to God and working for the reestablishment of the Islamic government."

The commandery of good and the rooting out of evil are "the basic component giving structure to the personality of the Muslim and allowing the building of the Islamic society." It is the very expression of faith in God, its first and necessary achievement. Thus it is through the rooting out of evil that the Muslim is defined, a minima. He who, when he sees an evil, does not shun it in his heart, at the very least, has not the slightest iota of faith, and excludes himself from Islam. Returning its power to Islam means commanding good and pursuing evil. But one must further know what good and evil mean. For lack of a criterion to distinguish one from the other, "the community of believers is living today in dissension."

Innovation and Heresy

Many Muslims believe, for example, that any "bid'a," anything new which departs from dogma, even if only its minor aspects, is an evil. They refer to a saying by the Prophet (hadith) to the effect that "any innovation is heresy, any heresy is perdition (dalala), and all perdition leads to hell."

Now it must be understood that there are three degrees of innovation, or heresy. The most serious, the level of doctrinal heresy (bid'a fi-l 'aqida) leads straight to the flames of hell. Such heresy is committed by those, like the philosophers, who assign attributes to God contrary to what the Koran says. The second degree, heresy in religious practice (bid'a fi-l 'ibadat), nullifies the practice involved, but does not lead to Gehenna unless the express purpose of the act was to violate the revealed texts. The lowest degree, that of innovation in the realm of customs and social relations (bid'a fi'l akhlaq wa-l mu'amalat), nullifies only the work affected, without invalidating faith, unless the explicit purpose was to violate the texts.

There are however Muslims who regard everything new as heretical and evil such as, for example, the wearing of "European costumes (thiyab ifranjiyya)--trousers, vests and ties," and who say: "A tie? Heresy, perdition, damnation here and now!" Now "these garments are better suited to a cold climate than the djellabah, which was designed for heat and the desert.... The Prophet himself wore a Byzantine costume when one was given him as a gift," and can one imagine soldiers waging war today in djellabahs? (laughter).

Quoting Hassan al Banna, the founder and supreme guide of the Association of Muslim Brothers, Sheikh Faisal expressed the view that wearing such clothing is not a reprehensible innovation, insofar as modesty is respected (garments should conceal the form of the body), and so long as the purpose is not to imitate the Jews or the Christians. If this were the purpose, heresy would be involved and would be an evil to be pursued.

Only one who has "'ilm," one who is versed in canon law and the jurisprudence of Islam, can judge whether this or that action is heretical. Now very often, believers come to blows about this, mutually accusing each other of heresy without understanding what it is all about. Banna, arriving in a village one day, saw that the Muslims were divided into two factions which were tearing each other to pieces. One group insisted that a prayer must be said to the Prophet when the muezzin's call rang out, while to the others this was heresy.

They put themselves in the hands of the supreme guide, who told them to eliminate both the prayer to the Prophet and the muezzin's call. Banna explained to his listeners, who were astonished by this decision, that dissension in the ranks of the believers is a worse evil than the heresy involved in this instance.

Another example of an ignorant charge of heresy is this: a Muslim Brother, an adolescent of between 16 and 18, read in the prayer manual of Sheikh Albani that in performing one's devotions, one must arrange one's hands in a certain fashion. The next day he went to see a venerable sheikh of 70, the leader of a Muslim association, to whom he said: "You should not place your hands as you do in praying. Your prayer is invalidated. It is heresy, perdition, hell." Laughing, Sheikh Faisal recalled that his venerable colleague retorted as follows to the adolescent: "Then we and all our ancestors, who have always prayed in this way, will burn in the flames of hell, and you and you alone, because you read three lines of Arabic text yesterday, will go to paradise?"

The Greatest Evil

There are degrees of heresy and degrees of evil. Being aware of this makes it possible to avoid missing the mark, mistaking the tree for the forest, so that one can concentrate all his efforts on a single goal, chasing out the worst of evils (al munkar al akbar). "Master Sayyid" (Sayyid Qutb) defined that evil thus: it is the exercise of power in violation of the injunctions of God (al hukm bi ghayr ma anzala Allah). The favored tools for casting out this evil, that is to say the overthrow of an ungodly regime (al hukm al jahili), followed by the establishment of the Islamic government, are the jihad (holy war) and exhortation through sermons (khutba).

This is the single theme which should be preached in order to rally the believers who are wasting their energies on the pursuit of more trifling evils. "There are people who say: 'Too bad (ma'alich), let Hafez el Assad govern, let him wreak what havoc he will, although it is known that he is an Alawite, an infidel, and let us concern ourselves with casting out someone who prays to the Prophet when the muezzin's call sounds'."

This is a solemn moment: all of the energies of the community should be devoted to chasing out the worst evil, and one must presume that the internal disputes among the Muslims are secondary, given this perspective. By making too much of them, one plays into the hands of the enemies of Islam. This is the case for example in connection with the problem of intercession (tawassul), which is practiced in particular by the followers of the brotherhoods, who appeal to God to give them creatures to intercede with him in their favor --Marabouts, dervishes, living or dead, saints and prophets, and others. Many Muslims wage a merciless battle against those who make such appeals, since intercession kills the spirit of Islam, according to which God has no associates. But Sheikh Faisal believes, with regard to the disputes which give rise to the polemic among the believers about the legitimacy of intercession (and on that basis, the debate for and against the brotherhoods), that as long as one addresses God himself, it matters little how.

Hand, Tongue and Heart

If the pursuit of the greatest evil, involving overthrowing an ungodly regime, is the unifying goal around which the community should rally, it is necessary to know how to make knowledgeable use of the various means which can provide this effort with a concrete expression.

It is to the suitability of their use that Sheikh Faisal devotes the third and last part of his lesson, beginning it with a reference to the celebrated "hadith." "If you see an evil, let your hand reject it. If you cannot do this, use your tongue, and if you cannot do that, reject it in your heart." Here again, Islam establishes degrees. If one fails to understand and respect this, one is likely to achieve a result opposite to that sought. It is this risk which is run by more than one Muslim when, in his enthusiasm and passion (himasa), he wants to use his hand, or force, to eliminate each evil he sees, our sheikh explains, illustrating his statement with an example narrated in Lebanese dialect very characteristic of the people. "Well, you are in a Muslim neighborhood, there is a mosque there, all very neat (nadif), and here comes a guy who wants to open a movie house or a bar. Then the neighborhood people jump on him: 'What? You want to open a movie house, a bar? This is a clean neighborhood, nothing (reprehensible) here, and evil is going to come in? And...and...and...we got to force him out, that's all!' Then they toss in dynamite and blow up the bar.... And why? Because 'if you see an evil, let your hand reject it'."

This is not the meaning of the "hadith," according to Sheikh Faisal. The only ones in a position to chase out evil physically, by force, are those who have authority in their own domain (sahib al sultan fi sultanihi)--the prince (al hakim) in his country, the father in his house. Others must abstain. "You are the boss of a factory with a hundred workers. You see an evil among them: you can eliminate it physically or in any way you choose, because you are the boss of the plant. Now then, if I see an evil in your factory--what if I want to eliminate it by force? This would be entirely senseless."

But even one who has authority should not use force without contemplating its suitability. Let us take the example of a Brother living here in the present. He is a father and he wants his 20-year-old son to pray. He uses force. "He hits him (biemzel fih)." So the son prays, but without making his ablutions, if he can avoid it, and he is the friend neither of his father nor his God. And the day he leaves the paternal home, he will cease to pray and will be lost to Islam.

One must always bear in mind that we live in an ungodly society (jahili), and it serves no purpose to be too harsh with children to make them pray, when they see that few of their comrades around them pray. And here again, one must be careful lest the inopportune use of force bring about a result opposite from what is sought.

Today, then, it is with the tongue, through exhortation, that we should, in 99.99 percent of the cases, embark upon the rooting out of evil. This is a task which falls to the preacher, par excellence.

Strategy for a Time of Weakness

What does eliminating evil "in one's heart" mean, Sheikh Faisal asked his audience, in concluding his lesson. It means withdrawing (muqata'a) from the society in which one lives, if one cannot eliminate the evil one sees, they answered. Wrong interpretation: we are in fact in a time of weakness (waqt al du'f), there are few of us, and sinners abound. "The countries of Europe are wholly evil (kulluha munkarat): drink, women and everything! And if we decide to withdraw, where will we go? Return to our countries? Because they would be free of all evil? On the contrary! Shall we go then to the mountaintops? And what would we do there?" No, one must remain among the sinners to preach to them. And in such a situation, the pursuit of evil "in the heart" involves maintaining one's minimal Islamism in one's heart of hearts, never forgetting its moral and doctrinal criteria, which the pressures of the corrupt society (fassad) in which we live threaten to dissolve. Thus, for example, if a Muslim sees his nubile daughter going out without a veil, and if at the very least, his heart does not suffer pangs of sorrow, then there is nothing of Islam left in him.

The Meaning of the Lesson

If we in turn were required to "classify" this morsel of Islamist eloquence, it would have to be placed somewhere in between the sermons of the great international preachers, the stars of the "khutba," of which Sheikh Abd al Hamid Kichk of Cairo is the most brilliant,[4] and the little homilies of a whole crowd of ordinary preachers delivered in the basements of HLM buildings or adapted factory premises. The hundreds of cassettes of tape-recorded sermons by Sheikh Kichk are on sale in all of the best Islamic bookstores in France, where, as in Egypt, in the Gulf region or in the Maghreb, they are an integral part of the auditory environment of the Muslim population. Sheikh Faisal does not enjoy this popularity. While his words and his message have been recorded on cassettes, they have not as yet enjoyed anything but private distribution in some bookstores of a clearly defined type. As compared to the stentorian oratory of the Cairo preacher, his colleague in Bagnolet can only offer a thin voice. Where Kichk makes successive use of a thousand metaphorical notes, plunges his listeners into scatological jokes to propel them into the theory of international relations, loses them in commentaries on the Koran and in surgical jargon in order to lead them to the threshold of unjust government, Sheikh Faisal, for his part, employs only a vocabulary poor in images and a pedagogical method which relies on constant repetition of some key ideas, illustrated by examples taken from an ordinary world and from among the most oft-repeated episodes in the life of the Prophet.

Our imam is not very likely to have great success on the radio or cassettes, but in the very effort he puts into persuasion, in his patient and scrupulous didactics, he reveals the undeniable virtue of clarity and a very keen political sense, which assure him of a measure of esteem within the immigrant Muslim population, with which he can communicate in a language which is not without eloquence and which is anchored in daily experience.

To analyze the lesson of Sheikh Faisal here means making an effort to determine what procedures have been used to establish an Islamist image of the

Muslim immigrants in France and how a model has been developed which, by coding the events of real life, transports them into a new semantic universe and takes them through a transcendental realm which dictates a form of militancy the goal of which is the transformation of the social system.

The structure of the meaning which informs our lesson is topped by a keystone at which the lines of force made clear by Sheikh Faisal converge. This keystone, on which Sayyid Qutb's coat of arms is inscribed, is the identification of "the greatest of all evils" in the characteristics of the ungodly regime.

At this geometric point, located at the center of the lesson, the curve of heresy and the curve of pursuit intersect like two ribs of a vault. By rejecting the former, Sheikh Faisal minimizes the dissension in a community he wants to rally in the identification of the greatest of evils. By rejecting the second, he creates the ideal political attitude for this community to adopt in its present immigrant situation.

The Curve of Heresy

The Islamist discussion, in its multiple variations, is but one of the Muslim subcultures which share the field of Islamic culture. It is adjacent there to other subcultures which may also include associative life in various forms, multiple brotherhood memberships, and individual piety--all kinds of ways and means in which Muslims experience and develop their Islamic nature. These subcultures have in part a life which is particular to each one, but in addition, they all develop and are defined in relation to the others, and they function within an overall cultural structure of which the very dynamics is ensured by the effects of the clashes among the subcomplexes. Through its practices and its discourse, the Islamist movement is thus developing a particular image of Islam which is in contradiction with the models proposed by the Marabout faction, for example.

The profession of the preacher is judged, from this point of view, by the manner in which he is able to defend and illustrate his system of images, taking into account the sociopolitical context within which he delivers his sermon or lesson.

When he addresses the Muslim immigrant workers gathered to listen to him in the basement of a SONACOTRA club in Bagnolet, Sheikh Faisal does not by any means employ the incendiary tone used in a whole Wahhabite tradition (of which it is, moreover, the heir) in the sandy deserts of Arabia against mystics and Sufis they were eager to charge with "associationism" (chirk) and godlessness. The truth is that the time and place do not in fact lend themselves to the extreme doctrinal harshness which, unless it were implemented by the sword of the prince, could only give rise to dissension within the community. For the believers who are immigrants are in a situation of weakness. Everything must be done, first of all, to rally them, and to that end, sophistry must be used with a view to integration, and not segregation. Therefore Sheikh Faisal has very soothing things to say about those who have recourse to the intercession of a "creature" in appealing to God, while one is accustomed to hearing Islamist discourse of much greater vigor in the Muslim countries themselves

when it comes to the brotherhoods often accused of having "suffocated Islam" under the dervish rubbish. However, this very strategic tolerance of the differences among believers never degenerates into laxism. This is one of the thresholds the Muslims could never cross, on pain of abandoning Islam. If intercession is tolerated, it is on the express condition that the intercessor is not confused with God.

The lesson of Sheikh Faisal is used to make a clear and attractive concept of an Islamic community space from which the little trivial tensions arising in connection with heresies of the second order, minor evils, have been removed. But its clarity is subject to two prior conditions which establish boundaries: the lower limit, already described, creates in principle a minimal sector of Islam outside which one must not step. Doing so would involve doctrinal heresy, which as set forth by the sheikh is attributed to a single example--the "philosophers" (of medieval Islam), in whom we would wager his listeners would hardly be likely to see anything of themselves. This is the point at which "not the slightest iota of faith remains," being the situation of those whose hearts are no longer stabbed at the sight of an unveiled Muslim woman. The other prior condition establishing the Islamic community space of which Sheikh Faisal wants to be the architect is the culmination of the battle of the Muslims in a single goal, the pursuit of the greatest evil, that is to say the overthrow of the ungodly regime.

The Islamist subculture is characterized precisely by the absolute primacy it assigns to this goal, but the original aspect introduced by Sheikh Faisal is that he makes of this priority a condition which in some way suffices to establish the Islamism of his immigrant audience. Any rooting out of an evil of lesser importance is seen not only as secondary, but even superfluous. This is, I believe, what characterizes the meaning of timeliness as set forth by our preacher. In an immigrant situation, the Muslim population should first of all be rallied in one community and, according to Sheikh Faisal, there is no better unifying theme than that of this elimination of the greatest evil, as defined by Sayyid Qutb, that is to say the overthrow of the ungodly regime.

The Curve of Pursuit

Such is the basic theory of the Islamist discourse. Adapted to it there is a practice, a political strategy, wherein the reference is transcendental but the aim is terrestrial. While Sheikh Faisal urges reconciliation of the social system and the celestial order, the coincidence of the former with the latter involves the pursuit of the jihad, the holy war. This jihad, provided that society is its framework, comes up against resistance the importance of which the Islamist movement must be able to assess, if it hopes to avoid being swept away as of its first public appearance.

In describing the curve of pursuit and specifying the conditions under which one should use "the hand," "the tongue" and "the heart," Sheikh Faisal takes a position in a debate which causes constant turbulence in the Islamist movement and gives rise to discussions and factions within it.

The major obstacle which the Muslim Brothers and their followers have always come up against involves the strategy for seizing power. Because of its failure to set forth a clear doctrine here, the leadership of the Association of Brothers found itself seriously challenged in Egypt, beginning at the end of the 1940s. Since then, differing schools, giving priority to the use of force or to the use of persuasion for bringing down the ungodly regime, have opposed each other. In Nasser's Egypt of the 1960s, Sayyid Qutb developed a whole dialectic concerning the use of each method, as a function of the "weakness" or the "strength" of the Islamist movement as compared to the determination of the ungodly state. According to him, the stronger the state is, the more dangerous a violent open struggle against it will be. Some of the young readers of Qutb concluded therefrom that it was necessary to withdraw from society to build a pure countersociety, in order later, when the number and the determination of the militants had reached their peak, to return to the rotting Babylon to conquer it. Others believed that such isolation was futile and doomed to failure, and gave their approval to an immediate putschist strategy, like that which culminated in the assassination of Sadat in October of 1981. Still others, finally, believed that the time was right neither for a coup d'etat nor for a new hegira, but for exhortation and preaching to the Muslim masses, in order to persuade them of the validity of the Islamist model.

It is as an arbiter among the various voices in this debate that Sheikh Faisal, for his part, served. In his view, and he does not allow the slightest doubt, the believers (that is to say, and by metonymy, the Islamist movement), when they are immigrants, are in a situation of weakness par excellence: evil is everywhere. Under such circumstances, the ill-considered use of violence to combat an ungodly regime would be truly suicidal. Withdrawal from the ungodly society, urged by the young listener, would be futile. For unless one set out for the mountain summit, toward what Medina would the hijra proceed? (The term hijra, in Arabic, means hegira--the political flight of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina, as well as the emigration of the workers.) Evil is present in the countries of origin just as it is in the host countries: the ungodly regime prevails everywhere.

It should be noted that at no point in the lesson we have studied did Sheikh Faisal designate the location of the ungodly regime with any precision which would justify identifying it with the French authorities. The only embodiment of the greatest of evils mentioned by name is the person of Syrian President Assad, an "Alawite and Infidel." Should one see in this vagueness, in which only the characteristics of the "Machiavelli of Damascus" are described, a tactical concern for the caution which would safeguard our preacher from any future expulsion from the territory, thus spoiling his preaching, for a time? Without the need to reject this hypothesis totally as an absurdity, a priori one could not reduce the clarification of the problem to it exclusively either.

I believe that, more basically, the Islamist militants see their immigrant status in France as a period and a locality for training and retreat. In this country, they enjoy a freedom of assembly, to publish and to organize vastly broader than is to be found in the nations from which they came. This is a rather important stage in their overall strategy, and the risk which would be

involved in designating the French state as the absolute evil to be brought down immediately would very speedily put the very existence of the movement in danger. Therefore a destabilization effort within the framework of French society, whatever form it might take, is not included among the tactical hypotheses suggested by Sheikh Faisal in his lesson. It is more important, for him and his friends, to broaden the base of their recruiting within the immigrant population and to propagate the Islamist model than to run the risk of a confrontation with the French authorities from which they would probably emerge the losers. From this point of view, we should note the thesis of our preacher in assigning the factory boss alone the authority to chase out evil there by force. Here we see one of the famous "integrists," eagerly charged with responsibility for the strikes by certain politicians and newsmen,[5] surprised while preaching social peace, in Arabic and in the name of Allah, to his audience of immigrant workers. The reality does not always correspond, as one can see, with the phantasms which appear so clearly before one's eyes.

These are the elements in an analysis of the Islamist image of policy which, in a first attempt, one can derive from a lesson taught in the basement of an immigrant workers' club. Let us recall that the voice of Sheikh Faisal is not by any means at all that which makes itself most clearly heard among the Muslim population in France. But in his discourse, he drafts a model of Islamic culture which is structured and consistent, and which is situated at one of the extremes of the spectrum of immigrant Muslim subcultures. By emphasizing the pursuit of the greatest evil and exalting preaching as the means of this pursuit par excellence, he tends to isolate those who hear him within a community rallied for future militancy. Here, because it is intellectually oriented toward a transcendental realm, the terrestrial reflection of which has erupted all around the Mediterranean, the policy does not involve a priority return toward the French social system nor does it seek to revive its contradictions. Sheikh Faisal puts tactics in the service of strategy, and is working to transform the Muslim population of France, over the long term, into an Islamic community which will one day make the return trip to other Meccas, from which to find and cast out idolatry and iniquity.

FOOTNOTES

1. SONACOTRA [National Workers' Housing Construction Company], a body which manages a large number of housing units for the immigrant workers in France.

2. "The Commandery of Good and the Rooting Out of Evil" (al amr bi'l ma'ruf wal-l nahi 'an al munkar), according to the translation by Massignon and Berque, is the "coat of arms" of Islam.

3. Sheikh al din al Albani is a personality in the Islamist movement in the Middle East. Known for his virulent homilies, which put him in the "extremist" fringe of the movement, he is also the author of a prayer manual rather widely carried in the Muslim bookstores in France. However, the rival work, the Ta'lim al Salat by Mahmoud Sawwaf [leader of the Iraqi Muslim Brothers] is much more widely available.

4. For a comparison of a sermon by Kichk and the lesson of Sheikh Faisal, I take the liberty of referring to the chapter "The Preaching of Sheikh Faisal" in "The Prophet and the Pharaoh"--Islamist Movements in Contemporary Egypt," by G. Kepel, Paris, La Decouverte, 1984, pp 165-182.

5. I have to a very great extent spared the reader the innumerable repetitions characteristic of the pedagogy of Sheikh Faisal.

6. See the article by Jacques Barou farther on.

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ACTIVITY, ROLE OF MURID ASSOCIATIONS

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 197-206

[Article by A. Moustapha Diop]

[Text] Among the Senegalese migrants, the practice of Islam was for long years clandestine, marginal and pietistic. Limited as it was to the immigrants' centers in certain neighborhoods[1] with a heavy concentration of African Muslims, the religious phenomenon did not begin to emerge from its cocoon until the year 1977. The adherents of a Senegalese brotherhood, the Murid Brotherhood,[2] were the main artisans of this process.

Murid preaching, which was begun by the Senegalese students and apprentices in Paris, revealed an Islamic practice within the immigrant population which approached the aspects of the sociocultural environment in which it was developing in an original fashion. Following a phase of explanation designed to combat the prejudices and stereotypes which existed concerning the brotherhood within the Senegalese student population, Muridism then opened itself to other circles and served as the vector of a certain number of conversions.

The process of popularizing this doctrine, inspired by the message of its founder, Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba, whom the adherents of Muridism also call Serign Touba, came about in a number of fields of socialization, through two associations, one Senegalese and the other international. This study traces the origins of these associations, following a brief summary of the Murid doctrine. From an Islam lived in a vacuum by itinerant merchants, there was a transition to an Islam which has been rethought and reworked by social protagonists (students and apprentices) who, qualified to decode the mysteries of the sociocultural structures in the surrounding environment, were able to provide the national, ethnic and religious group to which they belong with intellectual dynamism. But the development of the Murid weltanschauung within the immigrant Islamic culture, far from seeking to confine the Muslim population in a fixed community, turned in upon itself, proposes to it and prepares for it bridges toward French society, into the sectors of which it put new life.

Outline of Murid Doctrine[3]

Born in the Baol, in the heart of Senegal, the Murid movement was subject to numerous exactions during the colonial period. Perceived in terms of the ideologies of the time as an "Islamic deviation," a sect "peddling paradise," a fraternal and monoethnic Wolof[4] "infernal machine," Muridism, according to the precepts of its founder, Ahmadou Bamba (1852?-1927), falls within the spiritual area of the Prophet.

The Murid doctrine is based on a structure with a triple dimension: the "baia," or pact of allegiance, which establishes the relations between master and disciple; the "irada," the will to progress toward God; and the "khidma," or labor.

This last concept, which constitutes the keystone of the doctrine, can be understood on three levels:

--the relation of man to God follows and implements the Koran verse which says "I have created men and the jinns to adore me." Man is but love and obedience in his relations with God.

--the relation of man to himself. The individual should engage in constant introspection and self-criticism "in order to detect his own shortcomings and lacks, the better to combat them." The individual should combat his "nafs" (soul, ego) through humility and perseverance.

--the relation of man to society. The individual incorporates all of his actions in the framework of community life. He must work for the good of the community with the goal of being in harmony with God. Faith and labor must guide all of the actions of the true Murid.

From Withdrawal to Proselytism in France

With the exception of the Murid soldiers who came as a part of the "war effort" between 1914 and 1918, the establishment of the Murid population in France really began just after the former colonies gained independence. Sharing the French attraction to things exotic, the Murid peasants, abandoning an unfertile land, became merchants of "objets d'art" (masks, bracelets) and swarmed into the various provinces of France. To this migratory movement was added that of the students and apprentices from Senegal. Without denying its economic and cultural aspects, the Murids view their exodus to Europe from a mystical perspective. In his writings, the founder of the movement, Ahmadou Bamba, predicted the popularization of the Murid movement. "I will carry the message to all the sons of Adam beyond the seas and the continents."

Until 1977, the Murid movement existed in an enclosed space. It was turned in upon itself in the Touba[5] era. The itinerant Murid merchants, who had chosen to settle in the Chalon quarter in Paris, organized themselves in small groups, recreating the original pattern of community life. Under the leadership of an influential member, the representative of the caliph, they organized "da'iras" (religious circles with 20-30 members) in order to collect the dues to be sent to Touba, to provide mutual aid, and to gather once a week

to read the Koran and sing the "qassida" (in this instance, the poems of Ahmadou Bamba). The Murid movement was almost invisible, being the prerogative of specialized practitioners little inclined or unsuited to popularize the thinking of their sheikh (spiritual guide).

This attitude seems justified on several levels. In their development, the merchants gave priority to one of the axes of the "khidma," to wit labor. For cultural and situational reasons, they were not equipped to interpret the signs and symbols of the host society, and within the Senegalese community itself, whether in Marseilles or Paris, any effort at popularization was initially doomed to failure, since the split between the brotherhoods--Tijan[6] and Murid--as very definite. Each sector defends its own spiritual bastion. The Murid intellectuals capable of popularizing the doctrine are confined by the yoke of political-union demands within the students' associations.

The year 1977--let us remember that Ahmadou Bamba died in 1927--marked a turning point in the process of popularizing and disseminating Muridism in France. It should be noted that in Senegal, in that same era, a resurgence of interest in the Murid doctrine was seen, running throughout the social fabric in the urban centers: "da'iras" were established and multiplied in the various neighborhoods in Dakar, and, in a wholly symptomatic phenomenon, Muridism effected a penetration which was not negligible in the university complex in Dakar, the age-old site of dispute and the stronghold of the political opposition.

In Paris, this "call of Islam" developed at the beginning in an endogenous environment, at the Golden Gate in the 12th Precinct. Ponia, the African students' club, located on Poniatowski Boulevard, was the fief of the strongly political students, the veterans of "consciousness raising" who were nostalgic for May 1968. It was in this veritable mine field that a minority of Murid followers and sympathizers, under the iron rule of a Senegalese apprentice who had just arrived from Dakar, attempted to popularize the thinking of Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba.

The process of popularization was divided into two phases. The "phase of weakness" occurred within a context of mistrust, ironic curiosity, contradictory debate and research work. Later, in 1977, in the "phase of strength," the Murid missionaries established a structure, the Association of Murid Students and Apprentices in Europe (AESME), which became the Islamic Murid Movement in Europe (MIME) in 1983, and then embarked on finding international forums. This was the "Murid boom" within and outside the boundaries of France. Cells or "da'iras" were established in the university towns, and conversions were made and reported in the association's journal, N'DIGEL (The Murid Voice).[7]

The Period of Suspicion

Within the framework of bilateral cooperation, Senegal sent an official, the assistant to a prefect who was formerly a territorial development inspector, for a period of study and apprenticeship as an architect and landscaper. When he arrived in Paris with his family, Abdoulaye Dieye, the "missionary,"[8] was housed in a student room at the Ponia. Wearing the traditional garb, he

continued the rhythm of life he had pursued in Senegal. It should be stressed that, as a disciple of a Mauritanian Murid, Sheikh Sidy Ahmen, he was an adherent of the spiritual school[9] of Saint-Louis who remained faithful to and the jealous guardian of the doctrine of Ahmadou Bamba. On the other hand, the other residents at the Ponia took delight in cultivating the "narcissism of petty differences" in ideology. It was the position of all of them, moreover, to support the antireligious banner. The axiom "Religion is the opium of the people" served as the rallying cry in the ranks of the progressive students. In their eyes, the presence of Abdoulaye Dieye was doubly suspect: some saw him as an agent of Senghor, whose mission would be to infiltrate the Association of Senegalese Students and Apprentices in France (AESF), while others saw him as a defender of the Senegalese consumer bourgeoisie, compromising with religious feudality. He was tagged with a nickname both ironical and pejorative--Serign Doudou, which implies both quackery and hypocrisy.

The Period of Confrontation

The AESF meetings became a veritable battlefield on which the various social protagonists eyed each other, challenged each other and measured each other by the yardstick of ideological references. The confrontation spread into the realm of the political: the socioeconomic situation in Senegal provided fuel for the battles. To the theoretical and rhetorical discourse of the AESF members, the Murid minority and their sympathizers opposed concrete facts drawn from the field--the experience acquired by the head of the Murid ranks dealt harsh and damaging blows to the student structure. "I had grasped the economic and social problems of Senegal which they had not mastered," A. Dieye told us, "because I had already served in the field. As a former development worker in the Delta Development and Exploitation Company (SAED), I was familiar with all of the tricks and forces and weaknesses in our economy. Here I found young people masturbating with a Marxism which was not supported by concrete facts. Some leaders did not even know what the annual income of the Senegalese peasant was, but they were screaming 'The peasants are hungry'."

Faced with these concrete arguments, the theoretical constructions of the students showed cracks in certain places. Although no great conversion could be seen, the Murid minority nonetheless began to win some volume of sympathy. Its leader, washed clean of the sin of collaboration, was now recognized as an authentic nationalist, despite the Murid label, which continued to be troublesome because, A. Dieye says: "They saw Muridism as a religious practice favoring obscurantism. I explained that the teaching of Ahmadou Bamba is but the extension of that found in the city of Medina in the days of the Prophet. I denounced the practices of all the obscurantist Marabouts."

The Period of Research and Popularization

The Murid group realized the need to go beyond student discussions. This consideration involved the education of the members, who were unfamiliar with the writings of Ahmadou Bamba and Wolof literature. In an initial stage, the stress was placed on the basic practices of Islam, and then on mystical teachings. According to our informants, A. Dieye gave of himself

unstintingly. "He neglected his family to teach us Arabic, the Koran and the thinking of the sheikh. Every day, from Monday through Sunday, there was always someone at his house. The room was very small, but one could always find a place. The atmosphere was warm."

Initially informal, the group then became a "da'ira." On the initiative of A. Dieye, two goals were set: to undertake research in the archives in order to establish the truth about Ahmadou Bamba, and to begin the process of popularization on a national scale. Relying on the "khidma" (labor), Abdoulaye Dieye assigned various tasks to the Murid students. Some were entrusted with reading the reports and minutes of the colonial administrators dealing with Ahmadou Bamba. To others fell the task of undertaking a survey of the reports, theses and other works dealing with Muridism. This work of "reestablishing the truth" enabled the group to make use of a new argument: Ahmadou Bamba, a religious man, was also a resister, a man of protest. This dimension could not fail to attract the revolutionary students. According to Abdoulaye Dieye, "this search gave us more arguments to combat the intellectuals trained in Western culture, who could not believe in the verses quoted to them. Their Koran was documentation. With the documents, going beyond the relations (between) Serign Touba (A. Bamba) and the French, we unraveled the myths about certain Senegalese 'saints' who in fact were collaborators and slanderers. These students came to understand why Serign Touba was seen as 'the enemy to be defeated,' because he was a nationalist, a rallyer of men. Oudinot Street (where the Overseas Archives Documents are kept) provided grist for our mills."

This period coincided with the first conversions and rally to the Murid cause. "Brilliant students decided to join us, because they were avid for knowledge and respectful of it." The group, which still remained a minority one, decided to expand its base by populating various sectors of life with Senegalese: clubs, university complexes and even the streets. These were moments which were difficult and special at the same time. "This was the first time one could see students one considered rationalists going into the streets to talk of religion. It was difficult and it required faith and a combative attitude, and above all the real training they had received from Abdoulaye Dieye, which had developed a sincere faith in Ahmadou Bamba, so that they could go beyond the criticisms, beyond the sneering laughter, to set forth for the first time the religious thinking of an African, no longer choosing among the ideologies offered, but instead contributing an idea, a body of thought proposed for mankind," A. D., a disciple and comrade-in-arms of A. Dieye, stressed.

The problems of popularization led to further reflection, and a new strategy was established. In the month of September 1977, the Murid followers decided to form an association, the AESME. Financial contributions were left to the discretion of each member. To fill the coffers of the new organization, the Poniatowski student "da'ira" paid a visit every Thursday evening to the Touba-Paris "da'ira" in the Chalon quarter (mainly made up of peddlers). The group participated in and enriched the evening meetings with "qassida" (poems by Sheikh Bamba) and sermons, and received in exchange "adiya" (charity gifts). Thanks to this system, the "da'ira" recreated a community life from which any concept of parisitism was excluded. Having emerged from the period of initial

development, the members of the association maintained contact with spiritual organizations, participated in debates, and, using these forums as their base, provided various audiences with the teachings of the founder of the doctrine, setting forth both the orthodoxy and the universality of the thinking of the sheikh.

In 1978, the missionaries added a graphic contribution to the oral popularization effort. The first issue of the periodical N'DIGEL (The Murid Voice) was published. Printed in 100 copies, it was distributed to all of the university towns in France, Belgium and Senegal. The single issue received was reproduced in photocopies. The goal sought was to "bring things up to date," using documents from the archives to show the development of Ahmadou Bamba, a nonviolent man misunderstood by the public authorities in his time, but also to present him as a pious man, faithful to the Koran and the Sunna. Articles on Wolof literature were designed to demonstrate to the Senegalese intellectuals the wealth of their cultural heritage. To these various themes were added the articles in the category of testimony, in which converts explained the path of their development.

In view of the success of the periodical, the association began to develop new cells. The members of the association traveled throughout France, making contact with sympathizers and organizing discussions on the life of Serign Touba. The Murid movement emerged from semiclandestinity and became a social phenomenon. It challenged and disturbed the students, who could not remain indifferent. As of the fourth issue, the periodical was printed in 1,000 copies, and beginning with the fifth, it addressed the audience with a basically Wolof culture by presenting a summary of the various articles in that language. Contributions on the conceptualization of the Murid doctrine, on Islam and the dialogue between cultures and on the various "da'ira" began to enrich the bimonthly issues of the periodical in three languages--French, Wolof (using Arabic characters) and Arabic. N'DIGEL became the link among all the Murid adherents in Africa and Europe. Beginning in 1979, the AESME undertook to win for itself international forums. The UNESCO opened its doors to it in 1979 and 1981, and the EEC did so in 1982, after participation in the international conference to celebrate the 1500th anniversary of the hegira, held in Kuala-Lumpur in November and December 1981. On each of these occasions, the Murid participants spoke on subjects pertaining to the life of Ahmadou Bamba and the orthodoxy and universality of Murid thought.

In 1983, the AESME died, rising again from its ashes under the name Murid Islamic Movement in Europe (MIME), with the goal "not of limiting membership to the students and apprentices, but uniting us all to work together without any distinctions based on social or professional, much less brotherhood, category." The name is not neutral in significance: it has the double connotation of universality (Islamic) and esotericism (Murid, referring back to the character "mim" [spelled "mime" in French], the 24th letter of the Arabic alphabet, which has a strong mystical connotation). This last aspect appears to have been an invitation addressed to those individuals enamored of spiritual matters.

Be that as it may, it is clear that in 1983 and 1984, the activities of the MIME were basically cultural. The public relations aspect seems to have

received priority. Contact was made with the various Islamic associations, Alawit in particular.[10] In addition, the MIME made its contribution to the ecumenical efforts, based on the dialogue among cultures.[11]

For lack of financial resources--the movement is supported by dues ranging between 20 and 100 francs, depending on the vocational status of the members--the N'DIGEL showed a deficit of 30,000 francs, and the MIME did not seem able to breathe new dynamism into its provincial cells which, with the exception of that in Rouen, had sunk into a state of lethargy. This (temporary) exhaustion cannot be explained solely in terms of reasons of a material nature. The true cause must be sought elsewhere. Abdoulaye Dieye, the founder and sponsor of the association, had returned to Senegal, but he remained honorary president of the movement and contributed editorials to N'DIGEL. The movement was structured in appearance only. Individual personalities emerged and challenges arose. The MIME appeared to be experiencing a growth crisis, and a certain number of its members were seen to go over to another Murid body, more recently established--the International Association for Aid to and the Popularization of the Muridism (AIADM).

The AIADM and the Voltaire "Daara"[12]

Initially, the effort to establish the AIADM was dictated by two major concerns. The need was felt to rescue the non-Senegalese Murid adherents, ill-accustomed to Senegalese community life, from their marginal status, and thus to establish a structure to accommodate them which would be better adapted to their culture, lifestyle and level of religious training. Organized in September 1983, the AIADM, the "eldest daughter of the MIME," had as its goal "establishing a dialogue among cultures, aiding and assisting those in distress, helping them to reestablish themselves and resume their true role in their environment; clarifying the example and the teachings of the great humanists of the earth--Gandhi, Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba." The association includes sympathizers, the majority of them women working in the social sector, and members who, for their part, are students from the "daara" on Voltaire Street in the 11th Paris precinct.

The president of the association is also the guide of the "daara." A West Indian with a Christian background, Ahmadou-Guy Pepin encountered the teachings of Abdoulaye Dieye after 10 years of spiritual searching and became his disciple. A teacher of physical education, an athletic champion and a performer (he is a comedian and musician), he began to popularize the thinking of Ahmadou Bamba within his own entourage while he continued to learn from his master. "I have had the opportunity to reach a number of people. I spoke about Serign Touba and tried to awaken people to the spiritual realities, to religion. People noticed the change in my behavior. Little by little, I created a minisociety in which everyone valued and respected the others. There was an atmosphere of peace and friendship there."

The school has 40 regular members representing a veritable kaleidoscope of nationalities, a dozen or so, including Europeans (French, German, Italian and Polish), Africans (Zairians and Senegalese), West Indians, natives of the Maghreb, Syrians and Lebanese, as well as a number of Iranian sympathizers and a Dominican nun.[13] The age range is from 25 to 30, and the dean is 50.

These adepts fall into various socioprofessional categories. There is an economist, a PTT [Postal and Telecommunications Administration] engineer, laborers, office employees and students. There are about equal numbers of men and women.

The association seeks to be a community. Dues are left to the discretion of the individual. According to Ahmadou-Guy Pepin, "the people bring their purchases,[14] but there is no obligation. Here nothing belongs to any individual. Everything belongs to everyone, our goods are held in common. We must change society, and thus we must change ourselves, developing our virtues. In other words each individual can contribute something to the others, as his means and opportunities allow, without this being demanded."

The "daara" is a microsociety, falling within the framework of the mission assigned by the founder, Ahmadou Bamba. Through the institution of marriage (there are five mixed marriages--two Senegalese men married to Italian women, a Frenchman married to a West Indian, a Moroccan married to a French woman, and a West Indian married to an Algerian woman), the members of the "daara" are not only maintaining the purity of the unit, which serves both as a school and religious premises, but are also laying down "toothing stones" with a view to the building of a new society "beyond considerations of race, culture and religion, in which men and women will be united in the search for truth and in waging the great holy war of the soul,"[15] Ahmadou-Guy Pepin stressed.

The educational program has several levels. The Arabic language is taught (with classes given by a Moroccan), as is Islam--the stress is placed on "the five pillars," in the double dimension of the visible and the hidden.[17] Religious law ("fiqh") and mysticism ("tassaouf") are taught. The "ideological training" is linked with Muridism and is divided into seven chapters, on the history of Muridism; Muridism and colonization; Muridism and the traditional regime; Muridism and modern ideology (capitalism, Marxism, socialism); the exile of the sheikh; the "khidma," in its triple dimension as a mystical doctrine, economic doctrine and social project; and Muridism and the major mystical schools--Ghazali, Ibn Arabi.[18] The purpose of this training is "to show in what way Serigne Touba surpasses these people, and to reveal the contemporary aspect and depth of the thinking of the sheikh."

Whatever the level of the adherents, a large role is assigned to meditation. Every Thursday night, from midnight until dawn, the adepts meet for a session of "zikr,"[19] followed the next day or in the course of the week by a day of fasting. "Our goal is to cause the light in us to grow, to develop purity in ourselves, and to create this communication among hearts."

The school does not have a prescribed schedule, although the majority of the classes are held in the evening on a very flexible basis. Conviviality goes along with learning.

Proselytizing in Beaubourg

With some dozen members, men and women, the master of the Voltaire "daara" is waging a continuing campaign to popularize Islam. Every Sunday for a year now, rain, wind or snow, the group has gone to Beaubourg, after spiritual

preparation. "We always pray together before starting out." At the beginning of the venture, the group held forth with the aid of a microphone on the esplanade in Beauborg. The master of the "daara" gave an introduction on the problems of society, and then introduced Ahmadou Bamba. Once the attention of the people had been secured, small groups began to form. Each adept, with a stack of copies of N'DIGEL under his arm, then joined the listeners and encouraged discussion, while the women proceeded to sing songs about the Prophet and to chant "qassida," quietly. The police soon put an end to this activity, and the Voltaire Street school had to change its strategy. Since then, the group has held forth from 5 to 7 pm at a site on the main street opening out onto the main entrance to the esplanade. The scenario has undergone some changes: deprived of the microphone, the group gathers to sing before beginning its work.

The questions inevitably have to do with the violence of Islam and its fanaticism, Khomeyni, the sects and politics. The most aggressive challengers are found among the population from the Maghreb, which has led Ahmadou-Guy Pepin to say: "Our Arab brothers believe that Islam belongs to them because they speak Arabic. Serign Touba provides an answer to this, but we have noted that when the thinking of Serign Touba is explained to them, they then come to apologize." How many people have been reached by this preaching? According to Sheikh Ahmadou-Guy, numerous sympathizers come to talk to the members every Sunday, and during one month there had been one conversion per week. "On Sunday (7 February 1985), we had a conversion, a French woman who was given the name Rabia. A week ago, it was a Hindu man. The most surprising thing about him was that he had lived in Arab countries for 8 years, but had never wanted to convert to Islam."

Before concluding, the group gathers to sing again. On the way back to Voltaire Street, each describes the difficulties he encountered and reports on the subjects unresolved, which become the focus of immediate discussion or a study to be undertaken.

The mission in Beaubourg is of a heuristic nature for the "daara" members. The contacts made develop self-mastery in the adepts, as well as a sense of introspection and self-criticism, and also emulation. The mission in Beaubourg is viewed as a practical application of the "khidma." In emigrant territory, Muridism has come out of its cocoon. By embarking upon the paths of popularization and conversion, it has found a new, adapted field of discussion by returning to the initial teachings of its founder.

Islam, which for a long time was imbued with the hue of the Maghreb, has in forsaking a single path branched out in new directions. Muridism is making its contribution to the organization of the Islamic community, despite the rents developing within the community fabric, since the brotherhoods have not won the favor of certain religious associations (World Islamic League). The Senegalese members of the Murid movement, having passed on the torch, seem to be seeking a second wind. The implementation of short- and medium-term projects (construction, restoration) will certainly succeed in injecting new dynamism. For the time being, it is the spiritual axis of the "khidma" which prevails, while the Voltaire "daara" is studying the "road signs" with a view to building a new society.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Chalon neighborhood in Paris, which has recently acquired a reputation as an area of drug peddlers, remains the fief of Murid peddlers.

2. For the spelling of the words Murid and Muridism, we have followed the official norms of Senegal.

3. See Ph. Couty, "The Doctrine of Labor Among the Murids," in Copans, Couty, Boch and Bocheteau, "Social Maintenance and Economic Change--Economic Doctrine and Labor Practice Among the Murids," Paris, ORSTOM [Bureau of Overseas Scientific and Technical Research], 1972, pp 67-83.

4. The Wolofs are the ethnic group with a numerical majority in Senegal.

5. Town in Senegal where the caliph general of the Murids lives, and where the grand "magal" (gathering of Murids to commemorate the banishment of the founder on 15 September 1895) is held each year.

6. The Tijan Brotherhood was founded by Abu 'Abbas Ahmed (1737-1815), who was born in 'Ain Madi, in Morocco. It became widespread chiefly in Senegal. See Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, "The Tijaniyya--A Sufi Order in the Muslim World," Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1965.

7. N'DIGEL means "advice" in the Wolof language.

8. According to our interlocutors, the path pursued by Abdoulaye Dieye was the same as that trodden earlier by Sheikh Ahmadou Bamba. While passing through Saint-Louis, the founder of Muridism predicted that a native of the ancient capital of Senegal would carry his message to the "countries of the Whites."

9. D. C. O'Brien, "Marxist Theory Against the Infernal Murid Machine," POLITIQUE AFRICAINE, I, (4), November 1981, p 115. O'Brien speaks of "academic Muridism" which he compares to "popular Muridism."

10. The 'Alawiya order, established in Mostaganem in 1920, is a branch of the Tijaniya. The Alawis, whose headquarters is in Drancy, have achieved a number of conversions among the French population.

11. A special section of N'DIGEL is devoted to this subject.

12. Concerning the "daara" (spiritual training school), see, among others, D. C. O'Brien, "The Murids of Senegal--Political and Economic Organization," Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1971, pp 163-187, and also N'DIGEL, No 12, p 10.

13. The association is open to non-Muslims, who may participate in the "zikr" (invocation of the name of Allah) sessions.

14. The members go on shopping trips and bring their purchases back to the "daara."

15. This refers to the "jihad," which is above all a perpetual struggle against the self.

16. Profession of faith, prayer, fasting, tithing and pilgrimage.

17. These two expressions--visible ("zahir") and hidden ("batin")--play a great role in the exegesis of the Koran. One of the names of Allah is "al-Batin."

18. Ghazali (1058-1085), Islamic thinker and theologian, and Ibn Arabi (1165-1240), called al-Shaikh al-Akbar by his disciples, a celebrated mystic mystic of "pantheistic doctrine."

19. The "zikr" is a prayer in which the participants invoke and chant the name of Allah.

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ROLE OF ISLAM IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 207-215

[Article by Jacques Barou: "Islam as a Factor in Social Regulation"]

[Text] With the following articles, the result of surveys made in the automobile industry in the Paris region, we leave the level of representation and models for that of practice and experience. Islam is an important factor in industry and in the social relations which are emerging in the labor world. Some business leaders see Islam as a possible factor in social regulation which could be used to shape the trade union influence on workers (let us note that this way of conceiving of Islam characterizes only a minority of leaders, but not the mass of small and average business owners), while conversely, some trade unions see control of the Islamic phenomenon, indeed the Muslim upsurge, as a good method of countering management.

Where the Muslim workers are concerned, while some are delighted by the presence of mosques in the labor place, whether social peace or challenge is preached to them there, others refuse to pray in a basically impure place, refusing, so to speak, to make God a "foreman."

This article comes within the context of a survey currently being made of the immigrant OS [skilled workers] in the automotive industry, and more specifically the role Islam plays in industry. This is a question which, beginning a short time ago, has provoked a certain number of polemic discussions which the Muslim workers in France still remember with much bitterness and irritation.

While we do not claim to be able to establish definitive conclusions, it is now possible for us to set forth a certain number of elements which alter the naive view which developed following the report on the mediation of the conflicts which occurred in the automobile industry between 1981 and 1984, which generally represented Islam as a disturbing element in industry. While Islam in the business world is often associated with clashes, it was present for some time prior to the conflicts in the 1980s without creating any major

problems for the enterprises involved. They were able to deal with the phenomenon with great flexibility and pragmatism such as to make of it, rather quickly, an element which could be integrated in the discipline governing social relations within the production context.

This possibility of using Islam in industry as a factor in social regulation is not surprising if one considers the continuity in the efforts made by thinkers and technicians in the field of labor organization, from the utopians of the 19th century to our day, to create in the workers affective adherence to the order in the factory which is required for making productivity optimal.

The emergence of Islam in industry, through the demand that Muslim workers have premises and time for their religion, is simultaneously a sign of crisis in the Ford system of production and a means of partially overcoming this crisis. These cultural and religious demands are far less factors in conflict than an opportunity to establish contractual relations between management and labor. They can serve as a transition from a "machine" form of discipline based essentially on time-scheduling limitations to a form of contractual discipline which is not limited to a mere alliance between management and labor, but which, as Jean-Paul de Gaudemar[1] stressed, "is designed to create a basis in organizational methods for a collective subjectivity on the part of the workers such that productive service is no longer the symbol of alienation, but on the contrary, one of support for a common project."

Even though at the present stage Islam is not functioning as an ideology entirely integrated in production discipline, it already is appearing as an undeniable social regulation factor capable of being developed in the future.

This situation and these prospects are the cause of differences among the various protagonists concerned. For example, the position of the trade unions undeniably reflects a fear of seeing an important portion of the workers escape the unions to become tacitly and informally direct interlocutors with management. This fear is evidenced in a desire "to occupy the field" by taking over the demands connected with Islam and sponsoring the emergence of Muslim trade union leaders, which sometimes gives rise to an overreaching seen by the workers at the base as demagogy.

These base-level workers are far from unanimous on the merit of an official presence for Islam in industry and its recognition by the trade unions. The workers who come from Muslim countries, whether they are believers and practice religion, or neither, often voice very conservative positions on these matters, based equally on references to secular ideologies and on interpretations of the Koran and the "hadith."

The enterprise is, for the Muslims, a special place where they must consider the social and political role of their religion. The questions they are led to ask themselves in relation to this place may have repercussions which are not limited to the life of Islam in the "dar el harb," but also affect the "dar el islam," with the frontier between the two becoming more and more difficult to determine, moreover, in the course of the migratory experience.

This article, which does not claim to report the full diversity of the points of view we have already noted, will be limited to establishing the main trends perceived both in terms of the usage which industry can make of Islam and in terms of Islam as experienced by the workers themselves. These are the two questions we will now attempt to deal with, after analyzing the conditions under which Islam appeared on the labor scene.

How Industry Discovered Islam

Islam has been present in industry for as long as Muslim workers have been employed. A historian's text[2] refers to the presence of an imam in the Renault factories in Billancourt in connection with the burial of an Algerian worker who was killed in an explosion in 1933. The presence of Muslims was gradually recognized through various measures, involving in particular the cafeteria menus and vacation dates, which had to take the month of Ramadan into account. But this phenomenon was never the focus of any particular attention on the part of social observers.

What is new and spectacular is the establishment of prayer halls or workshop "mosques" in a certain number of large enterprises where the immigrants from Muslim countries are very numerous. It is not only a question of the emergence of a visible Islam here, because the practicing workers had earlier had the habit of praying in the workshops, using sections of cardboard, but of official recognition of this visibility, which at the same time marks the beginning of enterprise control of the phenomenon. This phase is more important than all of the previous ones in the recognition of the presence of Islam in France, because it represents a violation of the legislation in effect concerning labor sites, where it is clearly specified that the pursuit of religious activities is not allowed. One might wonder what led a number of officials to undertake such a distortion of the law.

There was indeed at the outset a demand by the workers and the development of a balance of forces in their favor, but also, on the part of the enterprises, there was a pragmatic attitude which enabled them to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the phenomenon very rapidly. If they were quick to agree to satisfy this kind of demand, it was indeed because they became aware that it was no threat to the production order, but might even contribute to it.

One cannot understand the upsurge of demands for the provision of religious facilities in the enterprises without taking into account the struggles which developed earlier in the workers' centers.

The conflict in the workers' centers began in sporadic fashion in 1973 and 1974 and spread between 1975 and 1979 to the whole of the Paris region and certain sectors of the East and the Rhone-Alpes region. It constituted one of the largest organized urban struggle movements in France and the first movement characterized by demands in which the immigrants were the main protagonists. While the influence of various leftist factions was decisive in the mobilization and coordination effort, a certain "immigrant power" expressed itself here in almost autonomous fashion. One of the most forceful demands was for the almost routine establishment of prayer halls in the centers. It was voiced beginning with the first struggles which preceded the

movement in the 1970s, and seems to have reflected the desire of the immigrants to win back control of living space which they rarely chose of their own accord and which they had felt had broken down their organization.

In the old neighborhoods and the shantytowns in which they settled in the 1960s, the immigrants living without their families had reestablished mutual aid networks on ethnic and family bases, developing a whole underground economy. When urban renewal operations affected them, they were often relocated in centers which did not take the organization with which they had provided themselves earlier into account. This form of housing tended to individualize people by creating collective or semicollective areas unusable because of their tiny dimensions and nonfunctional nature. This disorganization of the community structure made it necessary to turn to an external authority whose actions very often took a most coercive direction. Naturally, as the living space away from the labor site became too depersonalizing and limiting, and because of ill-timed increases in rents, conflicts broke out, taking the form of collective refusals to pay, but also of a desire to resume autonomous control of housing. This was seen in the establishment of committees of tenants desirous of acquiring the capacity to participate in the management of the framework for their life. The demand for the establishment of religious premises also took on the aspect of a symbol of reconquest of autonomous collective space, since religion remains the last ferment of community life. Generally the prayer halls in the centers are maintained by the residents themselves, and are entirely removed from the control of the administrators.

In the course of the conflict, the establishment of prayer halls was often accompanied by a trend toward establishing Islamic order in the residential centers. The sale of alcohol, gambling and visits by prostitutes were often forbidden by committees of residents who temporarily took over, and they tended to be much more Draconian in disciplinary matters than the institutional administrators.

Nearly 10 years after the beginning of this conflict, almost no vestige of the self-administration which emerged then remains. There are, on the other hand, the prayer halls, which in the end took on a sacred aspect which is not found in the countries of origin. In certain cases, even if no one any longer uses these prayer halls, closing them or converting them for other uses would not be allowed. They are only very rarely made available to guests. Certain officials hold the keys to them and open them only for the hours of prayer, as is also the case in the workshop mosques. They have become basically the symbol of a Muslim identity which was rediscovered and imposed on the institutional spokesmen.

It must however be noted that the administrators very soon saw that the satisfaction of this demand could defuse conflict and introduce a beginning of order in the residential centers. As a result, they generally hold those who frequent the prayer halls in high esteem, and make an effort to sponsor them as representative spokesmen.

In the enterprises, the demand for the provision of religious premises occurred in about the same period as in the centers, because the first prayer

hall was established at the Renault plants in Billancourt in 1976, and at Talbot in Poissy in 1978. But unlike what happened in the residential centers, these demands almost never occurred within a framework of conflict, and at the beginning, they were free of the intervention of the trade unions. These unions were beyond any doubt very hostile to this phenomenon at the beginning, and they only began to support it when it had taken on such scope that it could not be avoided with risk of losing their influence.

At one automobile enterprise, a petition for the provision of a prayer hall initiated by a few Senegalese workers was signed by more than 600 individuals in a single afternoon. In this connection it can be noted that the establishment of prayer halls both in factories and in residential centers was initially demanded by Africans from the Sahel, before this demand was taken up by natives of the Maghreb. This may possibly be due to the effect of the more worshipful concept of the mosque in African Islam, and above all, the much greater force of community dynamism among the Africans than among the natives of the Maghreb.

In connection with this type of demand, management generally reacted more quickly than the trade unions, which more frequently followed the advancing trend, adding their support after the fact to a demand already granted.

But above all, for the factories, this type of demand provided the opportunity for discovering Islam. In fact, the need to provide a prayer hall in accordance with Islamic prescriptions led certain cadres to make contact with Muslim officials in the mosques in Paris or elsewhere. In some cases it even happened that the enterprise itself sought out the support of institutional Islam, or of national Islam as represented by the associations, in order better to control the religious sector within the plant.

In different forms, the trade unions reacted similarly, seeking through the intermediary of practicing militants, who might have links with more or less "official" representatives of Islam in France or in their countries of origin, to penetrate the sector in order to impose their countersigns there more effectively.

In certain enterprises, there were competing efforts by the FO [Workers Force], the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and the CSL to control the religious sector, and an avalanche of demands for the establishment of new prayer halls which the workers at the base, in many instances, had not requested. In this field, the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] is the trade union with the least "clerical" behavior, which without a doubt allows it, as happened during the 1983 and 1984 strikes in the automobile industry, to become more effectively integrated in the conflicts developing at the base, since the too obviously pro-Islamic actions of the other trade unions provoke a degree of mistrust.

Since industry discovered Islam, it thus seems that none of the principal protagonists usually involved (owners, trade unions) have wanted to take the risk of seeing those practicing this religion join together against it, such that each makes an effort to obtain if not an alliance with the Muslims, at least their neutrality.

Leadership of the Religious Sector

The flexibility which the management of very differently organized enterprises seems to be showing with regard to Islamic demands is a part of a very old tradition of using of religious ideologies by the owners.

There was indeed a major time lag between the period when the workers in the spinning mills in the North were required to begin the working day by reciting prayers[3] and the current era in which a national workers class which is in great part de-Christianized casts a mistrustful eye at those who practice religion and have come from elsewhere to demand and obtain the right to such practice in the workplace. The "modern" owners of the automobile industry of today do not have much in common, moreover, with the paternalistic owners of the textile or coal-mining industries of yesterday and earlier.

The fact nonetheless remains that the upsurge of religious considerations in the production sector can in some way provide an opportunity, if not to recreate affective concern on the part of the workers with the limitations of production, at least to develop a type of tacit contractual relations with them making it possible to avoid conflict and, by means of a certain number of judicious concessions, to extend a production system the aberrant effects of which, however, everyone agrees in denouncing. Having been able to provide religious space enables the enterprises to avoid any effect on what is for them still basic today, that is to say industrial time conceived of and divided up as a function of the dictates of production. There is no challenge on the part of the workers who are religious of the time given to industry, to the benefit of Islamic time, but rather an adaptation of the latter to the former.

As Robert Linhart described it very well in the report on his experience at a workbench at Citroen,[4] with assembly line work one can "outwit" time. One can step up the chain in order to allow some additional subsequent free minutes. Arrangements can be made between workers or can be the subject of negotiations with the lower supervisory echelons concerning these "speedups." This allows the pious Muslims to gain the 8 or 10 minutes they need to go to the mosque or to say their prayers on a rectangle of cardboard in the workshop itself.

Thus assembly line time is not subject to challenge, and by adapting it, the workers remain overall governed by it, which under the present conditions remains the final guarantee of productivity. The search for these few extra minutes of free time thus becomes for the Muslims a form of "jihad," a consecration of effort, because it enables them to satisfy basic religious obligations. According to our present information, while it has not been proven that the work is better done thanks to this system, it is in any case acknowledged that it is not suffering therefrom. This search for time gains, moreover, becomes so obsessive that it can mobilize the bulk of the workers' energy and thus divert them from the campaigns of claims in which they are regularly asked to participate. Certain trade unionists complain that since the prayer halls were provided and religious practice has developed in the enterprises, mobilization on national slogans is becoming ever more difficult, since the workers often spend most of their free time in prayer.

The functioning of Islam in industry has apparently created little conflict, even though management has not concerned itself with providing close leadership through certain intermediaries. While such a practice was to be found at Talbot several years ago, it appears that it did not yield good results, because the imams under the control of the CSL were unable to slow the strike movement in 1982 and were even forced, at a given moment, to participate in it themselves. It is much more nearly an effort to ensure a certain neutrality on the part of Islam toward the protagonists in industry which can guarantee social peace than leadership of it provided by management or the "house union," through intermediaries. Intervention by the trade unions in the religious sector is much more obvious than that of management, and seems less effective than the benevolent and flexible neutrality practiced by the cadres.

The assignment of labor posts by management to make it easier for the workers who are also imams to visit the prayer halls at the desired times is a form of tolerance on the part of the officials which the beneficiaries must repay by an attitude of neutrality at the least. It seems that they observe this strict neutrality in the Friday sermons, during which they never discuss the issues having to do with labor problems. Thus it is not surprising that the staffing personnel in the workshops in question often have a rather positive attitude toward Islam.

Generally speaking, the workers who practice religion and frequent the mosque are individuals uninclined to agitation, and those who fast during Ramadan are often the focus of a certain not entirely unselfish respect, to the extent that this practice shows above all an ascetic capacity which could profitably be put to use in production. Moreover, the infrequency of conflicts during the holy month is noticeable.

The image of Islam is less positive when it comes to the lower-level supervisors who must see to the daily management of relations with the OS and negotiate the allocation of time, which can hardly proceed without some friction. It is on this almost individual level that a challenge to industrial time may develop and might seriously disturb production. However, the cases reported are rather rare, because these matters can be resolved by the reassignment of jobs and arrangement to which the staff agrees. As to the visibility of Islam in industry, it does in fact raise some problems because of the discontent it seems to create among non-Muslims. A French enterprise official complained that the other religions represented at the plant are not given the religious facilities accorded the Muslims. But he immediately added that he did not understand why the immigrants have 6 weeks' paid vacation instead of 4 like everyone else, either, and he mentioned that their bonuses on dismissal are twice those given French citizens.

It is not the visibility of Islam as such which seems to create a problem, but rather the objective special treatment the immigrants have been given, to which this visibility may be related. This would explain why the lower-level supervisors at an enterprise often have a negative view of the prayer halls, even when their relations with the workers who practice religion may be good. The fact remains that on the somewhat higher levels of the hierarchy, the

image of Islam is very positive, and a certain value as a factor in social regulation is often attributed to it.

The Workers and Their Various Views of Islam

The practice of Islam in business and the official recognition of its presence with the provision of prayer halls are very differently assessed by the workers from the various Muslim countries, whether they practice religion or not. The attitudes on this level lend themselves very poorly to typology. There is hostility to the practice of Islam in the enterprise both among those who practice religion and those who do not, and sometimes for the same reasons. There are also both practicing and nonpracticing Muslims who are in favor of it.

Those who do not practice religion but favor the provision of prayer halls and the arrangement of work time to accommodate certain limitations dictated by the religious life are generally trade unionists. In their view, the religious requirements should be taken into account as a demand for recognition of a specific cultural identity. It is a demand to be dealt with in terms of the specific situation of the immigrants, like the requirement for longer vacation time or reduced prices on tickets for travel to the country of origin. This recognition can only be limited by the fear of eventual division among the workers as a whole. Their arguments stress above all the "unity" of the workers class and minimize the specific religious and national aspects, while their practical actions often tend to make use of them for purposes of mobilization. The position here can hardly be distinguished in this connection from that of the French trade union leaders.

Among the trade unionists, one also finds a certain number of individuals who practice religion and whose attitude is often oriented toward the more explicit use of Islam in the efforts to mobilize the workers. One then sees a juxtaposition of the two lines of argument. Some pamphlets begin with the usual phrase from the Koran: "In the name of God, the all-merciful, the very merciful, etc." and end with the traditional "Allahou Akbar," but the text in between is very often written in the prevailing trade union jargon on the subject, with exclusively and extremely secular and prosaic content. The mobilizing effects of the use of religious formulas in trade union discourse does not always seem to have been very efficient, and sometimes creates mistrust.

One often finds the same arguments among those who practice religion and those who do not when it comes to hostility toward providing religious premises. Both groups think that there are more important demands to be met first, and taking a position then in the realm of class struggle, they develop the concept that management is using this demand, which costs it little, to avoid those which are more of a problem. Moving then to the realm of Islam, both groups note that one can pray even if a nearby prayer hall is not available.

Many of those who practice religion refuse to go to the mosque, preferring a rectangle of cardboard in a corner of the workshop. Others go only to hear the Friday sermon. On the whole, the use of the enterprise mosque in Billancourt remains limited, involving little more than a fifth of the workers

who come from Muslim countries. Some note that the very fact of having to negotiate time for visiting the mosque may create a relationship of dependence on the lower-level supervisors which may lead to favoring certain individuals, who would be allowed to go to prayers in exchange for services rendered. Some say that such services could even extend to spying. Others have recourse to arguments of a religious sort against the practice of Islam in the enterprise. They note that workers are often too dirty and "impure" to pray, and cannot respect the requirement of prior ablutions, adding that there is not enough time and that praying does not consist solely of carrying out the "raka'at,"[5] but requires entering into a holy state.

It should be noted that it is not always a question of individuals demanding strict Islamic rigor, but also those who put forth ideas which could be called secular or "modernist," if not antireligious, as to the interpretation of Islam. Claiming an excellent knowledge of the Koran and the "hadith," they readily refer to these texts to justify interpretations which stress the spirit of religion more than the letter. In these individuals, one sees a substantial integration of the values of the labor world which must be respected and developed, and it is around these themes that their opposition to the Islamist militants crystallizes.

A reference to the constraints on immigrant life in an industrial society enters heavily into their very liberal interpretations of Islamic obligations. In their view, labor has the value of prayer. One of our interlocutors, who fully espouses this "modernist" position with regard to Islam, quotes a "hadith" in which the Prophet, surprised to see a man spending almost all his time in prayer, inquired about his resources and learned that the man was supported by his brother who worked very hard as a woodcutter. Critical then of the attitude of the pious man, he said that the woodcutter was much more obedient to the commands of God than his brother who prayed. The accusation of laziness and parasitism against the so-called integrist militants is also found very frequently among those who put forth this type of argument. However, believers who are becoming secularized make a great point of participating in the "high points" of Muslim life, very often fasting strictly during the month of Ramadan, despite the limitations they point out elsewhere to lighten their other obligations.

Participation in the industrial society in this particularly radical form of factory labor has thus had rather profound repercussions in terms of the emergence of secular and modernist interpretations of Islam. If one cannot say that those who take this position make up the majority of the workers involved, the faction they do represent seems likely to develop because of its capacity to adapt to the concrete conditions of life in immigrant societies. It thus seems that business has little to fear from Islam in terms of a radical challenge, and that without even having to intervene extensively, it need only let Islam play its role as a social regulator.

FOOTNOTES

1. Jean-Paul de Gaudemar, "Order and Production," Dunod, Paris, 1982, p 76.

2. J. B. Garache, "6 February 1933--Explosion in Workshop 17," in REVUE D'HISTOIRE DES USINES RENAULT, report by Renault Brothers to the National Renault Administration, 15th Year, Vol V, No 28, June 1984.

3. On this subject, see Laurent Marty, "Sing To Survive--Workers' Culture, Labor and Technology in the Textile Industry," Roubaix 1850-1914, Leo Lagrange Publications.

4. Robert Linhart, "The Work Bench," Editions de Minuit (Midnight Publications), 1978.

5. The "raka'a" (the plural is "raka'at), in the more restricted sense, means the inclination of the upper body, hands on the knees. This, with prostration, is a part of the gestures accompanying Muslim prayer. In the broader sense it is a component element in that prayer. The length of each prayer, depending on the hour of the day, is measured by the number of "raka'at" involved.

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EFFECT OF MUSLIM UNION WORKERS IN INDUSTRY

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[Article by Tomas Subhi]

[Text] We are presenting here a portion of a study in progress based on a series of group and individual interviews with the staffing personnel and the Muslim OS [skilled workers] in the automobile industry. These interviews were conducted at the work sites and housing units, in both French and Arabic.

These workers have not succeeded in their search for an identity in the host country. Treated as temporary residents, they are limited to a marginal life and their specific characteristics have long been ignored by the various political and trade union hierarchies. The economic crisis and technological changes have raised the issue of their presence in France and strengthened the feeling they have that they have never been more than a mechanical part in the assembly lines on which they have worked for nearly 20 years, doing difficult production jobs without the hope of career advancement. In their minds, modernization further reduces their worth and will cause them to lose the limited skills they are acknowledged to have.

The greater part of them, of peasant origin and illiterate, know Islam only in terms of the popular practices, which they have had to perpetuate in housing centers. These are places where various communities are concentrated together, constituting the location of choice for maintaining native cultures and developing links with the home countries. We can state, at the current stage in our study, that Islam as a religious belief and practice has always been present in industry in various forms, seen as a factor in mobilization by some, a spiritual refuge by others, or again as a revolutionary ideology. It offers to each individual what he expects of it. With low visibility prior to 1975, Islam has never ceased to assert its presence through the specific religious premises won through struggle by the Muslim workers, who have attempted to adapt their practices to the requirements of technological production.1

Although these workers are all aware of belonging to the "Umma," the community of believers, we found different attitudes as to the daily experience of Islam in industry which, classified in three groups, we will try to describe.

The Trade Unionists' Islam

In the automobile plant in the Paris region in which we pursued our study, the Muslim immigrants are heavily represented in all of the trade union organizations, in particular the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] and the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor]. They occupy important posts therein, as personnel and/or trade union representatives and members of the enterprise committee, and some have won fame beyond the gates of the factory.[2]

We found a certain number of CGT members who did not practice religion. They supported the specific demands of the Muslim workers, i.e., the provision of prayer halls, replacement on the assembly line of those who go to pray, facilitation of the schedules and labor sites of imams, and recognition of religious holidays. These trade unionists who do not pursue religious practices were motivated by the desire to make of the mosques a focus for mobilization capable of strengthening community cohesion, and through it cultural identity, on the one hand, and the legitimacy of trade union activity in the eyes of the Muslims, on the other.

According to one trade union leader at an automobile enterprise, there have in the past 5 years been 22 hours of strikes for the satisfaction of this type of demand in a workshop with more than 2,000 workers, the majority of them Muslims. For these trade unionists who do not practice their religion, Islam is above all a form of cultural identity and a model of an egalitarian, indeed even socialist, society, and thus a factor in progress. Nonetheless, they fear that the prayer halls may not serve the purposes for which they were established. They suspect management of wanting to manipulate certain workers serving as imams with a view to domesticating Islam, and they are concerned about "integrist" efforts which would make the mosques a rostrum for anti-trade unionist propaganda.

In this connection, in the plant where we pursued our study, the CGT has established a "mosque group" made up of imams belonging to or sympathizing with the CGT, supervised by leaders who practice their religion, in order to safeguard the mosques from any "deviation." The trade unionists voiced their bitterness on noting that the workers prefer prayer to trade union meetings. Some fear that the Muslim workers may organize themselves as an autonomous force. But this will not happen overnight, given the presence of powerful trade union organizations in this industry.

The trade unionists who do not practice religion believe that they have satisfied their obligations to Islam by their militant attitude as defenders of the specific demands of the community. The same is not the case with the communion members who do not practice religion, whose secular behavior may be interpreted by the practicing group of Muslims as failure to show solidarity with the rules of the "Umma." Sometimes they even feel guilty of a form of violation of their community obligations.

In the eyes of some of these, since the prayer hall is a special and holy place removed from the profane world of the workshop, it cannot be used at the center for disseminating trade union information and must not slide toward autonomy with regard to the political and trade union issues. The Muslims regard the prayer area as a spiritual place reserved for religious practices. However, 10 years after the establishment of the first enterprise mosques, others who practice religion still continue to say their prayers at the labor sites, without feeling the need for a special religious place. They even say that the Muslims should not negotiate with the enterprise for the establishment of mosque sites in the plant, because it is an illicit act for a Muslim to ask a non-Muslim for permission to pray.

It seems that one can classify the various nationalities according to the level of their religious practice in the following decreasing order: Africans from south of the Sahara, Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians. But because of the large number of Moroccans employed in the automobile industry, they represent the most "visible" group practicing religion. Prior to the establishment of areas reserved for religion, they used their free time to pray near the assembly lines. Depending on team membership, they have two breaks of 10-15 minutes each distributed during the labor day, and one 40-minute break at noon. At certain jobs on the assembly line, 8-10 additional minutes can be gained if the rhythm is speeded up a little. But most of the production workers (the new name for the OS) are tied to the line and cannot leave it without affecting production, in particular those in some of the key posts where any absence requires a replacement.

The majority of the Muslim workers are thus content to continue their habitual practices as they pursued them in their home countries, while they also try as well as they can to observe the prayer requirements and to respect Ramadan. For the most part, they have only very limited knowledge of the Koran and the "hadith," and they show particular respect for and attention to the "literate" Muslims, who can thus rather quickly assume a leading role. In fact, the provision of prayer halls allowed the institutionalization of the leadership of a certain number of imams chosen by the community to deliver sermons and lead prayer.

In the workshop where we pursued our study, the prayer room provided several years ago is used by a goodly number of workers, particularly the older ones. Management has also allowed those practicing religion to use a training room adjacent to the mosque, which enables the faithful to attend collective prayers and the Friday sermon in rather large numbers.[3] The imam at this prayer hall is an OS who has worked on the assembly line for 15 years. Since 1982, following a number of requests from the trade union, management transferred him to a permanent post enabling him to carry out his religious responsibilities.

This imam begins his sermon at 1:45 pm, while in the prayer hall of another workshop, the sermon begins at 3:55 pm. This time difference allows those practicing religion to attend the mosque they prefer to hear the sermon of their choice, lasting between a quarter of an hour and a half an hour. A

certain number of workshop imams obtain written "khutba" (sermons) from Islamic associations. The imam to whom we listened said that for his part he prepares his sermons by compiling suras from the Koran and the "hadith" of the Prophet. In his speeches we noted the following themes: the hope of the afterlife, a description of the Muslim paradise, the value of labor, community cohesion, solidarity, good works and the role of the "zakat" (legal alms--one of the five pillars of Islam). The stress was placed above all on patience and courage to overcome daily difficulties while awaiting a better world.

This imam is well accepted by the various partners involved. The CGT regards him as one of its own and the officials regard him as a very "proper" worker. His sermons are not however the unanimous preference of the Muslims practicing their religion in his workshop. Some prefer to visit the religious areas of other workshops where the sermons are clearly more politically oriented and committed.

The Islamist Militants

At the present stage of this study, we cannot as yet assess the breadth of this faction precisely. However, the fears expressed by the representatives of various groups, whether or not they are trade union members or practice their religion, confirm that the religious revival and certain disappointments with the trade unions have made a portion of the immigrants more sensitive to the arguments of the Islamist militants.

One of them told us of his religious conduct since joining the enterprise. "Arriving in France in 1960 as a packer in the automobile industry, I practiced my religion first of all on the basis of my experience in the village, without strict observance of the requirements, for lack of a deeper knowledge of Islam. I prayed where I was, once or twice a day, isolating myself as best I could. At the center, everyone did the same at that time. In 1968, I experienced a revelation. Muslims came to see me and they explained to me the meaning of the "pillars of Islam" and the requirements of strict practice. They asked for and got an allocation of mosque space at the center where I lived, and they even covered the cost of furnishing it. Then they invited us there to pray. I said to myself these are real Muslims! Since then I have trusted them, followed them and listened to them. I have reviewed my knowledge of religious practice, learned Arabic, and when they asked me to join their association, I agreed. My determination to respect the five prayers and to serve as an example to my colleagues at work has given me quite a bit of trouble with the hierarchy. In the end, I undertook an individual 3-day strike, and thanks to the support of a French trade union member, I was able to pray without being disturbed. Around about 1975, when the demands of those practicing religion became massive, we collected signatures for a petition for the provision of a mosque at the factory, and we won. Finally, thanks to my determination, I was transferred to an easier job which allowed me to be free for an hour and a half on Friday afternoon so that I can go and listen to the sermon of my choice. I have become a "hadj" (pilgrim), and I have made the trip to Mecca six times."

The "conversion" of this worker to militancy is the typical result of the activities of the movements close to the Muslim Brothers in leadership of the

immigrants. One of their members, whom we met in an immigrant center, explained their procedure to us. They go from center to center in multiethnic groups on campaigns lasting several days to talk with Muslims and lead them toward the "true practices." According to this militant, "there are Muslim Brothers more or less everywhere today, and it is thanks to our sincerity and our dedication that we have achieved such success, for we apply what we say. We all work to return the community to the right path. We have our methods for attracting Muslims into our ranks. Our guides recommend that we never try in any way to impose on people. Patience is needed. They suggest to us that we establish friendly relations, pay visits to Muslims, and if they live with their families, offer them gifts and invite them to our homes. And when we see that they are beginning to listen to us, we invite them to come to prayer with us in our mosques. When an individual becomes truly motivated, we suggest that he go with us to meet new adherents. I am satisfied with my actions, because I believe that God created us for his adoration."

The Islamist militants criticize the trade unions for their lack of combativity, arguing that it is necessary to be courageous and show solidarity and have faith in order to struggle efficiently. Some of them, in order to separate themselves better from the trade unionists, pretend to be Shiites and proclaim that Islam should reject secular political debate and arm itself with faith in order better to serve the Muslim cause. Although such groups seem currently to be much in the minority in the industrial context, the possibility that the immigrants might be won back by an autonomous Islam is a source of worry to the trade unions, and to a lesser extent, to the supervisory staff.

Relations Between Muslims and Non-Muslims

Due to the distribution of nationalities by vocational categories, these relations are superimposed in practice on the relations between workers and management personnel. It is from this point of view that we will discuss them here.

In some plants, management saw it as necessary, beginning in 1975, to encourage religious practices, understanding that the legitimacy derived from the Muslim religion represented an important force. In some cases, consciousness-raising courses concerning Islam and the Arab-Muslim culture were organized. Management also agreed to provide mosque space in many places, and to facilitate the work shedules of the OS who had become imams. Its desire was in fact to create intermediaries between management and the Muslim community, and the imams seemed to provide the best links for doing so.

With that as a basis, the trade unions and management proceeded to vie for control of the religious sector. Apart fror this "policy" of control, conceived and organized by higher management, there are the daily relations between the cadres, supervisory personnel who are not Muslims, and the Muslim workers. The latter have a view of Islam which does not reflect the same serenity as the concepts formulated by the thinkers in management. The views of these "field" supervisors, who are in daily contact with the Muslims, reveal a certain measure of respect in some cases, and definite irritation in others.

Some regard Islam as a civilization, just as Judeo-Christianity is a civilization, according it a community spiritual value which emphasizes the spirit of solidarity. In their eyes, the majority of those who practice religion are honest workers, but there is a minority using religious practices to escape assembly line work. They call the latter false believers, and believe that their behavior does harm to the image of Islam. They would like to be consoled by the idyllic concept they have of the practicing Muslim as a docile worker.

Others are content to hope that the Muslim practice of the workers in enterprises will continue to cause as little disturbance as possible, and they therefore try to represent themselves as pluralists respectful of differences. But while they avoid making a value judgment and all of them express concern for the welfare of their OS, they cannot help but see the Muslim religion as too limiting, and they believe that practicing Muslims should adapt to the conditions and the realities in the host country.

And finally others, in particular shop foremen, who are directly in contact with practicing Muslims, have difficulty in getting their teams to work and are constantly required to make arrangements enabling the practicing Muslims to go to prayer, while maintaining production on the assembly line.

FOOTNOTES

1. See preceding article by Jacques Barou.

2. An immigrant leader is chosen by the union on the basis of these criteria: he must be respected and courageous and must speak French and, if possible, be able to read and write. But at the same time, responsibility is given immigrants who show a talent for mobilization or have charismatic personalities.

3. At one Friday prayer session, we estimated the number of the faithful at about 150. Others were turned away for lack of space.

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POLITICAL EFFECT OF MUSLIM LABOR PRESENCE

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 222-231

[Article by Catherine Wihtol de Wenden: "Is a Political Force Emerging?"]

[Text] Muslim Immigrant Conflicts in Business

The immigrants, who still in many respects lack legitimacy in the French political space, are nonetheless an integral component of our society. This phenomenon, which has become almost irreversible, upsets the classic rules of the political game and the cultural and ideological consensus which underlies it. The immigrant population, as it diversifies (there are ever fewer workers and foreigners, in the strict sense, within it), must redefine its place in French society while simultaneously contributing to the development of the already somewhat eroded underlying myths of the national community, in order to be accepted.

This is a difficult task, for as it has settled permanently in France, the immigrant population has substantially pluralized its forms of expression in the cities, without however being willing to pay the price of inclusion in the political community, that is to say adoption of the dominant cultural model and the relegation of the religious beliefs dictating its mode of living to the realm of private life. The religious factor, which, as experienced, distinguishes the current immigrant population from all of the waves which preceded it, is one of the stumbling blocks. In France, Islam was not exteriorized in the migrant environment until such time as the immigrants became persuaded that they were going to remain. Previously, the Muslims experienced Islam in a sheepish way which had nothing (or little) to do with the French social, cultural or political space.

The Muslim immigrant conflicts in industry may perhaps in this regard represent a prime area for the clash between an aging component made up of immigrants deriving the legitimacy for their existence and expression in France from their labor and the factory, and the emergence of Islam as a factor in mobilization, which comes up against the French political model, although Islam has been very little expressed during the conflicts.

The Political Position

1. This is, it appears, an original form of "transition to politics," falling both within the old order and within the new forms of the foreign presence in France. The conflicts of the Muslim immigrants in business, and more specifically in the automobile industry, retain from the old order the labor aspect (although the majority of the first generation immigrants in France from the Maghreb, as is the case here, are not the product of the workers class). Despite the decline seen in certain sectors, immigrants still account for more than 9 percent of all the wage earners in France. Of the immigrant workers, 84 percent are laborers (34 percent of them being OS [skilled workers], according to the 1982 census, as compared to 40 percent in the 1975 census, and 37 percent OQ [semiprofessional workers] in 1982, as compared to 26 percent in 1975). This is a somewhat older labor force, low in the process of aging (83 percent of the immigrant manpower is concentrated in the 25-54 age category, as compared to 75 percent of the total French and foreign manpower), and is a work force at grips with the problems of redeployment and overemployment in sectors with particular visibility in the traditional mythology of worker employment (25 percent of the immigrant wage earners work in the automobile industry).

The conflicts in industry in which the immigrants are protagonists (either initiating or participating in them) also retain from the old order the parenthetical status of the immigrant identity. Although the recent strikes at Talbot-Poissy and Citroen showed the public that the workers class in France is now largely mixed, many of the struggles did not appear to be immigrant struggles, because both French and immigrant workers were intermingled therein. The demands (desire for dignity, opposition to the OS living conditions, job security), sometimes interpreted as an assertion of membership in the workers class, are more typical of the OS situation than any specific immigrant status (with the exception perhaps of annual vacations).

What appears to be new, on the other hand, is the atypical nature of the conflicts as compared to others in which the immigrants played a majority role: "savage" struggles with regard to daily life (against expulsion from their housing and against the clandestine status), sectorial campaigns (strikes by the occupants of housing centers, subway workers and street sweepers), struggles characterized by the "politicization of nonpolitical aspects," linked to a great extent with the internalization of the political neutrality requirement imposed on foreigners, and struggles of protest and challenge in which any reference to the religious aspect was lacking, and which did not involve the areas of demand characteristically used by French citizens--the trade union and labor sectors.

Here the worker status seems to override that of the foreigner, although this is not to say one can reduce the conflicts in the automobile industry to class conflicts. Because of their breadth, they have expanded beyond the marginal area to which the first conflicts were limited, and in terms of scope, they developed as more than enterprise conflicts, to the extent that the immigrants seem to have gained some autonomy in mobilization, partially escaping from the control of their countries of origin in terms of political participation, and

no longer relying wholly on the trade unions for the handling of their affairs and the voicing of their interests.

The reference to Islam in industry, even if it does not create conflict and is not mentioned on the list of demands put forth in the course of struggles, seems to suggest a broader dimension than that of the labor sector recently affected by the automotive disputes. While at the present stage in our study, we reject the integrist version of these conflicts, said to be "manipulated from abroad," which the government spokesmen put forth in 1983, the very fact that the struggles developed as no longer exclusively class conflicts[1] nor sectorial conflicts involving foreign workers has to do with the issue of the political regulation of the immigrant presence in France. Thus the emergence of Islam in industry, the traditional area for worker expression, which is not however limited to it, has disturbed the political interplay in France.

2. Thus the appearance of Islam in industry, perhaps less, moreover, as a symbolic or instrumental factor in mobilization than as the expression of a new form of the immigrant presence in French society, is as a result situated in the political field. It would be well then to analyze the methods of transition to politics illustrated by these new forms of immigrant mobilization. Are they political? Are they merely within political reach? How do they fit into the development, or rather the range of the immigrants' methods, of political expression (since they do not follow a continuous progression in their process of politicization)? How do they modify the political space of the immigrants in France and French political space?

This question about the political aspect of the social practices observed in enterprise conflicts also leads to a question about how the immigrants in industry structure their political action as a function of a body of thought in which religion plays a role.

For a long time, the political attitudes of the immigrants were analyzed without any reference to the Muslim religion. Does the idea, quite widespread, that the conflicts involving the immigrants in the automobile industry were in part beyond the control of the trade unions and enterprise management suggest that the Muslim immigrants have methods of political representation and ways of dealing leading to their own forms of challenge, and resistant to the establishment of political and social order in the host country? Or, on the contrary, should this be seen as a tale full of fantasies which are nothing but attacks on the immigrants, with the popular secularized Islam of the Maghreb, above all in an immigrant situation, being nothing but a kind of "quiet force," the "easy-going Islam"[2] practiced by the older workers, worn out by immigration, who seek to obtain religious premises and, through a return to prayer, to retreat into a community which tends to recreate a family, clan and village atmosphere in a universe of anonymity, excluding the outer social sector and the attacks which derive from it.

More broadly, can one assume that Islam is today, for the immigrants, a method of entering into politics, and that because of their quasi-definitive settlement, we are seeing the negotiation of a new form of relations defining the values with which the Muslim immigrant communities will enter into the dominant system?

3. Issues leading to the question as to how religious practices of a collective dimension and political in scope may be incorporated in the new forms of relations with the secular state. Both in business and in the state apparatus, the strategies of evasion and autonomy pertaining to the subordinate social groups and individuals in their "transition to politics" are not infinite, either in space or in time.[3] This is even more true since the symbolic trump which control of immigration represents for a nation-state in crisis leads it to try to show the public very speedily that in this connection it retains control of the definition of its political space. The Islam "transplanted"[4] into our secularized technical and industrial society, which has freed itself from a certain sacred aspect in order to exist as such, challenges the state secularity which has been regarded as progress and has involved giving the religious, political and social realms a juridical and political form. Religious visibility is a hindrance, above all when religion, culture and politics are differentiated. There is here, for the French state, a cultural production to be reworked, a new consensus to be defined with the emergence of the daily immigrant Islam, as an apprenticeship for "living together." This is one of the future trumps for our nation-state, even if Islam is being secularized in the immigrant situation.

Skilled Immigrant Worker Conflicts at Renault

These questions were taken up in the field on the basis of a double approach, political and anthropological, to the conflicts involving immigrant OS which have developed since 1981 at the Renault plants in Billancourt. With this study half-completed, it is not yet possible to present definitive results, but only to propose some guidelines for reflection.[5]

Fifty or so interviews in depth were held with management personnel,[6] the staff of Department 74 (management, supervisory staff and workshop foremen) at Ile Seguin, members of trade unions and immigrant leaders who played a notable part in the conflicts. These interviews were preceded by documentation work with the "social environment" cell of the DCPRS [Central Personnel and Social Relations Office for the Renault Factories] (files, internal reports).

The choice of Department 74 at the Billancourt plant was based on its position as a nerve center with regard to the conflicts involving immigrant OS. Because of its nearness to the headquarters, representing an important manpower mass for the central trade union representatives active there, and the mythical aspect of Ile Seguin, and more broadly, Billancourt itself, "the immigrants' factory" serves as a gauge of the heat of conflict ("when Billancourt sneezes, France catches cold"). Department 74, which includes a number of workshops (leather work, mechanics, painting, finishing and delivery) was chosen because of its heavy immigrant component (88 percent, with a majority from the Maghreb, out of a total recently reduced from 4,000 to 2,600 individuals), because of its combativity, both latent and evident (conflict is regarded as permanent there), because of its history preceding that of other sectors in Islamic practice (the first prayer hall was provided in Department 74 in 1977), and because of its combination of old and new methods of production and labor organization (some OS "backed into" the enterprise in 1974, being transferred from machine or individual jobs to find

themselves "chained" to the assembly line on the "Island of the Devil"; semi-autonomous workshops were established for the sealing process in 1979; and conversion to robots is rather well along for the painting process, and is raising the question of overstaffing and conversion).

The painting workshop, where we made a more detailed study, represents a strategic site here, one often chosen by the trade union leaders when "they want to do something spectacular," for this sector is crucial to production (780 vehicles leave Department 74 every day) and has often been at the source of conflicts developing in the other workshops or departments. The painters are the most combative workers, in particular those working with spray guns (100 out of 500 painters). They are a kind of "state within a state" constituting a bloc with great solidarity which is relatively cohesive in the event of conflict (their work rhythm is different from that of the others, with one half-hour work session every hour and a half). There is a certain professionalism in that sector ("One cannot substitute just anyone for a painter"). In the paint shop, the "P2" is a traditional demand, the trade union representatives (of the CGT in particular[7]) are very active, and a sense of belonging to a body develops. Finally, the combative nature of the painters is set forth here, both in the arguments of the cadres and those of the trade unions, as the explanation for the increasing use of robots in this sector.

1. What is meant by immigrant conflicts at Renault?

a) The definition of conflict in itself is rather flexible. Conflict is readily interpreted, by the various interlocutors, as a component element in the dynamics of the enterprise, department or workshop. There are conflicts every day, one strike after another, and one is always in conflict, just about to be or just having been. In view of this accepting attitude toward conflict against this background of central and constant negotiations, it sometimes seems difficult to establish whether one is in conflict or between conflicts, because:

--There are different criteria for asserting that conflict exists. A work stoppage is not necessarily the criterion, nor is the nature of the demand or whether it is negotiable or not. Even when there is a consensus as to the existence of conflict, establishing its beginning or end may sometimes be controversial; and

--There are conflicts which are discussed and those which are not. At Renault, the barometer for the social atmosphere in French industry and the mythical model of excellent coordination with the organizations representing the personnel, this is a political matter. Some conflicts in "the leading theater in France," as Pierre Dreyfus put it, are settled through the intermediary of the ministerial cabinet (war of communiques), and it is often the media and the external political situation which determine whether a conflict exists, depending on whether the interests of the various parties (management, unions, press, government) are served by discussion of the conflict or not. Politics and the media are two factors in the definition of conflict and the way in which it is perceived outside the sector which are not negligible.

More generally, a definition is established by the owners and the unions, as interlocutors, on the basis of the extent of the conflict. They distinguish between major conflicts, reported by the media, and small ones, which occur in everyday life. But this approach is in itself only approximate, because the definition, the scope, the duration and the intensity of conflicts are modulated by the picture of Renault one wants to present to the outside world. If a strike is known to exist, it is the reputation of the "house" which is dealt a blow, and those who decide to announce that conflict exists or not are often convinced that telling the truth does not pay.

b) It is another matter to establish what is meant by immigrant conflicts. Can one speak of specificity? Beginning in 1981, the press has focused attention on conflicts in the automotive industry, using the phrases "another May 1968 in the factories," and "a test for the government," inflating the specific immigrant aspect and presenting these struggles as a new generation of conflicts which, as compared to the earlier sectorial struggles, are accompanied by a more general process oriented directly against the owners, with specific aspirations ("dignity"[8]).

Is there specificity in the forms of mobilization? In the media, there has been talk of conspicuous, atypical struggles, more in the nature of a reaction than assertion, indeed of savage, unlawful, splintered and violent conflicts during the spring of 1982 involving unions overrun by the immigrant base (Flins, 1982), but not depending solely on them, in the general context of a reduction in the tendency toward conflict[9] in the enterprises. Others see differences in the development of the migratory structure, believing that we are dealing with new immigrants, more combative in inclination and more involved than was the case in the past in the life of the enterprise, resulting in the upsurge of a base which was present but silent heretofore, and which merely looked on when the plants were occupied.

Is there specificity because immigrants are involved? This other thesis, which defines immigrant conflicts as those in which the majority of the workers involved are immigrants, relies on the contrary on a somewhat dated view of the waves of immigrants, believed to have come for strictly economic reasons, to be uninclined toward integration and oriented toward their countries of origin. Emphasis is placed on the magic of the spoken as compared to the written word for this often illiterate population, on its excessive vulnerability to possible racism on the part of the "bosses," on the factors involving individual development (personal sense of injustice) rather than collective demands (wages and classification), on the fatalism, passivity and relative ease of influencing the immigrants when mobilizing them (a certain degree of absenteeism is noted by the supervisors before a clash develops, as if the workers desire to avoid it or escape possible pressure from work comrades), on the more limited attachment to and integration in the enterprise when foreigners are involved, on the fact that their purpose in coming was to earn money, so that they are thus less concerned about qualitative improvements (labor time and conditions), and finally, on the fact that the immigrants can "hold out" longer to extend a conflict, because they do not always have to support a family locally, and are characterized by greater solidarity among themselves than the French workers.

Is there specificity because the employees involved are OS? Those who support this interpretation stress a kind of specificity exacerbated by the acceleration of deprivation related to the intensification of the timekeeping system, an uncertain future, lack of career opportunities, very limited training prospects (resulting in the desire for dignity and recognition of the knowledge and capability of the OS), so that for lack of vocational advancement, the immigrants demand money. To the general problems of the OS, the immigrants also add some special demands (fifth week of paid vacation linked with the holidays, aid in returning to and reintegration in their societies, housing provided by the enterprise).

Finally and most important, specificity has been represented as linked with the emergence of Islam in business, a sort of "social confusion" characterized by trade union-religious leadership phenomena. Religion is mystified, it is the pretext, and an effort is made (by the government or the press) to suggest a foreign plot whereby the trade union, owners and public authorities would be excluded or would not have complete control. This is the official version provided by the prime minister[10] and the minister of labor[11] for the specificity characterizing the immigrant conflicts in January and February 1983.

Is their specificity in the stakes involved and the methods of settlement? Some see it in the "tools for resolving conflicts" the immigrants favor: training, return to the homeland, housing (a nonnegotiable demand where business is concerned, but one often put forth by the immigrants) or the "invention" of new negotiation structures (such as the strike committee which was a partner in the negotiations during the April 1982 conflicts in Flins). In the view of others, this specificity would lie in the sharing of roles (the immigrants do not make specific demands unless there is a union which endorses these demands).

But the specific aspect is not found in the conflicts alone. Specific demands may be formulated when there is no conflict, and the enterprise may grant the immigrants specific benefits when there is no conflict. The mosques are perhaps the best example of this, for the practice of Islam is favored by industry, which sees therein a means of pacification, and to an even greater extent, a factor which can regulate workshop operation (more regular hours for prayer in an appropriate place, avoidance of labor accidents, unexpected interruptions or the ridicule of non-Muslims, and the presumption that "those mosque guys are pretty straight"). The unions, sometimes after internal discussion, have for their part been willing to take religious demands (prayer halls, slowdown during Ramadan) into account, in the name of respect for freedom of thought.

2. Are there political conflicts?

After looking into the nature of these conflicts (are they different from those in which French citizens are in the majority or for which they are essentially the inspiration, in the conditions of their emergence, methods of development or settlement?), one can examine the strategies and their methods of incorporation in a political dynamic.

a) The strategies seem to be of rather modest breadth and to be the product of a kind of consensus on a freeze involving management, unions and immigrants, so that matters will remain the same, thus making of conflict a conservative element in the development of industrial innovation (one sees little contemplation of working conditions, the qualitative and nonmonetary aspects, or even conflicts linked with the employment problem or changes in the automobile industry in connection with the immigrant conflicts).

Pragmatism dominates, both on the management and union sides, in the method of handling these conflicts, but there is always reference to the preceding conflicts in the way they are settled. The feeling that one "proceeds blow by blow in these conflicts," as a function of local realities, and that a conflict "is born, lives and dies" such that it is therefore necessary to avoid its birth, and then to let it live without letting it go bad, dominates.

The local nature of conflicts. For several years, major collective mobilizations have been followed by minor conflicts, corresponding to greater tactical efficiency, although the expressive capacity of conflicts has yielded to their instrumental dimensions (all that is needed to halt an assembly line is one work bench, a handful of men) and to the desire of the cadres to avoid the "oil spill" phenomenon ("the more often things can be settled locally, the better").

The strategy of little steps--"other means of payment." A consensus shared by management and the strikers on the satisfaction of immediate demands, directly expressed in terms of money, can be seen. The trade unions believe that "we know we cannot delay on the money. When it comes to negotiation, only the language of money counts. Then we stonewall." The threatened sectors try to obtain the highest pay possible, committed to mass trade unionism which seems from the outside to be oriented above all toward struggle. From the point of view of the cadres, an effort is made to "divide to conquer" by agreeing to "other means of payment" through an accumulation of bonuses which does not challenge the classification schedule. The truck bonus established by management during the clash with the painters in Department 74 in January of 1983 serves as an example. It is basically a question of having exchange currency at the end of negotiations (recourse to law: court orders for affidavits by process servers can be used as a blackmail factor, serving this purpose), within a context in which the maneuvering room is limited and the rules of the game are known in advance.

b) The decisive turning point seems to have been around 1975, rather than 1968 (the year of heavy recruiting and transition to the 2 x 8), for 1985 [sic] marks the end of the rapid turnover in immigrant workers (after the suspension of the migratory flow which began in 1974), the freezing of these workers in the same jobs, the increase in this population until 1977 in the automotive industry (for as of this date, the crisis had not as yet touched this sector), greater attention on the part of the trade union movement to the specific problems of immigrants, and finally an increase in awareness among these workers that their settlement in France would be permanent. The year 1981 marked the beginning of an explosion of conflicts which went beyond the business context and brought a rather calm period on the social level (1975-

1980) to an end. These conflicts, which were political, appeared as such right away because of their scope, in connection with the changes they represented in the immigrants' forms of political expression (the enterprises are among the few places they can legitimately express themselves), their inclusion as a political trump in the French political debate (the noisy penetration of integrist Islam in the conflicts in the automotive industry aroused keen concern in the public, which envisioned a conspiracy plotted abroad), as well as the questions these conflicts raised as to the status of the immigrants (including the fact that they are practicing Muslims and of a relatively older age) in French society.[12]

Thus the political nature of the conflicts involving the Muslim immigrants in industry seem to be of a nature other than that which was very widely presented to the public. It is hardly from the integrist approach (very limited in its influence, it appears, in immigrant circles, in particular in Billancourt) that Islam has arrived on the political scene. Nor is it during the conflicts that it became political, because Islam in the enterprises stands aside from conflict. It is, on the contrary and paradoxically, in its daily, peaceful dimension, unrelated to conflict, that it makes itself felt in the workshops and raises the issue right there as to the role of the immigrants in society and in the French and secular nation state.

At Renault in Billancourt, Islam is not a demand factor "leading to conflict" (which does not however mean that it cannot be used as a mobilizing factor). It serves more nearly as a regulatory element, respectful of the law of the owners and accepted as such by them. But one should not envision here a new version of encouragement by the owners of religious practice like that in the 19th century, for here management (like the trade unions) does not have total control of the religious factor. Islam in the enterprises is one of the paths for the advance of the immigrants toward politics "at the bottom," to the extent that it imposes an acceptance of the political space of the immigrants in France on the French political space.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Abdelmalek Salad, "State, Nation and Immigration--The National Order Put to the Test of Immigration," PEUPLES MEDITERRANEENS, No 27-28, April-September 1984, pp 187-205.

2. See SANS FRONTIERE, "Muslims in France--The Quiet Force," No 84, March 1984, p 5.

3. See Jean-Francois Bayart, "Homage to the Queen--Popular Methods of Political Action in Authoritarian Situations," ESPRIT, June 1984.

4. See Felice Dassetto, "Islam Transplanted," EPO, 200 pp, Albert Bastenier, 1984.

5. Immigrants account for about 17 percent of the administration's personnel. As of 31 December 1983, the Renault Administration employed 17,152 individuals of foreign nationality, the largest numbers being Moroccans (5,847), Algerians (1,619), Tunisians (839), Spaniards (838),

Italians (576), and Yugoslavs (497). The foreign employees work above all in the establishments in Billancourt and Flins (about 7,000 in each), are older, on the average, than the French employees (Algerians and Spaniards, 43; Moroccans and Tunisians, 42; Portuguese, over 40) and have work done on average about the same length of time as the French employees (13.7 years).

6. The DCPRS [Central Personnel and Social Relations Office for the Renault Factories].

7. In the last elections for representatives of the personnel, held on 17 January 1985, the CGT gained in seats but lost in votes: 77 percent of the votes, as compared to 65 percent in 1984, or 39 CGT personnel representatives as compared to six from the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of Labor] for Department 74.

8. See Floriane Benoit, "The Springtime of Dignity," Editions Sociales, Paris, 1982.

9. On the decline in the level of conflict in industry, see DOSSIERS STATISTIQUES DU TRAVAIL ET DE L'EMPLOI, Nos 3 and 4, June 1984, Studies and Statistics Department, Ministry of Social Affairs, and also the 1984 Report of the ILO [International Labor Organization].

10. See LE MONDE, 11 February 1983. On the subject of the conflicts at Renault, Pierre Mauroy stated on 27 January that the immigrant workers "are being educated by religious and political groups which adopt positions on the basis of criteria having little to do with the social realities in France."

11. Ibid. Jean Auroux said: "There is obviously a religious and integrist factor in the conflicts we have experienced, which gives them an aspect which is not exclusively trade unionist. That having been said, we are situated in a secular state, and we do indeed intend that things should remain this way. I would oppose the institutionalization of any religion whatsoever within the workplace. I am opposed to religion in business enterprise just as I am opposed to politics there."

12. See Catherine de Wenden, "The Immigrants, a Political Factor," LES TEMPS MODERNES, Special Issue on Immigration from the Maghreb, March/April/May 1984, and "Making Good Political Use of the Immigrants," PROJET, January 1985.

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COMMENTARY ON INDUSTRIAL STUDIES

Paris ESPRIT in French Jun 85 pp 232-236

[Article: "Islamic Time and Industrial Time"*]

[Text] Alain Lancelot: First of all, it clearly appears that the phenomenon we are discussing today did not begin in 1982-83, but should be placed in a longer historic sequence, an understanding of which might be very enlightening. Whether it is a question of housing, workers' centers or the enterprises, historical analysis represents an indispensable preliminary.

Secondly, the phenomenon we are studying today provides an opportunity to evaluate the interplay of the majorities and the minorities, as always in politics. In the view of Catherine de Wenden, the phenomenon does not have mainly to do with Muslim integrism. But other writers have, on the contrary, stressed the role the minorities (related to the Muslim Brothers), whose strategy cannot be ignored, may play here or there. It would be well to keep in mind both of these aspects of the problem, each of which contains its truth.

My last comment has to do with cultural cross-breeding. The Islam of the immigrants falls within a very distinctive cultural environment. It comes up against the workers culture, the industrial culture and the French culture. And even when the Islamic demand is very forceful, it will be necessary to deal with the surrounding culture, to find a certain point of balance between the assertion or safeguarding of an identity and mixture with a very limiting foreign culture. We have very clearly seen this in discussing the attitudes toward work, industrial time and the consecration of labor. This cross-breeding cannot fail to have repercussions on the political attitudes of the immigrants in France, and doubtless in their countries of origin.

Jacqueline Costa-Lascoux: The data which are beginning to be gathered on Islam in industry, the Islam of the "basement mosques," requires contemplation from various viewpoints. Religion in the workshops and the HLM (low-cost housing) units, with the diversity of its cultural and political aspects, is a far cry from the Islam of the distinguished Islamologists, and assuredly more

* These are oral statements made subsequent to the preceding three articles.

complex than militant Islam. When one observes what is happening in the automobile industry, a basic question comes to the fore: Is Islam in the labor sector intrinsically a factor in mobilization, or is it rather a form of expression, a different language with which to support the demands which bear a singular resemblance to those of the other workers?

There is no approach possible to this first level without questioning the meaning of the emergence of the religious aspect in the business world. Research has provided the factors for interpretation, which the society in the residential sector, the trade unions and the owners groups have not in all cases wanted to consider. For example, Islam is represented as the reconquest of autonomy and dignity by certain immigrant communities. It cannot be conceived without considering the wealth of community practices wherein the cultural and theological aspects are cultural vehicles and vectors of identity. Islam, because of its symbolic and holy nature, legitimizes immigration for work purposes, which is regarded as a jihad. A return to the law, to values one dares assert and affirm, so that the residential society will recognize them as such, is occurring. Through Islam, exile and migration for work purposes are legitimized and lead to demands. But is it solely the desire for a certain dignity and opportunity for community practice, or is it, going beyond that, a religious movement with a renewal of spiritual and theological life to the point of creating separate institutions? Would the trade unions and political parties then find themselves overwhelmed by a religious movement which would not end with political and vocational, indeed corporatist, discourse?

This second level of analysis leads to a third question, concerning the use of religious demands. Is Islam a means of eliminating the disturbances within the enterprises and allowing new leaders to emerge? A very interesting phenomenon has been described, having to do with the designation of imams, with the agreement of certain trade unions, and their role as intermediaries, intercessors and spokesmen. But where does the role of partner or trade union militant begin? Will the use of religious demands extend as far as integration in the production order, maintaining the division of industrial time and the industrial hierarchies? Let us recall the statement by Jacques Barou: "Islamic time adapts to production time." Beyond the negotiations with the trade union leaders to obtain support for certain strikes, there is a certain respect for industrial organization which Islam facilitates by adapting to the schedules and hierarchies of business. An important factor in the "recovery" of workers demands by Islam is the use of the value assigned labor, the first duty of the Muslim. Thus through religious demands, "model" workers are developed, who respect assembly line rhythms because "work is sacred."

Does Islam fit within the workers' memory as it has developed in the industrialized countries of Europe? Some see therein, on the contrary, a kind of "betrayal" appearing as negotiation with the owners, what has been termed the "purchasing of Islam." Or is Islam becoming another partner, in another workers' history, which would explain the paradoxical attitude of the trade unions, the CGT [General Confed-ration of Labor] in particular, which have a tradition of long struggle against the power of the church, but which have now

established a "mosque collective"? The tendency toward the "Islamic bid" to sponsor leaders can only surprise and sometimes create conflict, because there has even been talk of "Islamic revisionism."

At this level of questioning the use of Islam, involving double or triple languages, which moreover was also the case in the European workers movement, it is necessary to clarify the juxtaposition of the debates. Is it a question of situational tactics or rather the meeting of a new interpenetration by Islam and a certain type of workers' demands?

A fourth level of analysis emerges, involving the development of Islam in business. Without a doubt we are seeing a development in Islam, correlated with an already visible mistrust by the workers, of the trade unions, which are perhaps somewhat overemphasizing the role of negotiation with religion. Conversely, the practicing Muslims' fear of a perversion of Islam, through its politicization and "trade unionization," is visible. There may be a new integrism here outside the enterprises, which are regarded as an impure site. Will Islam gain a place in industry which the other religions have lost? Will business allow the emergence of a secular Islam, with its own leaders, which will reformulate certain dogmas as a function of the socioeconomic reality in the industrial world? It is remarkable that all of the factions in Islam are currently to be found in industry, and that it has become a kind of apprenticeship area for a new culture, the crucible in which new forms of community life, other kinds of solidarity and conflicts, are developing.

The range of possibilities is broad, but what then will the repercussions on Islam in the countries of origin be? Would there be there an extension and strengthening of the "umma islamyya," or subversion and schism in a complex become too vast and too heterogeneous? Conversely, won't an assertion of a cultural and religious identity give rise to rejection and opposition within the residential society? There is a redefinition both of the links with the countries of origin and those with the country of residence, in particular involving the non-Muslim workers in enterprises, who are daily witnessing practices increasingly taken up by the workers from the Maghreb. Evidence of irritation on the part of the supervisors or certain enterprise cadres is beginning to be seen. Forms of rejection or lack of understanding are likely to arise when this cultural and religious renewal becomes evident. On the one hand, divisions involving individuals or groups can be seen, while on the other, there is behavioral adaptation with a "manipulation of codes" which is entirely remarkable, from the point of view of a jurist. One can get out of bed an integrist, be a CGT militant at 10 am and a model worker at 11. But the historic dimension must not be overlooked. This ability to adapt to new forms of enterprise life (while at the same time seeking to maintain one's origins and to respect one's culture, or what one believes to be his culture) develops in individuals who, 25 or 30 years ago, came from rural environments in which superstition sometimes prevailed over revealed religion, or wherein one did not always know exactly how many prayers were required or what the liturgy meant.

Jean Leca: Would it not be desirable to envision a comparison with what we have classically known as the workers movement in a colonial situation? I am thinking above all of Algeria and Tunisia. There are in fact a certain number

of points in common. First of all a struggle of the modern classes in industry is involved. It is a struggle involving wages and working conditions being pursued by people who are not alike, and who do not belong to the same national collective.

In Algeria, the Muslim Algerian owners in modern businesses were a small minority in comparison to the Algerian workers. The class struggle developed between the French owners and Algerian workers. There were similar aspects in Tunisia. Another point of convergence: individuals who are not Muslims monopolize the political system. But along with this there is a series of differences, including that pertaining to territoriality and the historic difference, since things have changed considerably in nearly 50 years. Thus there would be a path to follow, involving a comparison of the trade union movements in a colonial situation and the activities of the workers in the enterprises in France at the present time.

Remy Leveau: Just one observation. The conflicts in the Maghreb developed above all in the major public services, since the trade unions in Morocco established their roots in the railroad system, as well as the municipal administrations and the postal service. This was a means of opposing the colonial state, of joining in the nationalist movement, and not opposition to the European owners. It appears that there were fewer strikes and less trade union action in the textile industry, a rather important private sector, than in the phosphate industry and the major public services.

Abdelkader Zghal: Throughout I am struck by the prayer demands in industry. In the whole history of the trade union movement in the Maghreb, there was no such demand. There have been demands for mosques in the universities, but this is still rare in enterprises.

Felice Dassetto: I am wondering first of all if Islam in business cannot be understood as a phase in the migratory process of the Muslim populations, the phase of stabilization and settlement, whether it be in France, Belgium or other countries of Europe. This means two things: it requires negotiation on the part of the institutions (businesses, trade unions) which manage people, and this involves a redefinition of their presence on the part of the populations themselves. I believe that this effort to reinterpret labor in terms of Islam is the sign of a settlement in the worker's status, whereas up to the present the immigrant worker was in transition to this situation. Now he identifies with this status and reinterprets it in terms of his own values, just as the rural Christian populations of Italy developed a discourse and a Christian interpretation of labor at a certain time, because it was necessary to adapt to this reality.

Second comment: From the point of view of Islam in business, isn't what we are noting a new development of importance to Islam, in other words the fact that it must henceforth see to its articulation with the class society? I am not speaking of the theological Islam, which is perhaps lagging, but of the practical Islam which is establishing relations today with the class societies, no longer segmentary, and redefining itself on the basis of its role in business.

To this can be added a more specific comment. In fact, this instrumental use of religion is nothing new. The Ministry of Employment and Labor in Belgium made its first budget allocation for cultural agents in 1953. In that instance, it was a question of Catholic chaplains aimed to deal with Italian and Spanish immigrants.

Toma Subhi: The Muslim members of the CGT would be greatly pleased if the Muslim workers were to develop a labor movement of their own. They say: "We are in the CGT for lack of an alternative. If there were a trade union to represent the specifically Islamic issues, it would be a good thing."

Francoise Gaspard: I would like first of all to say a word about the way in which the government has spoken about the recent conflicts. The surprising statement by Pierre Mauroy at the time of the conflict in Poissy on the handling of the strike will be remembered. I wondered about the origin of this statement, and I even met with the secretary of state and the prime minister to ask them how they had been able to summarize a conflict which had a whole different dimension in this way. It seems that this both has to do with the majority tradition of the French socialist movement, which is profoundly secular, and is part of a radical rejection of the religious phenomenon, particularly within business, which is the primary site of the class struggle, and not a space in which one can wage battles concerning religious matters. Moreover, I have the feeling that the trade unions experienced such panic during this strike that they went to complain to the ministries that they could no longer control a strike being manipulated by the integrists, and this resulted in the atmosphere of paranoia which followed and the regrettable statements, which nonetheless have gone down in the history of the French socialist and workers movement.

But I would like to ask a more specific question about this practice of Islam in business, and the specificity which brings Islam into the workers conflicts. Don't you think that this specificity in the immigrant movement in the businesses in which Islam is involved today is linked with the fact that these immigrants are not only that, not only foreigners, but also immigrants from the land, members of the first generation to penetrate the industrial world? By the same token, haven't the demands of a religious nature taken on this breadth because industry is the primary place where the workers are incorporated, because it is there that they are integrated, being less so in the urban environment? After all, can one not see a correlation between the emergence of demands regarding religious practices within the enterprises, between the demand for mosques there, and the shift of the immigrants from their own centers to the HLM complexes? In the immigrant center there was a community and an opportunity to find a place for prayer through easily resolved negotiations. On the other hand, as soon as the immigrant workers moved into the urban environment thanks to the reintegration of families, it was more difficult to provide space and areas for prayer. Paul Picard in Nanter-la-Jolie, and I myself in Dreux, have experienced difficulties in finding space. I encountered tremendous difficulties when financing was lacking for the building of a mosque, for buying land.

One last question. Isn't the specific nature of the immigrant workers' movement in business linked with the fact that these workers represent the

first industrialized generation? Although they are beginning to buy property, they are "established" in few instances. They have nothing to lose and they participate in conflicts which in some respects resemble those of the workers movement at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th.*

Paul Picard: On that I also think that the radicalization seen in industry derives from a kind of frustration regarding integration and practice in daily life. If the immigrants' centers favored it, the HLM and other large complexes are not the proper place for going back to and engaging in religious practice. On the contrary, the individual is given value in business, while in the HLM or other residential complexes, fingers are pointed at him. In the enterprise, the immigrant can express himself as a full individual.

Jacques Barou: On this matter of the link you seem to see between the difficulties involved in religious practice in the housing sector and the search for such opportunities in business, I would answer that I see no relation. There are a certain number of requests in the HLM for the use of certain collective residential premises for religious purposes. Parallel with the establishment of prayer halls in the factories, we have seen the establishment of a number of mosques in the towns, often in the back rooms of shops owned by Muslims, and sometimes in new buildings. The demand for religious space in enterprises is not a result of the fact that people cannot find proper places for prayer in daily life. On the contrary, they make an effort to see that religious premises are established near their homes for themselves, along with Koranic schools for their children. On the other hand, many workers in the automobile industry still live in immigrant centers and can make use of the religious premises provided there. As to those who have brought their families to France, it often happens that they continue to visit the prayer halls in the centers where they formerly lived. I believe that the demands pertaining to religious practices in the enterprises should be included within the complex of demands characteristic of the situation of the immigrant workers in the automobile industry.

Industry has been described as a sector favoring the integration of immigrants. Is this so certain? The immigrants are in the majority working in assembly-line jobs which are doomed to disappear in the end with the increasing introduction of robots. Thus they are more in the process of being excluded than integrated. And what if these "religious" demands reflect an awareness of this exclusion, and are becoming the ideological expression of this marginal fringe of the workers class represented by the immigrants in the automobile industry? The immigrants have no illusions about this, and they know that while the trade unions want to defend all of the workers without exception, this does not mean that they will oppose the modernization of enterprises requiring the elimination of assembly-line jobs.

Francoise Lazgard: In Renault, we observed a very specific chronology. The establishment of the first prayer hall in a center was followed by the establishment of prayer halls in Poissy and Flins, and then a request was made

* Text not reread by Francoise Lazgard (editor's note).

to the city or to the BLM office for the establishment of a soeque. It was what had been obtained in the enterprise which gave legitimacy to this request to the town, one which had never been formulated previously.

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